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Witada Anukoonwattaka  
 
Asian international production networks (IPNs) started by the changes of 
MNCs’ strategies on international fragmentation of production in responding to rapid 
globalization, technology changes, and increasingly open trade and investment 
environments in Asian countries in the 1980s.
1 The phenomenon was fuelled in the 
1990s by the opening of China which has emerged as a global centre for 
manufacturing assembly. Currently, the growing IPNs have a significant impact on 
merchandise trade patterns and regional integration among Asian economies. The 
phenomenon has led to dramatic expansion in trade in parts and components with a 
notable development in exports by Asia-Pacific. The share of the Asia-Pacific region 
in total world exports of parts and components has been increasing since the 1990s, 
especially during the past 10 years (figure 1) 
 
Figure 1.  Exports of parts and components by the Asia-Pacific region  
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Source: UNCOMTRADE data downloaded from WITS database. 
                                                            
 
1 International fragmentation of production generally refers to the spreading of production stages across 
countries. In public debates, the terms “international product fragmentation”, “offshoring” and “vertical 
specialization” have been used interchangeably. Slicing up the value chain allows production cost 
savings through cross-country differences in factor prices, resources, market sizes, infrastructures and 
institutional factors. The geographic dispersion of the value chain creates international production 
networks (IPNs) between countries where different stages of the production are located. IPNs can be 
organized within a single firm (vertically integrated) or can involve different companies (outsourcing). 
In both cases, the fragmentation of production requires a sophisticated organization, and involves trade 
in parts and components and/or trade in tasks.  
2 Data on parts and components is based on the 5-digit SITC Revision 3, and follows the descriptions 
of parts and components given by Athukorala (2010). The list of parts and components is provided in 




 During this process, China emerged as a pivotal assembling centre for a wide 
range of manufactured products by importing parts and components from other East 
and South-East Asian countries such as the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. It appears that the phenomenon has provided 
tremendous trade and investment opportunities for developing Asian economies 
participating in IPNs. The fact that countries in East and South-East Asia have 
benefited from the expanding IPNs has been widely documented, especially in terms 
of gaining access to world market, employment creation, and technology transfer.
3 
Available evidence also indicates that there would be a sizable benefit for late-comer 
countries if and when they were to increase their presence in existing IPNs of Asian 
manufacturing industries. 
 
While the IPN phenomenon has accelerated trade and investment linkages 
between countries in East and South-East Asia, the remainder of the region has not 
matched those countries in this process. Chapter II discusses the fact that India, the 
second-most populous economy in the world, remains a tiny participant in the global 
production networks of manufacturing industries. Although India’s emergence as a 
world-class IT-services hub has proved that a developing country can achieve high 
economic growth without following the IPN-driven development strategy, concerns 
are mounting over the low-employment generation of India’s growth model. Heavy 
reliance on relatively skill-intensive service sectors created somewhat limited 
prospects for employment growth in India during the past two decades. An average of 
13 million people is expected to enter into India’s labour force annually for the next 
four decades, most of whom will be unskilled workers.
4 To absorb such a massive 
expansion of the workforce, India will need to develop more manufacturing sectors 
that are labour-intensive.  
 
However, recent trends indicate that the factors shaping the manufacturing 
landscape of IPNs in Asia are changing. Overall, China is facing growing competition 
from other low-wage countries. The costs of assembly activities in China have been 
increasing rapidly during recent years, especially in the highly-concentrated 
manufacturing centres in the coastal regions. According to the United States Bureau 
of Labour Statistics, the estimated hourly compensation in the Chinese manufacturing 
sectors more than doubled from US$ 0.62 per hour in 2003 to US$ 1.36 per hour in 
2008 (figure 2). In addition, investment incentives for the majority of new 
manufacturing activities near the coast have been eliminated or dramatically reduced 
due to the efforts of the Government of China to encourage manufacturing activities 
                                                            
 
3 See, for example, Borrus, Ernst and Haggard, 2000; Ernst, 1997; and Gauiler, Lemoine and Ünal-
Kesenci, 2004. 
4 See, for example, Acharya, 2006; Kochhar and others, 2006; and Mehta, 2005.  
 
3
to locate in other parts of the country (Timberlake, Schneider, and Terry, 2009). Will 
these dynamics create an opportunity for a low-income country to fill the labour-
intensive activity gaps in Asian IPNs? What are the challenges and prospects for a 
country that has been lagging behind in this process? 
 















United States dollars per hour
Source: United States Bureau of Labour Statistics, 2011. 
 
The objective of this study is to clarify these issues by using India’s 
performance in the Asian IPNs as a case study for other countries that are trailing 
behind in this area. The study seeks to identify the reasons why India has performed 
below its potential in this new form of international division of labour, even though 
that country possess several supportive factors including: (a) the sheer size of the 
economy and population; (b) a large pool of engineers; (c) relatively sound 
intellectual property protection; and (d) an increasingly open trade and investment 
climate resulting from progressive economic reforms.
5 In addition, continuing efforts 
towards the “Look East Policy” (LEP) have been made by forming preferential trade 
agreements (PTAs) with East and South-East Asian countries, including Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand as well as the push for the 
India-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (IAFTA). 
 
It has been argued that the emphasis on PTAs with the important players in 
Asian IPNs may provide a stepping stone for India to increase its integration into the 
                                                            
 
5 Based on indicators from various institutions and various years (e.g., World Bank, 2011; and A.T. 




Asian IPN process. However, the effectiveness of using PTAs to increase India’s 
integration with Asian IPNs will depend on the features of each PTA as well as 
India’s ability to engage in the division of labour in the production networks. 
Therefore, this study also considers PTA features that are necessary for the 
development of IPNs. 
 
The reason for focusing on India is not only because that country is a gigantic 
emerging economy that is expected to become another growth centre of the region 
within the next two decades; more importantly, it is because such a study holds 
important policy messages for other low-income countries that have been missing out 
on the opportunities offered by the IPN phenomenon. If integration of the Indian 
economy into Asian IPNs occurs, it may have trade opportunity implications for 
peripheral countries in South Asia through their trade with India.
6 In a policy context, 
India’s growth and trade patterns are an illustration of adverse impacts generated by 
inward-looking policies as well as tight controls on foreign and domestic investment. 
The efforts of India to sign a number of PTAs with players in Asian IPNs can provide 
a very useful case study for countries seeking to use PTAs as a vehicle for integrating 
their production and trade with production networks in the region.  
 
Chapter I of this study presents a brief review of the appearance and expansion 
of the Asian IPN phenomenon, followed by a literature survey that explores key 
drivers of this phenomenon from theoretical perspectives. Theories point to important 
conditions that countries must meet in order to be successfully integrated into IPNs. 
These conditions highlight policy implications for creating trade and investment 
climates that are favourable to IPN development. 
 
Chapter II and III undertake a comparative analysis between China and India, 
with a view to understanding the divergence in the performances of the two countries. 
Chapter II begins with a comparative overview of the differences in the economic 
structures of the two countries, followed by a detailed examination of the roles of the 
two countries in the current landscape of Asian IPNs. Due to the fact that the IPN 
phenomenon has been driven by decisions of multinational corporations (MNCs) 
regarding operations and locations of their production systems, chapter III provides an 
insightful background aimed at understanding the issues involved. It examines the 
operational characteristics of Japanese MNC affiliates in comparison to United States-




6 See, for example, United Nations (2011) exploring prospects of Sri Lanka’s integration into the  




Chapters IV and V analyse more closely the constraints and challenges facing 
the integration of India into the Asian IPNs in the future. Chapter IV includes case 
studies of the automotive components and electronics sectors in order to illustrate the 
potentially successful example of India emerging as an important regional player in 
Asian IPNs.  The policy challenges and key recommendations for India to integrate 
into Asian IPNs are analysed. Chapter V specifically emphasizes India’s recent 
initiatives towards entering into PTAs with East and South-East Asian countries. The 
chapter critically analyses the depth of PTAs between India and important players in 
IPNs in order to decide whether they contain the necessary coverage and institutional 
depth to provide a vehicle for the integration of India into the value chain of Asian 
IPNs.  
 
Chapter VI synthesizes the findings and key messages emerging from this study 
and presents policy recommendations with regard to fostering IPN participation by 
countries that are still lagging behind. The recommendations hold important 
implications for India and other developing Asian countries that have been missed out 
in the growing phenomenon of IPNs, given their similarity in terms of the constraints 
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Driving forces of Asian international production networks: 
 A brief history and theoretical perspectives 
 
Witada Anukoonwattaka  
 
During the past three decades, the process of global production sharing has 
created a new form of division of labour between Asian economies, especially in East 
and Southeast Asia. The rapid growth of production networks has dramatically 
transformed patterns of production and international trade in the region, with a notable 
expansion of intra-regional trade “through multiple border crossings of parts and 
components” (figure 3).  
 










   Source: Baldwin, 2010. 
 
This chapter provides a brief review of the development process of the IPN 
phenomenon in Asia, followed by a literature survey, with the objective of providing 
an analytical framework for discussing the necessary conditions for the successful 
integration of a country into IPNs. It conveys important policy implications for setting 





1. Brief overview of the development of Asian IPNs 
 
International product fragmentation has been an important feature of the 
international division of labour since about the mid-1960s (Athukorala, 2008). 
Electronics MNCs based in the United States started the process in response to 
increasing pressure created by domestic real-wage increases and rising import 
competition from low-cost sources. The Government of the United States facilitated 
the process by introducing an outward processing tariff scheme under which 
companies were allowed to export material for processing overseas and to re-import 
the finished products, paying tariffs only on the value-added abroad (not the exported 
intermediates).  
 
The growth of IPNs led to international division of labour between countries 
along the value chain, in which the term “vertical specialization” is used 
interchangeably to describe the same phenomenon as documented by Hummels, Ishii 
and Yi (2001). Consequently, intra-industry trade in parts and components has been 
growing rapidly between countries participating in IPNs as intermediate inputs are 
imported and used in goods that are subsequently exported (so called outward 
processing trade).  
 
Using the Asian input-output table maintained by Japan’s JETRO, Baldwin 
(2008) concludes that international production sharing in Asia has developed from a 
simple North-South outward processing trade to a much broader phenomenon, for 
which the term “Factory Asia” is widely used. The process of linking Asia to global 
supply chains began in the 1960s in the electronics industry with the arrival of two 
United States companies, National Semiconductors and Texas Instruments, which set 
up plants in Singapore to assemble semiconductor devices (Athukorala, 2008 and Goh, 
1993). From around the late 1970s, MNCs with production facilities in Singapore 
began to relocate some low-end assembly activities to neighbouring countries 
(particularly Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand). Many MNCs that were 
newcomers to the region also set up production bases in those countries. Singapore 
has since become a regional centre for component design and fabrication as well as 
providing headquarter services for production units located in neighbouring countries.  
 
Although the United States electronics MNCs started their IPNs in Asia in the 
1960s, the vertical specialization form of trade was more important in North-North 
trade among European and North American nations up until the early to mid-1980s 
(Amador and Cabral, 2008). Initially, the United States MNCs explored opportunities 
for North-South offshoring in neighbouring countries in Latin America, but the 
unfavourable investment climate in those countries – macroeconomic instability, 
political tensions, trade union upheavals and uncertainty – led American producers to 
switch to sub-suppliers located in Asia (Feenstra, 1998; Grunwald and Flamm, 1985;  
 
9
and Helleiner, 1973). Consequently, a rapid increase in North-South intra-industry 
trade occurred, especially in Asia, after the mid-1980s.  
 
By the 2000s, rapid development of IPNs led to countries in East and South-East 
Asia becoming important players in the global supply chain system. Amador and Cabral 
(2008) found that the group of first-tier newly industrialized economies (Republic of 
Korea, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China and Hong Kong, China) accounted for 24.5 
per cent of global vertical intra-industry trade between 2001 and 2005. The most 
impressive increase took place in China; while China’s share of global vertical intra-
industry trade between 1986 and 1990 was 2 per cent on average, this share increased to 
an average of 15 per cent between 2001 and 2005. 
 
Corresponding to the growth of IPNs in the region, South-South trade in parts 
and components became more significant. In the mid-1980s, developing nations in 
East and South-East Asia had little trade among themselves.
7 They either supplied 
their own intermediates or imported intermediates from technologically advanced 
nations, mostly Japan, the United States and members of the European Union. In the 
1990s, the importance of local sourcing declined, while imports of intermediates from 
Japan, the United States and Asia’s newly industrialized economies (NIEs) increased. 
More recently, the emergence of China as the “global assembly centre” has 
strengthened the linkages between countries in IPNs, as the success of China’s 
manufacturing exports appear to rely significantly on parts and component imported 
from other countries in the region particularly those in East and South-East Asia.
 8 
 
The evolution of Asian IPNs during the past two decades appears to 
correspond to dynamic decisions of MNCs in responding to changes in trade and 
business environments. Prior to the 1990s, operations of MNCs could be divided into 
two categories: “vertical” and “horizontal” FDI (Markusen, 1995). Vertical FDI 
corresponds to international fragmentation of production on a factor-cost saving basis 
(such as labour), while horizontal FDI occurs when MNCs follow a “build-where-
you-sell” strategy for seeking markets. In the context of Asia, vertical FDI by the 
United States electronics MNCs in the 1970s was documented as the beginning of 
IPNs in Asia. Meanwhile, investment by Japanese MNCs in the South-East Asian 
automotive sector during the same period is an example of horizontal FDI responding 
to high tariff protection in the host countries.  
 
Since the late 1990s, MNC operations in Asia have progressively adopted an 
international product fragmentation strategy; as a result, the division between the two 
types of investment has become unclear. Both horizontal and vertical operations of 
                                                            
 
7 Parts and components are intermediate products. The list of parts and components is given in Appendex I. 
8 This is discussed in more detail in chapter II.   
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MNCs are increasingly able to coexist as declining tariffs and transportation costs 
allow for more flexibility in sourcing components from various countries. For 
example, Japanese automobile assemblers are taking advantage of regional trade 
liberalization programmes to consolidate duplicated production facilities in ASEAN 
countries and facilitate the division of labour within the region, in order to achieve a 
regional scale of production (figure 4).
9  In addition, during the past two decades, 
many MNCs have significantly upgraded technical activities of their regional 
production networks in ASEAN, and assigned global production responsibilities to 
affiliates located in Singapore and, more recently, to those located in Malaysia and 
Thailand (Athukorala, 2008, Borrus, Ernst and Haggard, 2000; and McKendrick, 
Doner and Haggard, 2000). Overall, the ASEAN experience appears to support the 
view that MNC affiliates have a tendency to become increasingly embedded in host 
countries the longer they are present there (Rangan and Lawrence, 1999; and 
Athukorala and Yamashita, 2006). 
 







































































































9 For details see, for example, Legewie, 1999a and 1999b, and Hiratsuka, 2010.  
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2.   Theoretical perspectives of international production network  
 
This section reviews the literature that is relevant to this area of research with 
the objective of identifying the key determinants in the successful integration of a 
country into IPNs. This will be built into an analytical framework for providing 
guidelines for policy reform aimed at enhancing IPN-friendly trade and business 
environments. 
 
IPNs are driven by firm-level decisions regarding the organization and 
locations of their production system. When factor-cost savings are large relative to the 
costs of fragmenting business activities across countries, a multinational firm will 
decide whether or not to fragment the production into stages as well as where to locate 
those fragmented units. The firm will optimize these decisions, given a set of 
exogenous factors. 
 
Two elements of the relevant literature are of particular relevance: (a) 
offshoring literature that models the process of international fragmentation of 
production; and (b) new economic geography (NEG) literature that discusses how 
industrial locations are shaped in general equilibrium.
10 The focus of the offshoring 
literature is on factors driving a firm to split its production process into stages and 
locate them between countries, while the focus of the NEG literature is on discussing 
simultaneously the centripetal forces that cause economic activities to cluster together 
in particular locations and the centrifugal forces that push it apart. In the context of 
Asian IPNs, these two elements of literature coexist. The offshoring literature helps us 
to understand important factors driving rapid growth of IPNs in Asia. Meanwhile, the 
NEG literature completes the picture by helping to clarify the reasons for the 
concentration of a particular industry in a certain country (for example, why assembly 
activities are concentrating in China whereas manufacturing parts and components are 
clustering in South-East Asia). 
 
Offshoring literature contains comparative-advantage elements of international 
trade theory. This is a large area of research that could be divided into groups. One is 
the literature on international fragmentation of production, such as Jones (2000), 
Jones and Kierzkowski (2001), and Feenstra and Hanson (1996a and 1996b). The 
literature directly discusses the vertical specialization in the international supply chain. 
A general conclusion is that the division of labour between countries in an IPN is 
                                                            
 
10 Another branch of literature looks at a firm’s organization issues arising from the fact that production 
networks can be organized within the boundary of a single firm or take place between different firms.  
However, such organization decisions of MNCs are not a focus of this study. Literature in this area 
looks at microeconomic decisions of MNCs regarding organizations governing IPNs, i.e., the literature 
on outsourcing versus vertical integration. Antràs and Rossi-Hansberg (2009) provide a comprehensive 
review of this intersection of organizational economics and international trade.   
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determined by factor intensity of production stages and differences in factor prices 
between countries. An implication of this proposition is that relative abundance of 
labour was an important factor driving China to become a major assembly centre in 
the past decade.  
 
A comparative advantage element is that studies of international fragmentation 
of production share a common feature with a branch of the FDI literature that models 
vertical investment of MNCs. In general, vertical FDI models assume that activities of 
a multinational firm differ in factor intensities, while host countries differ in factor 
proportions. Early general equilibrium trade models of vertical firms include Helpman 
(1984) and Helpman and Krugman (1985). Recently, attempts to integrate vertical and 
horizontal FDI models have led to a modern view of multinational firms. In recent 
models, parent firms are exporters of services that are produced using knowledge-
based assets to foreign subsidiaries (Markusen, 1995, 1998, 2002 and 2005). These 
models are referred to as “knowledge-capital” models. They assume that firm-specific 
knowledge assets are geographically mobile and are a joint input to multiple 
production facilities. An important implication of these FDI models is that reducing 
trade barriers will enable location advantages to be more easily realized and will allow 
MNCs more greater flexibility in sourcing components across countries. 
Consequently, trade liberalization is expected to increase intra-firm trade within the 
production network of MNCs. 
 
A recent attempt to discuss the growing phenomenon of trade in tasks and 
components in the literature led to development of modelling the production process 
as combining a continuum of components or tasks (Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud, 2010; 
Deardorff, 2001; Dixit and Grossman, 1982; Feenstra and Hanson 1996a; Grossman 
and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008; and Yi, 2003). The literature discusses trade in tasks or 
components between that stand at different levels of development, i.e., countries that 
differ in factor endowments or disparate technological capabilities. Motivated by the 
fact that trade in intermediate goods largely take places between advanced industrial 
countries, more recent literature in this area started to  discuss trade in tasks between 
countries with similar characteristics by sharing the “new trade theory” features of 
(external) economies-of-scale at the task level (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 
forthcoming). 
 
The NEG literature covers several levels of agglomeration. At one extreme, 
the literature discusses a core-periphery structure of production where factor mobility 
in some areas results in a great deal of economic activity while in other areas there is 
almost no such activity.
 11 Another form of agglomeration is industrial concentration, 
                                                            
 
11 An example of this type of agglomeration is the fear about crowding-out effects resulting from the 
rise of China.   
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where different sectors cluster in different countries This form of agglomeration is 
particularly related to internationalization and trade in IPNs. Of the large number of 
studies that deal with this area, Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) provided a 
comprehensive framework for the agglomeration mechanisms. As shown by Venables 
(1996) and Krugman and Venables (1995), there are backward and forward linkages 
that tend to draw the upstream and downstream producers of an industry to 
concentrate in a single location.  
 
The forward linkages, which depend on market size issues, form an important 
force for agglomeration of firms in a country with a relatively large domestic market. 
Firms want to locate where they will have good access to a large demand, thus 
enabling them to reduce trade costs. When a large firm or many firms doing so, their 
suppliers then move to nearby areas in order to serve their customers and minimize 
trade costs. As a result of this circular mechanism of forward linkages, agglomeration 
may begin. 
 
The second driver of industry agglomeration is through the backward 
linkages.
12 Firms buy inputs such as raw materials, intermediate goods, machinery 
and equipment as well as services (e.g., financial and logistic services) from service 
providers. The cost linkages work by encouraging firms to locate near their suppliers 
to save transport costs and trade-related costs. When many firms move to a low-cost 
location for intermediates, the cost of intermediates in that location reduce even 
further because suppliers of intermediates can enjoy economies–of-scale. As final 
products of some firms are also intermediates for other firms, an additional benefit for 
these upper-stream producers comes from increases in demand for their final goods. 
 
Key messages from the NEG literature are that: 
(a) The input-output linkages form a key driving force for industries to choose 
particular regions within which to become concentrated; 
(b) Economies-of-scale, transportation costs, and mobility of factors can cause 
spatial structure of industrial sectors to emerge and changes; 
(c) The landscape of industrial concentration may change in response to trade 
cost reductions in a non-linear manner. Trade cost reductions from high to 
intermediate levels will lead to a concentration of manufacturing activities 
in a country already having many firms located there because firms want 
to be located near their major markets to save trade costs while reductions 
in trade costs allow them to export their goods to peripheral markets. If 
trade costs are reduced further to a very low level, production cost savings 
start to dominate trade-cost saving. Consequently, firms will disperse their 
                                                            
 
12 See, for example, Grossman and Helpman, 2002, 2003 and 2005.  
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manufacturing activities out of the core location to peripheral countries in 
order to exploit benefits arising from differences in factor prices and other 
advantages in those latter countries. 
 
3. Key factors driving integration of a country into IPNs 
 
On the basis of the literature reviewed above, this section summarizes 
important factors for countries to successfully integrate into the IPNs, which are: 
 
(a) Factor-cost advantages 
 
Theory suggests that international fragmentation of production allows firms to 
reduce production costs as some intermediate inputs are cheaper to produce in some 
countries. Therefore, given that trade costs are relatively small, interactions between 
factor-intensity of fragmenting tasks and factor-price differences between potential 
host countries will determine the division of labour between countries participating in 
IPNs. The emergence of China as a major assembly centre during the past decade, and 
the division of labour in IPNs between countries in East and South-East Asia, appear 
to support this view. Empirically, MNCs tend to spread production stages over 
different countries due to production-cost savings. For example, Kimura (2006) 
reveals a fact about IPNs in East Asia that wage differential plays a crucial role for 
multinational firms when taking location decisions. Meanwhile, Athukorala (2008) 
indicates that significant differences in wages among the countries within the East and 
South-East Asian regions have provided the basis for rapid expansion of intraregional 
product-sharing systems, giving rise to increased cross-border trade in parts and 
components. 
 
China’s emergence as a major assembly centre in Asian IPNs appears to 
support this supposition. However an ongoing transition of industrialization in China 
that has led to rapid increases in real wages could change the location advantages of 
China. In this context, relative abundance of labour of an emerging economy such as 
India appears to be a supportive factor for participation by such a country in labour-




Certain stages of production that involve high fixed costs require scale 
economies from specialized providers (Abraham and Taylor, 1996). According to the 
new trade theory, a country will export goods for which it has a large home market, 
which is called “the home market effect”. Large domestic industries serve as a base 
for exports because the operation of increasing returns-to-scale makes manufactured 
products cheaper in a country that has a large domestic market. In addition, the NEG 
literature points out that for firms clustering in a single location positive externality  
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emerges from knowledge spillovers and backward- and forward-linkages, called “the 
agglomeration effect”. 
 
In the context of domestic market size, China appears to have the location 
advantage for scale-intensive activities such as automotive manufacturing due to its 
large and rapidly growing home market. The apparent consolidation of Japanese 
operations in the ASEAN automotive sector in order to use benefits of regional trade 
liberalization programmes to overcome the limitations on domestic market sizes of 
ASEAN countries also appears to be consistent with the literature. In the case of India, 
the country offers the advantage of a huge and fast-growing economy even though the 
level of per capita income is still relatively low. Therefore, the country appears to 
offer a supportive environment in this regard, especially in the medium to long term. 
 
(c)  Thickness of markets 
 
One implication of the NEG literature is that for an industry having a vertical 
production structure, the input-output relationships create forward and backward 
linkages between firms, and lead to industry concentration in a particular country or 
region. Such linkages rest on issues concerning thickness of markets, which implies 
ability to access to downstream customers and upstream suppliers. 
 
In this context, early establishment appears to be an important factor 
determining location decisions of firms. Based on experiences of ASEAN and China, 
Athukorala (2008) indicated that site selection decisions by MNCs operating in 
assembly activities were strongly influenced by the presence of other key market players 
in a given country or in neighboring countries. In this context, late establishment of 
manufacturing industries as well as poor development of supporting industries and 
supply-chain networks appears to put late entry into global production networks by 
countries such as India and other South Asian nations at a serious disadvantage.  
 
(d) Low  international trade costs 
 
International fragmentation of production requires intermediate inputs to be 
manufactured in one or more countries and then shipped to another destination for final 
assembly. In addition, operating international supply chain requires sophisticated 
management and the use of infrastructure services, such as telecoms, the Internet, air 
freight and trade-related finance, in order to coordinate the production process and 
flows between production units in different locations. Costs related to those operations 
are commonly termed as “international trade costs”. A broad definition of trade costs 
includes: policy barriers from tariffs; non-tariff barriers; transportation, communications  
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and information costs; exchange rate costs; legal, regulatory and enforcement costs, and 
local distribution costs (WTO, 2008).
13  
 
Trade in IPNs involves multiple cross-borders trading of a good-in-process 
during different stages of production. As international trade costs are incurred each 
time a good-in-process crosses a border, even a minor reduction in trade costs can 
result in the cost of a vertically-integrated good being reduced considerably below the 
initial trade cost reduction. 
 
An obvious precondition for the international unbundling production process 
is that such international trade costs must be low enough to enable firms to utilize 
location advantages of countries arising from factor-price differences and economies-
of-scale. A trade cost reduction may make it profitable for firms that previously 
concentrated all of their production stages in one country to move some stages of the 
production overseas. Firms that have already been internationally fragmenting their 
production are also likely to increase their flows of component trade when trade costs 
decline.  
 
Several factors can result in reductions in trade costs, including: eliminating 
trade and investment barriers; trade facilitation; deregulation; infrastructure 
improvements; technological advances in communications; transportation and 
logistics services; increased automation; and standardization of production 
technology.
14  Except for technology factors, all of these factors can be influenced by 
policy and its implementation. The next section considers policy implications for 
countries that have been missed out on taking advantage of the IPN phenomenon in 
order to create a more IPN-attracting environment. 
 
4. The way forward: Creation of IPN-attracting environments 
 
To benefit from the opportunities for trade and employment expansion through 
the international fragmentation of production in IPNs, policymakers need to create IPN-
attracting environments, which will require major reforms. The implications drawn 




13 Kimura and Ando (2005) termed the costs of coordinating production units over different locations 
as “service link costs”. Therefore, service link costs are a subcategory of trade cost in broad terms. 
14 The rapid development in automation of production technology has allowed an increasing number of 
tasks to be standardized. These tasks can easily be offshored. An implication is that the development of 
automation and specialized software that allows workers to follow a set of routine procedures has been 
a driving force in IPN development (for example, in the automotive industry). Evidence supporting this 
argument is found in the changes in distribution of tasks performed in the United States. Since the 




(a)  Promote comprehensive trade liberalization  
 
Trade barriers – not only tariffs but also non-tariff barriers – are an important 
element of international trade costs.
15  Trade within IPNs is postulated as being 
relatively more sensitive to changes in trade barriers because it involves multiple 
cross-borders trading in parts and components. Tariffs have been progressively 
reduced globally, especially in most Asian countries, because of unilateral 
liberalization, multilateral commitments, and preferential trade agreements (PTAs).  
However, most trade barriers are in forms of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) that include 
quantitative restrictions, subsidies, anti-dumping and countervailing duties, customs 
valuations, standard and technical regulations.  
 
The comprehensiveness of liberalization is highly important, because trade in 
IPNs involves international trading in extensive areas, not only manufacturing (such 
as final and intermediate goods) but also agricultures (such as primary and 
intermediate inputs), and services (communications, finances and logistics, and other 
related services). In addition, tariff escalation in favour of domestic production in 
final goods should be avoided because it creates a bias against domestic 
manufacturers of parts and components. 
 
At the national level, several approaches to trade liberalization are available: 
(a) a regional approach to liberalization through PTAs; (b) multilateral liberalization 
through WTO; and (c) unilateral liberalization. In theory, the trade-stimulating effects 
of preferential trade liberalization would be high for trade of participants in IPNs, 
which require multiple border crossings in the trading of parts and components. 
However, in practice, the actual benefits of PTAs with regard to increasing the trade 
of participants in IPNs depends much on the nature of the rules of origin built into 
PTAs. Trade-distorting effects of rules of origin can be more detrimental to trade in 
IPNs than the conventional style of trade in which firms only trade in final goods 
because trade costs arising from the bureaucratic process of utilizing tariff preferences 
will be accumulated over multiple cross-border trading in parts and components at 
different stages of production. Moreover, maintaining trade barriers against non-
members may distort the natural expansion of fragmentation trade across countries. In 
the policymaking context, it is difficult to define products giving tariff preferences 
because vertical specialization in IPNs may need a very fine level of product 
categorization.  
 
Under multilateral liberalization, trade diversion is supposed to be 
insignificant since the liberalization tends to cover almost all important trading 
                                                            
 
15  For more details on trade cost calculation, see the comprehensive ARTNeT trade cost database 
available at www.unescap.org/tid/artnet/trade-costs.asp.  
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partners in IPNs. Furthermore, transaction costs associated with multilateral 
liberalization are expected to be lower than those under preferential trade 
liberalization. However, the complexity of the nature of trade within IPNs has already 
gone beyond the current scope of multilateral trading rules designed under 
GATT/WTO. Doing business abroad and connecting international production 
facilities means that IPN-type trade barriers are now not only tariffs and other border 
measures, but also threaten tangible and intangible property rights, discriminatory 
treatment of foreign investment, restricted movement of capital, and anticompetitive 
practices. Currently, the multilateral system still lacks deeper disciplines in these 
regulatory measures. 
 
Unilateral liberalization with comprehensive and deep coverage appears to 
cause fewer distortions than other approaches to liberalization, ceteris paribus. The 
non-reciprocal approach of unilateral liberalization also makes the process associated 
with low transaction costs. Under this approach, a country also has full control over 
the pace and sequence of liberalization measures. On the other hand, because of the 
absence of reciprocity in the opening of market access, in reality it is the least 
favoured  road to take. 
 
(b)  Combine trade and investment liberalization  
 
Based on experience of East and South-East Asian countries, direct investment 
by global producers is a necessary starting condition for developing countries to 
become integrated into the global value chain. Vertical (efficiency-seeking) FDI has 
been a major driver of the growth of IPNs. The type of FDI attracted by a country is 
mainly governed by the characteristics and policy environment of that country; for 
example, trade barriers and protection given to domestic producers will create 
incentives for market-seeking FDI rather than efficiency-seeking FDI. An open 
investment climate is more necessary for efficiency-seeking operations than for 
market-seeking operations, because efficiency-seeking MNCs rely not on economic 
rents created by protection but on profit margins, which are determined by the cost 
competitiveness of a vertically-integrated good. To establish an investment-friendly 
environment, restrictions on investment have to be relaxed in an effort to simplify 
investment procedures, remove investment bottlenecks on a national treatment basis, 
and capital and financial market openness to inward and outward investment flows.  
 
(c)  Spend on infrastructure improvement  
 
Coordinating international production requires assurances of world-class 
telecommunications and goods transportation as well as efficient financial services 
and customs clearance. These “infrastructure” services are necessary in order to 
facilitate international business transactions that are highly intensive in the IPN 
operations. In much the same way as trade barriers, the costs of those infrastructure 
services penalize goods produced in multiple stages across different countries,  
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because producers need to pay for moving goods at each stage of the production 
process. A reduction in costs and the time required for those services will therefore be 
beneficial to trade in IPNs. 
 
Although investment in infrastructure and technological advancement has 
played an important role in reducing costs and the time required for shipping and 
communications, infrastructure services are still state-monopolized in many 
developing countries. However, state monopolization results in distortions in trade 
and investment, and the often inefficient operation of the services providers. 
 
Therefore, comprehensive policy reforms to promote trade and investment in 
services are needed in order to minimize trade costs arising from inefficiency of 
service sectors. As pointed out by ESCAP (2011), FDI can play a key role in 
improving the efficiency of service sectors, especially infrastructure services which 
are characterized as capital- and technology-intensive. International service providers 
are a major source of capital, technology transfer and improved managerial skills for 
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Comparative overview of economic profiles and roles of China and 
India in Asian international production networks 
 
Witada Anukoonwattaka  
 
Despite the fact that China and India have gone through the period of high 
growth in the 2000s (figure 5), there are considerable differences in terms of 
economic structure, sources of growth and trade patterns. The differences have 
resulted in divergent performances by the two countries in Asian IPNs. This chapter 
provides a comparative overview of the economic structure and participation of China 
and India in Asian IPNs to enable the current position of India to be evaluated, with 
China being used as a benchmark. 
 





























































































Source: Based on data from the ESCAP Statistical Yearbook, 2011. 
 
1. Macro comparisons of economic structures 
 
China and India are the world’s two most populous countries. In 2010, China 
accounted for nearly 20 per cent of the global population, while for India it was 
approximately 18 per cent. Output and income per capita of China was significantly 
higher than that of India (table1). Based on real GDP per capita, adjusted for 
purchasing power parity (PPP) to reflect the actual purchasing power of a country, 





Table 1. Economic profiles of China and India 
 
      1990  1995 2000  2005 2008 2009 2010 
Population          
(million 
people) 
China 1  142  1 211  1 267  1 312  1 337  1 346  1 354 
India 862  953 1  043 1 131  1 181  1 198  1 214 
Share of world 
population (%) 
China 21.6  21.2 20.7 20.2 19.8 19.7 19.6 
India 16.3  16.7 17.0 17.4 17.5 17.5 17.6 
GDP                  
(million US$ ) 
China 404  494  756 960  1 192 836  2 302 719  4 416 104  4 984 426    
India 326  796  369 240  467 788  840 470  1 281 330  1 287 292    
GDP per 
capita                  
( 2005 US 
dollars) 
China 469  790 1  141 1 755  2 429  2 633    
India 409  475 576 743 897 953    
GDP per 
capita                 
(2005 PPP US 
dollars) 
China 1  094  1 840  2 658  4 088  5 658  6 134    
India 1  230  1 426  1 731  2 235  2 697  2 864    
Source: Based on data from the ESCAP Statistical Yearbook, 2011. 
 
(a) Structure  of  GDP   
 
China and India experienced a significant decline in agricultural production 
during the past two decades (figure 6). In the case of China, output has been shifting 
towards the industrial and services sectors. The industrial sector of China increased its 
share in total value-added from 40 per cent in 1990 to 48 per cent in 2009, while its share 
of the service sector increased from 34 per cent to 41 per cent during the same period. In 
contrast, India’s production has shifted toward services. India’s share of services in total 
value-added increased steadily from 42 per cent in 1990 to 55 per cent in 2009, while its 
















Figure 6. Shares in GDP by economic sectors 
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Source: Based on data from the ESCAP Statistical Yearbook, 2011. 
 
In terms of growth, the service sector of India grew notably faster than the 
industrial sector, especially during the late 1990s (figure 7). In China, by contrast, the 
industrial sector grew slightly faster than the services sector. The performance of 
India’s service sector led to the praise that Indian’s growth pattern had revealed an 
alternative growth model that was driven by services and which skipped the phase of 
a typical labour-intensive industrialization exemplified by the rapid growth of East 
and South-East Asian economies. However, employment in the economic sectors 
shows that India’s rapidly growing service sectors may have a limited impact on 




Figure 7. Growth of production by economic sector 
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While the agricultural sector represents a minor part of total value-added of 
China and India, in terms of employment that sector is still the most important one for 
both countries, the employment share of China was 50 per cent while that of India was 
60 per cent in 2000 (figure 8). The industrial sector accounted for 23 per cent of 
employment in China, and contributed 46 per cent of Chinese GDP in the same year. 
The service sector contributed 28 per cent of total employment, and accounted for 39 
per cent of the Chinese GDP.
17   Despite a commonality in agriculture, India’s 
employment and production structure appears to be the reverse of that in China: in 2000, 
India’s services sector generated more than 50 per cent of the country’s GDP, while 
accounting for only 24 per cent of total employment. The industrial sector generated 16 
per cent of employment and accounted for 27 per cent of India’s GDP. 
18 
 
In terms of wages, labour costs in India appear to be lower than in China. For 
example, according to Kalish (2006), International Monetary Fund (IMF) data reveals 
that the monthly wage of a typical manufacturing worker in India was US$ 23.80 in 
2002, while for China the figure was US$ 110.80. Thus, it appears that India has not 






16 Data related to employment and wage in China and India should be taken cautiously. The data for 
unregistered sectors are usually not reported.   
17 Chinese employment data show that the agricultural sector accounted for 40 per cent of Chinese 
employment in 2008, followed by the services sector (33 per cent) and industrial sector (27 per cent). 
For India, the latest employment data are available only up to 2000 (see figure 8). 
18The sectoral distribution of India’s employment and output appears to support the argument by some 
reports, such as Gordon and Gupta (2004), that rapid increases in Indian output were related to IT 
services, which are relatively skills-intensive and have small impact on job creation. 
19 Recognizing the importance of the manufacturing sector with regard to employment creation, India 
plans to increase the share of manufacturing in total value-added and employment. A draft national 
manufacturing policy was approved in 2011. For more details, see chapter IV of this book.  
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Inner circle: Share of employment






















In 2010, China’s trade value was more than quadruple that of India. China’s 
total exports (merchandise and services) amounted to US$ 3,335 billion versus US$ 765 
billion for India. The export dependency of the Chinese economy is considerably higher 
than it is in India. Before the impact of the global economic crisis significantly affected 
export figures, the share of China’s exports in GDP was more than 35 per cent in 2008, 
while for India it was less than 25 per cent (figure 9).   
 
Figure 9. Shares of exports in GDP 
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Source: Based on data from the ESCAP Statistical Yearbook, 2011. 
 
Exports of goods by China now account for more than 90 per cent of that 
country’s total exports, while the figure for India is still well below 70 per cent (table 
2). Services play a more important role in trade by India than trade by China, 
especially on the export side. The services sector share of Indian exports rose from 27  
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per cent in 2000 to a peak of 35 per cent in 2008, while the sector’s share of Chinese 
exports remained at about 10 per cent throughout that period. During the economic 
crisis in 2009, services trade was relatively resilience compared to trade in goods 
(Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Review, 2011). As a result, since most of China’s 
exports are goods, the country was hit harder by the adverse impact of the global 
economic crisis than India as a considerable proportion of Indian exports comprise 
services. 
 
Table 2. Shares of goods and services in trade by China and India 
(Unit: Per cent) 
Year China  India 
  Exports   Imports  Exports  Imports 
  Goods Services Goods Services Goods Services Goods  Services 
2000  89.2 10.8 86.3 13.7 72.6 27.4  73.2  26.8 
2005  91.2  8.8  88.8 11.2 65.6 34.4  75.3  24.7 
2008  90.3  9.7  87.8 12.2 64.6 35.4  78.5  21.5 
2009  90.3  9.7  86.4 13.6 66.4 33.6  76.2  23.8 
2010  90.3  9.7  87.9 12.1 66.4 33.6  73.4  26.6 
 





Many empirical studies have documented the fact that machinery and transport 
equipment (SITC 7) are predominant sectors in terms of international fragmentation 
of production.
21 Trade patterns of countries that have been extensively involved in the 
product fragmentation process are likely to have a considerable share of machinery 
and transport equipment. Therefore, the share of those sectors in trade sometimes has 
been used as a general indicator for IPN participation in empirical studies, apart from 
indicators that focus specifically on trade in parts and components.
22 
 
According to the World Bank (2011), manufacturing currently accounts for 32 
per cent of China’s output while for India the figure is 16 per cent. Within the 
manufacturing sector, machinery and transport equipment account for 25 per cent of 
Chinese manufacturing output, but less than 20 per cent in India.  
 
The difference between the two countries is more notable when it comes to the 
role of the manufacturing sector in exports. Exports of manufacturing products have 
                                                            
 
20 The manufacturing sector is defined as SITC (Rev.3) 5 to 8, excluding SITC 68. 
21 See, for example, Ando, 2006; Ando and Kimura, 2005 and 2009; and Athukorala, 2010a and 2010b. 




been growing in importance in China’s export structure, and currently account for 85 
per cent of total exports (table 3). The share of the manufacturing sector in Indian 
exports is significantly lower than its share in Chinese exports, and has declined from 
56 per cent to 42 per cent during the past decade.   
 
There has been a noticeable shift in the composition of China’s exports, from 
conventional labour-intensive product lines such as apparel, footwear, toys and sports 
goods to more sophisticated goods in machinery product lines.
23 From 2000 to 2010, 
the share of miscellaneous manufactures (SITC 8) – a miscellaneous group 
encompassing most of the traditional labour-intensive products – in total exports of 
manufactures declined from 39 per cent to 26 per cent, while the share of machinery 
and transport equipment increased from 38 per cent to 53 per cent. By contrast, Indian 
manufacturing exports are characterized by resource-based materials such as primary 
and fabricated metals (SITC6-68). The share of machinery and transport equipment 
remains small, although it increased significantly from 9 per cent to 23 per cent 
between 2000 and 2010. 
 
Table 3. Distribution of manufacturing exports by China and India 
(Unit: Per cent) 
SITC   China  India 
Rev.3   2000  2005 2008  2009 2010 2000 2005 2008 2009  2010 
5  Chemicals 5.5  5.1 6.0 5.5 5.9  13.2 16.1 18.1 15.8  17.1 




17.8  16.9 18.2 15.4 15.7 50.3 45.2 40.9 34.0  40.1 
7  Machinery and 
transport 
equipments 
37.6  50.3 50.6 52.6 52.9  9.4 14.9 21.8 23.0  23.1 
8  Miscellaneous 
manufacturing 
articles 
39.1  27.7 25.2 26.6 25.5 27.1 23.7 19.3 27.2  19.7 
  All 
manufacturing 
products 
100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 
  Shares of 
manufacturing  
sector in total 
exports 
78.7  83.8 84.4 84.6 84.5 56.4 46.7 37.9 46.0  42.4 
Source: Calculation based on United Nations COMTRADE data downloaded from WITS database. 
 
A closer examination of the machinery and transport equipment subsector 
reveals that information and communications technology (ICT) products (SITC77-
                                                            
 




772-776) has been a major driver of the remarkable growth of China’s machinery 
exports. The share of ICT products in exports of manufactures by China increased 
from less than 15 per cent in 1994/95 to nearly 33 per cent in 2007/08. In the case of 
India, it appears that the country’s export success in IT services has not been 
associated with ICT hardware sector. The share of ICT exports remains very small 
(below 3 per cent of manufacturing exports) throughout the same period (figure 10). 
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Source: Based on data from Athukorala, 2011.  
Note:  In Athukorala (2011), developing Asia covers 12 developing Asian economies including China, Hong 
Kong, China, India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan 
Province of China, Thailand and Viet Nam. 
 
 
A relatively similar pattern is found on the import side. Manufacturing 
accounts for one-half of Chinese imports, but only one-third of Indian imports. 
Machinery and transport equipment dominate imports of manufactures by both 












Table 4. Distribution of manufacturing imports by China and India 
(Unit: Per cent) 
SITC   China  India 
Rev.3   2000  2005 2008 2009 2010  2000 2005 2008 2009  2010 
5  Chemicals 18.3  17.4 18.1 18.6 18.6  20.8 20.2 24.7 21.4  22.4 
6 -68  Resource-
based products 
20.5  13.6 10.9 11.1 9.7  35.7 30.1 23.2 25.2  31.1 
7  Machinery and 
transport 
equipment 
53.7  57.0 58.1 57.8 59.1  34.7 42.0 46.4 45.7  40.0 
8  Miscellaneous 
manufacturing 
articles 
7.5  12.1 12.8 12.4 12.6  8.8 7.7 5.7 7.7  6.6 
  All 
manufacturing 
products 
100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0
  Shares of 
manufacturing  
sector in total 
imports 
62.5  59.1 49.8 50.7 49.7  31.9 35.4 34.0 37.7  28.3 
 
Source: Calculated based on United Nations COMTRADE data downloaded from WITS database. 
 
The trade patterns reviewed above indicate that the manufacturing trade of 
China is largely characterized by two-way trading in the machinery and transport 
equipment sector on an aggregate level (at 1-digit SITC Rev.3). For India, the trade 
pattern is largely characterized by traditional inter-industry trade. Manufacturing trade 
by India is more about exporting resource-based manufacturing materials, and 
importing machinery and transport equipment. According to Kochhar and others 
(2006), India’s industrial development policy from independence until the early 1990s 
focused on import substitution more than export orientation. Consequently, Indian 
manufacturing production has emphasized industries that are capital-intensive and 
large-scale, rather than labour-intensive; in fact, such distorted industrial structures 
remain despite the regulation reforms that have taken place. One implication that can 
be drawn from observing the trade patterns of India is that sophisticated 
manufacturing industries in India have not been associated with the country’s export 
competiveness.  
 
3. Intraregional trade 
 
Participation in Asian IPNs is partly reflected in high involvement in 
intraregional trade because parts and components at different stages of production will 
be traded back and forth between countries in the production networks. From 1998 to 
2009, the shares of intraregional imports ranged between 51 per cent and 57 per cent  
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of total Chinese imports, while the share of intraregional exports was between 45 per 
cent and 52 per cent (figure 11).  
 
Intraregional trading by China is largely dominated by trade with ASEAN, 
Japan and the Republic of Korea. China’s trade with these countries is skewed 
towards imports more than exports. This asymmetry in the intraregional trade 
structure partly reflects the fact that East and South-East Asian countries are 
supplying inputs for China’s exports to the rest of the world. 
 
Figure 11. Shares of intraregional trade in total trade of China, 1998-2009   
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Source: Based on data from the ESCAP Statistical Yearbook, 2011.  
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Compared to China, India’s trade is significantly less integrated with 
intraregional markets (figure 12).
24 Intraregional exports by India remained at around 
30 per cent throughout the past decade. However, India has been increasingly 
sourcing from countries within the region. The share of India’s intraregional imports 
increased from less than 30 per cent in the early 2000s to 39 per cent in 2009. 
Throughout the study period, India’s trade with other members of the South Asian 
Free Trade Area (SAFTA) was negligible. 
 
 
Figure 12. Shares of intraregional trade in total trade by India, 1998-2009 
 

















































24 Eight member States of the South Asian Free Trade Area include Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.  
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Figure 12. Shares of intraregional trade in total trade by India, 1998-2009 
(Continued) 


































Intra Asia-Pacific Intra-SAFTA 
 
Source: Based on data from the ESCAP Statistical Yearbook, 2011. 
 
 
4. Intraregional trade in manufacturing products 
 
Participation in Asian IPNs will result in a larger proportion of intraregional 
trade particularly in manufacturing products. Consistent with the view that China has 
been increasingly acting as a centre of final assembly and an export platform for 
Asian IPNs,  the shares of intraregional exports and imports in Chinese manufacturing 
exports and imports have been large but asymmetric (figure 13). Currently, more than 
60 per cent of Chinese manufacturing imports are sourced within the region, while 
intraregional manufacturing exports account for about 50 per cent of Chinese 
manufacturing exports.  
 
Japan and the Republic of Korea, account for the major share of China’s 
manufacturing imports, while ASEAN increased its share from 5 per cent of China’s 
manufacturing imports in 1995 to 16 per cent in 2010.  South Asia (including India) 











Figure 13. Intraregional trade of Chinese manufacturing sector, 1995-2010 
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In recent years, manufacturing exports by China have been increasingly moving away 
from intraregional markets towards markets outside the region. Although the United States and 
the European Union remain the most important extra- regional destinations, the shares of these 
traditional markets for manufacturing exports have been declining; at the same time, the share 
of Chinese manufacturing exports in the rest of the world increased steadily from 10 per cent in 
1995 to 17 per cent in 2010 (figure 14). 
 












































Asia-Pacific Developing Asia-Pacific United States European Union 25 Rest of the world
 
Source: Calculated by author based on United Nations COMTRADE data downloaded from WITS 
database. 
 
Although India‘s manufacturing sector has been slowly engaging with intraregional 
markets, it has been increasingly turning to the Asia-Pacific region (particularly East Asian 
countries) as a source of its manufacturing imports. India’s share of intraregional imports in 
total manufacturing imports nearly doubled from 22 per cent in 1995 to 42 per cent in 2010 
(figure 15). The increases in India’s intraregional sourcing were largely dominated by imports 
from East and South-East Asia. Since 1995, ASEAN countries have accounted for about 10 
per cent of India’ manufacturing imports, while the share of imports from China, Japan and 
Republic of Korea more than doubled in the same period from 16 per cent  to 34 per cent.  
 
While India is increasingly sourcing more manufacturing imports from within the 
region, export linkages have not grown in the same manner and remain significantly less than 
those of China. Intraregional markets account for less than 30 per cent of Indian manufacturing 
exports throughout the period of the study. The United States and the European Union are still  
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major export destinations for India. However, the share of those traditional markets declined 
from 52 per cent in 1995 to 37 per cent in 2010, while exports to the rest of the world increased 
from 17 per cent to 37 per cent during the same period (figure 16). 
 
Figure 15. Intraregional trade by Indian manufacturing sector, 1995-2010 
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Source: Calculated by author based on United Nations COMTRADE data downloaded from WITS 
database. 
 
5. Foreign direct investment
25 
 
Many studies have documented the fact that the growth of IPNs has been associated 
with FDI inflows because MNCs have primarily built their international production 
networks through FDI.
26 IPN-driven FDI is usually vertical FDI in nature (or so-called 
efficiency-seeking FDI) (Markusen, 2002, and Navaretti and Venables, 2006).
27 This type 
of FDI will lead to an increase in trade within and between firms at different stages of 
production. The manufacturing sector is a primary target for the IPN-driven FDI, because 




25 FDI data should be accepted with caution. There is some opinion that FDI data for China and India 
are inflated as they include a substantial amount of round-tripping FDI through Hong Kong, China in 
the case of China, and through Mauritius in the case of India (Rao and Dhar, 2011; Wei, 2005; and 
Xiao, 2004). In addition, Chinese and Indian FDI data may not be directly comparable due to variations 
in definitions, coverage and availability of the data. 
26 See, for example, Feenstra and others, 2000; Hanson and others, 2001 and 2005; Kleinert, 2003; and 
Swenson, 2004.   
27 See chapter 1 of this book for additional details. 
28 Manufacturing FDI is not always aimed at production for export. A certain (but unfortunately not 
quantifiable) share of FDI may be for market-seeking purposes and circumvention of high import 




Regarding FDI inflows, China has attracted more FDI than India throughout the 
past two decades. FDI net inflows to China increased from US$ 3.5 billion in 1990 to 
US$ 108.3 billion in 2008. For India, FDI net inflows to the country increased from a 
negligible level in the early 1990s to US$ 40.4 billion in 2008. In particular, FDI inflows 
have been increasing rapidly since 2005. However, both China and India recently 
experienced a slowdown of about 10 per cent in FDI inflow in 2009 due to the global 
economic crisis (figure 17).  
 
However, comparing FDI inflows relative to GDP reveals that India is now 
outperforming China if economic size is equal. FDI inflows relative to GDP in India 
increased steadily from 0.9 per cent of GDP to 2.7 per cent of GDP during the past five 
years. The figure for China declined continuously from 3.1 per cent to 1.9 per cent during 
the same period. 
 








































































































































































FDI inflows to China FDI inflows to India
FDI inflows-to-GDP (China) FDI inflows-to-GDP (India)
 
Source: ESCAP Statistical Yearbook, 2011, based on data from UNCTAD. 
 
Sectoral distribution of FDI inflows reveals that MNCs directly investing in China 
have focused on manufacturing activities.
 The manufacturing sector received about 60 per 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
(2011) uses recent firm-level data on the operation of Japanese and United States MNCs in China and 
India in order to deal with these issues.  
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cent of total FDI in China between 2005 and 2008 (figure 18). Recent studies by Dullien 
(2005), and Liu and Dalley (2011) indicated an ongoing transition in manufacturing FDI in 
China from the low-tech manufacturing sector to the high-technology manufacturing sector.  
 
In contrast, the services sector of India attracted much more FDI than the 
manufacturing sector. India’s manufacturing sector accounted for only 21 per cent of FDI 
inflow while services related to finance, infrastructure, IT, real estate and construction, and 
telecommunications accounted for 68 per cent of FDI inflow. 
 
Figure 18. Distribution of FDI inflows to China and India 
by sector, 2005-2008 
(Unit: Per cent) 
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 Source: Based on National Bureau of Statistics data. 
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Existing studies, such as Aggarwal (2001) and Kumar (1990), indicate that 
much of the FDI inflow into India’s manufacturing sector has been largely driven by 
market-seeking and the need to circumvent high import duties. This is consistent with 
a firm-level analysis by Anand and Delios (1996) which found that investment by 
Japanese MNCs in India was largely characterized as market-seeking, while Japanese 
investment in China was more efficiency-seeking and more connected to export 
activities.  
 
6. Intra-regional foreign direct investment 
 
Intraregional investment has played an important role in China. High-income 
East Asian countries are all on the list of top-10 investors in China. Altogether they 
accounted for almost 70 per cent of total FDI inflow into China from 2008 to 2010 
(figure 19). Although there is some debate about round-tripping FDI through Hong 
Kong, China, even after adjusting for round-tripping intraregional FDI is still ahead of 
FDI from outside the region.
29, 30  Singapore, Japan, and the Republic of Korea 
together accounted for more than 16 per cent. Other countries on the top-10 list 
included the United States, the United Kingdom and some other European countries.  
 
In the case of India, only 15 per cent of FDI inflows between 2005 and 2009 
originated from Asian countries. Apart from round-tripping FDI from Mauritius, other 
top-10 investors in India during that period were the United States, the United 
Kingdom and other countries in Europe. Only Singapore and Japan were well-













29 The estimated magnitude of round-tripping FDI varied from about 30 per cent of total FDI inflows 
from Hong Kong, China to only 7 per cent. For details see, for example, Huang (2003), Naughton 
(1996), Tseng and Zebregs (2002) and UNCTAD (2007). According to Wei (2005), the magnitude of 
round-tripping FDI in China is supposed to be declining because since 1996 there have been 
continuous reforms in Chinese FDI tax preferences and in the FDI statistical methodologies.  
30 Hong Kong, China is the most important FDI investor in China, accounting for more than a half of 
all FDI inflow. Kalish (2006) pointed out that China’s diaspora in Hong Kong, China has played an 




Figure 19. Distribution of FDI inflows by country of origin  
 























































Source: Based on data from the United States-China Business Council, and China’s Foreign 
Investment Department of the Ministry of Commerce. 
FDI inflows to India, 2005-2009
11.3
7.3





















































Source: Based on data from Rao and Dhar (2011). 
 
The firm-level data on global operations of MNCs in China and  India 
discussed in chapter 3 reveals that intraregional FDI from Japan appears to contribute 
to manufacturing production in India more than extraregional FDI from the United 
States. Based on the size of employment, operations of Japanese MNCs in India are 
concentrated in the transport equipment sector; operations of United States MNCs are  
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concentrated in professional services including IT, scientific and technical services. In 
the case of China, there are no such patterns. Investment in China by Japanese and 
United States MNCs appears to be concentrated in the manufacturing sector, with 
computers and electronics capturing the largest share of employment by MNCs.
31 
 
7.  Participation by China and India in the current Asian IPNs 
 
An analysis of exports and imports of parts and components provides a more 
detailed view of the roles of the two countries in Asian IPNs. The best available 
indicator for intensity of an IPN is the share of parts and components in total 
manufacturing trade, because IPN activities normally involve multiple border 
crossings of components. Athukorala (2011) carried out a comprehensive compilation 
of data on trade in parts and components, based on the 5-digit SITC Rev3. He found 
that the rapid development of global production networks in Asian economies was 




During the past two decades, there has been a sharp increase in the share of 
components in world manufacturing trade. The share increased from a two-year 
average of 19 per cent for 1992/1993 to 27 per cent for 2006/2007. The share has 
increased at a much faster rate in developing Asian economies, from 17.3 per cent to 
34 per cent.
34   The share of components is particularly high among ASEAN 
countries.
35  The component share in manufacturing exports from the six ASEAN 
countries combined amounted to 44.2 per cent in 2006/2007, up from 22.7 per cent in 
1992/1993. In countries such as Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand, components 










31 See Chapter III of this book for additional details. 
32  Henceforth, for the sake of brevity, the term “components” is used in place of “parts and 
components”. 
33 Data on parts and components shown in this section are based on Athukorala, 2011.  
34  Developing Asia in Athukorala (2011) covers 12 developing Asian economies including China, 
Hong Kong, China, India, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, Thailand, and Viet Nam. 
35 Among the South-East Asian nations, only the six largest economies – Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Thailand, Singapore and Viet Nam – are integrated into global production networks. 
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myanmar are not covered 




Table 5. Share of parts and components in manufacturing trade of  
selected economies  
(Unit: Two-year average percentage share) 
Economy Exports  Imports 
  1992/1993  2006/2007 1992/1993 2006/2007 
World 19.3  27.1 19.6 27.3 
Developing Asia  17.3  34.0 29.0 44.2 
China 7.4  25.6 20.4 44.0 
Hong Kong, China  15.8  33.3 24.1 48.5 
Republic of Korea  18.1  47.3 30.1 31.9 
Taiwan Province of 
China 
24.7  44.2 29.5 38.9 
ASEAN 6  22.7  44.2 36.0 47.9 
    Indonesia    3.8  21.5 27.0 21.8 
    Malaysia  27.7  53.6 40.5 50.0 
    Philippines  32.9  71.7 32.6 61.3 
    Singapore  29.0  49.3 39.9 60.4 
    Thailand    14.1  29.9 30.6 36.1 
    Viet Nam  n.a.  11.0 n.a. 19.1 
India 3.0  10.4 17.5 22.9 
 
Source: Based on 5-digit SITC Rev.3 data from Athukorala, 2011 (table 9). 
 
The importance of components in intraregional trade of Asia is higher than in 
intraregional trade of the European Union and NAFTA. In 2006/2007, components 
accounted for 54 per cent of intra-developing Asian exports, but only 31 per cent and 
22 per cent of intraregional exports of NAFTA and EU15, respectively (figure 20). A 
similar picture is found for intraregional imports of components. This reflects the fact 
that the intensity of IPNs has been more prominent in developing Asia than in 


















Figure 20. Share of parts and components in intraregional  
manufacturing trade  
 Intraregional manufactuirng exports 











 Intraregional manufacturing imports 











Source: Based on 5-digit SITC Rev.3 data from Athukorala, 2011 (table 9). 
Note: * Broader devloping East Asia includes four East Asian developing economies (China, Republic 
of Korea, Hong Kong, China,and Taiwan Provice of China) and six ASEAN countries (Indonesia, 




China has been at the centre of the IPN phenomenon. Components have 
dominated manufacturing imports of China, while final goods have dominated the 
country’s export composition (figure 21). In 2006/07, components accounted for 44 
per cent of Chinese manufacturing imports. The component share in intraregional 
imports by China was much higher at nearly 60 per cent. In contrast, final goods (total 
exports minus components) outpaced China’s manufacturing exports, especially 
exports destined for extraregional markets. Final goods accounted for 75 per cent of 
China’s total manufacturing exports in 2006/07, while the corresponding share of 
intraregional exports was significantly lower at 60 per cent.  
 
Figure 21 Parts and components vs Final goods in China’s manufacturing trade 
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components final goods
 
Source: Based on 5 digits SITC Rev.3 data from Athukorala, 2011 (table 9). 
 
The production linkages between China and East and South-East Asian countries in 
IPNs are reflected by China’s the components trade, which is particularly high with 
countries in East and South-East Asia. Developing East and South-East Asia accounts for 
about one-half of China’s exports and imports of components for machinery and transport 
equipment. Meanwhile, the central role of China as a major export platform for Asian IPNs 
is reflected in the fact that more than 50 per cent of China’s final goods exports in that 
corresponding category are to extraregional markets, particularly the OECD countries 




Figure 22. Parts and components vs. final goods in China’s trade in machinery 
and transport equipment, by destination 
 Trade in components , 2004/05
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In the case of India, the low level of the components trade clearly illustrates 
that India has not participated in the new form of international production sharing 
within the supply chain. As shown in table 5, the share of components in 
manufacturing exports by India remains small, although it increased from 3 per cent 
in 1992/03 to 10 per cent in 2006/07. The corresponding import share increased from 
18 per cent to 23 per cent during the same period; however, the figures were far 
behind those of East and South-East Asian economies.  
 
India’s trade is still largely characterized by a traditional form of international 
trade in finished products (figure 23). In terms of both total and intraregional trade, 
final goods accounted for about 90 per cent of manufacturing exports and nearly 80 
per cent of manufacturing imports in 2006/07. The share of components in India’s 
intraregional trade is trivial. Components accounted for only 14 per cent of 
manufacturing exports to the rest of the region, while imports from the region 
amounted to 25 per cent.  
 
 
Figure 23. Parts and components vs. final goods in India’s manufacturing trade 
 













Total imports Intraregiona imports
components final goods
















Total exports Intraregiona exports
components final goods  
Source: Based on 5 digits SITC Rev.3 data from Athukorala (2011), table 9. 
 
8.  Conclusion 
 
As a precursor to further analysis of the potential of India to become the next 
assembly centre, this chapter evaluates current positions of India in the Asian IPNs, 
using China as a benchmark. The comparative overview shows that the performance 
by China has been ahead of that of India, especially with regard to the manufacturing 
sector and participation in the global IPNs. Patterns of production, employment and 
trade reflect the fact that India has not become significantly integrated into the rapid 
development of IPNs in which the manufacturing of parts and components has been a 




Currently, India’s trade has been focused narrowly on parts of the services 
sector. Consequently, India has failed to capture the benefits of the dynamism of 
Asian IPN growth. India remains an insignificant participant in intraregional trade and 
under-performs in exports of labour-intensive manufactures.  
 
Based on the experience of China, encouraging the integration of India into 
IPNs will need to include an extensive effort to expand the country’s manufacturing 
sector. Evidence shows that IPNs are primarily driven by efficiency-seeking FDI, in 
which factor-cost saving is a prime determinant. Thus, priority should be given to 
supporting export-oriented manufacturing industries that utilize the country’s labour-
cost advantages. Increasing competitiveness will enhance the country’s potential for 
participating in IPNs and, more importantly, employing a larger proportion of the 
population.  
 
In addition, the experience of major countries involving in Asian IPNs reveals 
that the IPN process involves extensive intraregional trade in parts and components. 
This implies that policy priority should be given to reducing trade and transaction 
costs that stand as a major obstacle to multiple cross-border sourcing, which is a vital 
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Can India become an export platform for global operations of 




One of the most important developments in international trade and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in Asia during recent years has been the rapid growth of 
cross-border production networks, driven by widespread multi-plant operations of 
multinational corporations (MNCs), and their extensive use of outsourcing and intra-
firm trade in parts and components (Athukorala and Yamashita, 2006; Jones and 
Kierzkowski, 2001; and Jones, 2000).  
 
In this context, China and India, the two most dynamic emerging economies, 
have so far had contrasting experiences in attracting MNCs engaged in global 
production networks. On the one hand, China has emerged as a prime export base for 
assembling a wide range of manufactured goods. As a result, the bulk of China’s 
manufacturing exports contain imported parts and components. This suggests that 
China’s participation in production networks has been high (Dean, Fung and Wang, 
2011) India, on the other hand, has a poor track record of attracting this type of FDI, 
which is possibly one of the reasons for its lacklustre export performance during past 
years (Athukorala, 2008; and Srinivasan, 2004). Despite India’s huge potential for 
hosting larger-scale FDI, the country is still generally lagging behind China and other 
Asian countries in this area with the exception of its success in attracting FDI for 
back-office business processing and software service industries. 
 
Although the literature at large has pointed out possible reasons for India’s 
under-performance in attracting FDI (Srinivasan, 2004; Athukorala, 2008), these studies 
mainly draw inferences from a macro-view of FDI statistics. Instead, this study explores 
a uniquely constructed operation-based dataset of Japanese and United States MNC 
affiliates in India from an international comparative perspective, using China as a 
comparison. Specifically, this study compares and contrasts various indicators of 
economic operations of Japanese and United States MNC affiliates in order to capture 
any systematic differences. An analysis is conducted in the context of India’s ongoing 
economic and business reforms since 1991. In particular, the recently signed Japan-
India Free Trade Aagreement is seen as an important step that may help to change the 
perceptions of India among Japanese investors. In fact, the latest survey conducted by 
the Japan Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC), ranks India for the first time as the 
most promising country for the next 10 years or so for Japanese manufacturing MNCs. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 develops the analytical context 
of the distinctive specialization and operations of MNC affiliates in a host country,  
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followed in section 2 by an overview of trends and development of United States and 
Japanese FDI patterns in China and India. Section 3 takes a closer look at the 
operational characteristics of United States and Japanese MNC affiliates in India and 
China. Section 4 summarises the key findings and puts forward policy implications. 
 
1. Overview of Japanese and United States MNCs in production networks 
 
While the rise of production networks is a general phenomenon, it has been 
suggested that the nationality of MNCs characterises the functions of production 
networks (Sturgeon, 2003). For example, in the electronics industry the Japanese 
electronic networks have been a relatively closed system with a tightly controlled 
buyers-suppliers linkage excluding outsiders (Hackett and Srinivasan, 1998). Japanese 
production networks have developed based on the social relationship of “trust” and 
“reputation”. Product and process specification remain relatively tacit, and involve 
intensive information flows between firms and suppliers; this leads to greater asset 
specificity and relation-specific investment. In electronics, this form of inter-firm 
production network relies heavily on technology-intensive components (sound 
display, memory chips, microprocessors, power and mechanical components, or 
advanced design and development) supplied by related Japanese suppliers; simpler 
and non-strategic components are sourced from unaffiliated suppliers, usually for the 
previous generation model (Borrus, Ernst, and Haggard; 2000). This procurement 
arrangement essentially blocks outside vendors from becoming involved with 
Japanese production networks and supply chains. 
 
On the other hand, United States electronic firms are often characterised by the 
full integration of modularity and the heavy use of contract manufacturers (Sturgeon, 
2003).
36 This system is facilitated by highly standardized inter-firm links that require 
less frequent and less intense interactions. The functions of contract manufacturers are 
highly modular in nature, being accessed and shared by a wide array of “lead firms”, 
                                                            
 
36 Development of modular production has been one of the most notable changes in the United States 
electronics machinery industry during the past 15 years. The modular production network is driven by 
contract manufacturers who provide traditional and standardized manufacturing functions, product 
(re)design, component processing and purchasing, inventory management, routine tests, and after-sales 
services and repairs.  The use of contract manufacturers may bring cost and flexibility advantages to 
“lead firms” (Borrus and others, 2000; Sturgeon, 2003). As a result of the widespread use of modular 
technology, major firms such as Hewlett Packard and Ericsson have been able to sell most of their 
worldwide manufacturing infrastructure to contract manufacturers Solectron and Flextronics (Sturgeon, 
2003). The modular production network has also spread into semiconductor and other heavy industry in 
the United States.  In the  United States automotive industry, Ford and General Motors (GM) have 
retained vehicle design and final assembly while relying on an increasing supply volume of 
components (such as entire automotive interior systems, headlights, carpets, cockpits, interior panels 
and module design) from Leair, Johnson Contrils, Magna and TRW.  
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thus increasing flexibility (Borrus and others, 2000). While acknowledging this 
difference in characteristics, it has been argued that, with the passage of time, 
operations of MNCs of different nationalities become similar as the ongoing process 
of globalization forces MNCs to emulate international best practices in global 
business operations. Hence, a common evolution between Japanese and United States 
MNCs in a given host country should be expected (Encaration, 1993; and Dunning 
and others, 2007). 
 
In sum, these contrasting structures between Japanese and United States 
production networks may contribute to the distinctive specialization and operations of 
MNC affiliates in a host country. They may also be influenced by the development 
process of global business operations. 
 




A notable difference between the patterns of outward investment by Japan and 
the United States is the importance attached to developing Asian economies. Table 6 
shows country/regional distribution of United States FDI (USFDI) and Japanese FDI 
(JFDI) outward stock between 1996 and 2010. In 2010, developing Asia accounted 
for 25.6 per cent of total JFDI stock, but only 8.9 per cent of USFDI stock. The 
majority of USFDI stock is still in Europe; in fact, 56 per cent of all outward USFDI 
stock in 2010, up from 49 per cent of the total in 1996. 
 
China has been an important FDI destination, especially for Japanese MNCs. 
The total value of Japanese direct investment in China increased from US$ 8 billion in 
1996 to US$ 67 billion in 2010. Accordingly, the share of China in outward JFDI 
stock rose from 3.1 per cent in 1996 to 8 per cent in 2010, the largest share among 
developing Asian economies. During the same period, the accumulated value of the 
United States’ direct investment in China increased from US$ 3.8 billion to US$ 60.5 




37 Some issues concerning the quality of FDI data are in order.  First, it is well-known that FDI data 
reported from China and India are inflated somewhat, because of round-tripping FDI through Hong 
Kong, China to China and through Mauritius to India. (Wei, 2005). Second, FDI outflows from Japan 
and the United States may not be comparable. According to the standard definition, the three 
components of FDI are (a) equity capital, (b) retained earnings and (c) intra-company loans or intra-
company debt transactions. The majority of FDI reporting countries do not include retained earnings as 
a part of FDI (Lipsey, 2003; Athukorala, 2007). Only the Government of the United States consistently 
reports all three components of FDI in official publications. In1996, Government of Japan also started 
reporting all three components of FDI (UNCTAD, 2001).  Thus, to increase compatibility between 
JFDI and USFDI data, the data are tabulated from 1996 onwards in table 6. Last, it should be noted that 
the Reserve Bank of India broadened the definition of FDI to include retained earnings in 2003 only 
with effect from 2000/01 fiscal year (Athukorala and Hill, 2010).  
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Relative to China, India attracted much less FDI. However, its importance in 
the investment stock of MNCs has been rising rapidly. The share of India in outward 
JFDI stock increased from only 0.3 per cent in 1996 to 1.6 per cent in 2010. A similar 
increase can be seen for the share of India in outward USFDI stock, from 0.2 per cent 









Table 6. Country distribution of USFDI and JFDI stock, 1996-2010 
Source: United States Bureau of Economic Analysis at http://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm#omc  
and JETRO at http://www.jetro.go.jp/indexj.html  
  JFDI outward stock 
(US$ billion) 
Annualized growth rate 
(%) 
Share in total FDI outward 
stock ( %) 
   1996  2000  2010  1996-2010  2000-2010 1996  2000  2010 
Developing Asia  79.2  49.3  212.7  7.3  15.7  30.6  17.7  25.6 
China 8.1  8.7  66.5  16.2  22.6  3.1  3.1  8.0 
India 0.8  1.2  13.6  22.6  27.7  0.3  0.4  1.6 
Hong Kong, China  9.4  6.5  15.5  3.7  9.0  3.6  2.3  1.9 
Taiwan Province of 
China 
4.0 3.6  10.4  6.9  11.2  1.6  1.3  1.2 
Republic of Korea  3.5  4.2  15.0  11.1  13.6  1.3  1.5  1.8 
Singapore 11.4  8.9  27.5  6.5  12.0  4.4  3.2  3.3 
Thailand 15.8  4.8  27.8  4.1  19.3  6.1  1.7  3.3 
Indonesia 17.2  4.8  11.9  -2.6  9.6  6.6  1.7  1.4 
Malaysia 5.8  4.0  10.0  4.0  9.6  2.2  1.4  1.2 
Philippines 2.9  2.0  8.7  8.3  15.6  1.1  0.7  1.0 


















Latin America  12.0  21.0  107.0  16.9  17.7  4.6  7.5  12.9 
Europe 47.7  56.8  193.5  10.5  13.0  18.4  20.4  23.3 
Middle East  1.0  0.8  4.9  12.3  20.0  0.4  0.3  0.6 
Total  258.7 278.4  830.5  8.7  11.5  100.0  100.0  100.0 
         
  United States FDI stock 
(US$ billion) 
Annualized growth rate 
(%) 
Share in total FDI 
Outward Stock (%) 
   1996 2000  2010  1996-2010  2000-2010  1996 2000 2010 
Developing Asia  68.0  108.2  349.5  12.4  12.4  8.6  8.2  8.9 
China 3.8  11.1  60.5  21.7  18.4  0.5  0.8  1.5 
India 1.3  2.4  27.1  23.9  27.5  0.2  0.2  0.7 
Hong Kong, China  14.4  27.4  54.0  9.9  7.0  1.8  2.1  1.4 
Taiwan Province of 
China 
4.5 7.8  21.0  11.7  10.3  0.6 0.6  0.5 
Republic of Korea  6.5  9.0  30.2  11.6  12.9  0.8  0.7  0.8 
Singapore 14.9  24.1  106.0  15.0  16.0  1.9  1.8  2.7 
Thailand 5.0  5.8  12.7  6.9  8.1  0.6  0.4  0.3 
Indonesia 8.3  8.9  15.5  4.5  5.7  1.0  0.7  0.4 
Malaysia 5.7  7.9  16.0  7.7  7.3  0.7  0.6  0.4 
Philippines 3.5  3.6  6.6  4.5  6.1  0.4  0.3  0.2 
    
North America  89.6  132.5  296.7  8.9  8.4  11.3  10.1  7.6 
Latin America  155.9  266.6  724.4  11.6  10.5  19.6  20.3  18.5 
Europe 389.4  687.3  2185.9  13.1  12.3  49.0  52.2  55.9 
Middle East  8.3  10.9  36.6  11.2  12.9  1.0  0.8  0.9 
All countries, total  795.2  1316.2  3908.2  12.0  11.5  100.0  100.0  100.0  
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(a) Industrial composition of FDI  
 
Traditionally, JFDI in India is concentrated in the automobile industry. Among 
the early entries by Japanese firms in India was Suzuki Motors (Suzuki-Marui, now 
Marui Udyog). In the reform year (1991), India also saw the entrance of Honda into 
the automobile industry and Sony into the electronics industry (Choundhury, 2009). 
According to FDI data from the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion in 
India, approximately 41 per cent of JFDI in India went to the automobile industry, 18 
per cent to electrical equipment and about 6 per cent to the service and 
telecommunications sectors from 2000 to 2007.  
 
Table 7 shows industry composition of USFDI stock in India and China from 
1990 to 2010. Manufacturing FDI in India declined from 59 per cent in 1990 to 14.4 
per cent in 2010 while the share of service sector, especially professional, scientific 
and technical services and information, has been rising. The rise of FDI in the service 
sector is closely linked to an impressive export performance of information 
technology and software services (Saxsenian, 2002). In the early period of reforms in 
India, USFDI was heavily concentrated in the capital goods sector, with chemical and 
machinery accounting for 31 per cent and 15 per cent, respectively, of total USFDI 
stock. However, as the reforms progressed, these shares started to decline. In 2010, 
the chemical industry accounted for 4.7 per cent and the machinery industry for 3.2 
per cent. Export-oriented MNC production of electronic products has been rapidly 
growing. Yet, this category only accounts for 1.7 per cent of USFDI. 
  
In contrast, the bulk of USFDI in China still remains concentrated in the 
manufacturing sector despite a decline from 63.5 per cent of FDI stock in 2000 to 49 
per cent in 2010. In particular, computers and electronic products accounted for 31.4 
per cent in 2000, although by 2010 that figure had declined to 13.2 per cent.  
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Table 7. USFDI stock in China and India, 1991-2010 
(Unit: Per cent) 
  India China 
  1991 1999 2000 2010 1991 1999 2000 2010 
All  Industries,  total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Manufacturing  50.6 48.7 46.2 14.4 46.0 61.6 63.5 48.8 
   (US$ million)  (210)  (1 163)  (1 098)  (3 886)  (196)  (5 787)  (7 076)  (29 477) 
Food  0.2 2.3 2.6 0.2 2.8 3.0 2.6 5.4 
Chemicals  30.8 10.5 10.8  4.7  12.7 10.6 10.1 10.7 
Primary and fabricated metals  2.7  3.8  3.3  (D)  -0.2  2.4  1.4  2.1 
Machinery  11.1  10.7  13.0  3.2 2.8 2.3 2.0 2.1 
Computers and electronic products  1.4  -0.5  -0.5  1.7  (D)  25.6  31.4  13.2 
Electrical equipment, appliances and components  0.0  1.3  2.0  0.5  0.0  4.2  4.1  1.0 
Transportation  equipment  0.7 5.0 2.4 1.8 (D) 6.7 5.9 6.9 
Other manufacturing  3.9  n.a.  n.a.  (D)  8.9  n.a.  n.a.  7.5 
Petroleum  -0.2      27.5     
Wholesale  trade  (D) 12.6 11.0 12.2 22.1  4.1  3.4  6.6 
Information  0.0 -1.2  -6.1  23.0  0.0 0.5 0.7 1.3 
Depository institutions  38.6  (D)  14.6    (*)  0.7  0.6  22.2 
Finance (except depository institutions) and insurance  (D)  12.3  12.0  11.5  0.2  0.1  0.4  3.1 
Professional; scientific and technical services    6.5  6.6  18.5    3.3  2.2  1.5 
Holding companies (non-banking)  0.0  n.a.  n.a.  1.4  0.0  n.a.  n.a.  5.7 
Services  2.7      (D)     
Other industries    5.1  8.9  (D)  (D)  15.3  11.4  4.8 
Source: United States Bureau of Economic Analysis at http://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm#omc  
Notes: Negative values of FDI net outflows show that the value of direct investment made by domestic investors to external economies was less than the value of 
repatriated (disinvested) direct investment from external economies. 
(D) indicates suppression to avoid disclosure of data of individual companies; n.a. = unavailability of data.   
 
61
3. Operations of Japanese and United States MNCs in India and China 
 
This section examines in detail the operational characteristics of Japanese and 
United States MNC affiliates in India and China. The Japanese MNC affiliate data 
were taken in 2010 from the online database of Research Institute of Economy, Trade 
and Industry ( RIETI), which stores various indicators of MNC affiliates in a 
breakdown of industries from 1989.
38 The data for the United States MNC affiliates 
was taken from the survey, “U.S. Direct Investment Abroad”, which is maintained by 
the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
39 The BEA data, which are 
known for their high quality and reliability of estimates, have been used in many 
important studies on United States MNC activities. BEA maintains publicly accessible 
electronic versions of the survey data, aggregated up to industry level. Two of the key 
differences between Japanese and United States MNC data are that (a) the BEA data 
coverage of variables is more comprehensive, and (b) high quality is maintained due 
to mandatory reporting. In contrast, Japanese MNC data reporting is not mandatory 
and the survey response rate varies across years.
40 
 
(a)  Employment by Japanese MNCs in India and China 
 
Table 8a presents employment data for Japanese MNC affiliates in India and 
China for 1992-2005. Japanese MNC employment in India increased from 14,500 
persons in 1992 to almost 40,000 persons in 2005. The annual average growth rate 
was 8.1 per cent, although there was some slowing down between 2000 and 2005 
(upper panel of table 8a).  
 
The industry with the largest employment rate is the transport equipment 
industry, accounting for around 60 per cent of total jobs created by Japanese MNCs in 
India (upper panel of figure 24). This focus on transport equipment is underlined by a 
long history of Japanese automakers in India (e.g., in 1983, Suzuki Motors partnered 
with the indigenous firm of Maruti established an assembly factory in New Delhi). 
Japanese MNCs also create employment in more skills-intensive manufacturing 
industries such as chemicals, accounting for some 9 per cent of total employment by 
                                                            
 
38  See  http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/database/FDI2010/index.html . The original data source was the 
survey, “Overseas Business Activities of Japanese Firms (OBAJF)”, conducted by the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), Tokyo. This annual survey is designed to trace the scale and 
functions of foreign affiliates of Japanese MNCs operating overseas. 
39 See www.bea.gov/  . 
40 The quality of the METI survey has been questioned from time to time. The response rate varied 
from 33 per cent in 1980 to 51 per cent during 1983-1992. However, in more recent years the response 
has increased somewhat. For example, in 2005, the questionnaire was sent to 4,564 Japanese firms; 
3,176 firms returned the questionnaire, giving a return rate of 69.6 per cent. Information on foreign 
affiliates operating in developing host countries is far less satisfactory than that on those operating in 




Japanese MNCs in 2005. While most sectors experienced some employment 
reductions between 2000 and 2005, non-manufacturing employment actually 
registered a healthy 10 per cent increase during the same period, led by the service 
sector. Employment by Japanese MNCs in this category stood at 1,600 persons in 
1995 but climbed to 5,500 persons in 2005, accounting for a 14 per cent share in total 
employment created by Japanese MNCs in India.  
 
While employment by Japanese MNCs in India is concentrated in transport 
equipment, it is more concentrated in the electronics and computers sectors in China. 
In 2005, computers and electronics alone attracted 289,000 workers for Japanese 
MNCs, which have experienced a 15-fold increase in employment since 1992 (lower 
panel of table 8a). Similarly, computers and electronics achieved a 10-fold increase in 
employment during the same period. These industries added together accounted for 
around 40 per cent of total employment created by Japanese MNCs in China in 2005 
(lower panel of figure 24). However, the employment shares of these industries have 
not changed drastically since 1992. For example, the employment share of electronic 
equipment was recorded at 12 per cent in 1992 and in 2005. 
 
In contrast, the transport equipment industry grew steadily from 2,600 workers 
in 1992 to 181,000 workers in 2005, with an annual employment average growth of 
38 per cent. In 2005, transport equipment accounted for 19 per cent of employment by 
Japanese MNC affiliates in China, up from only 3 per cent in 1992. This increasing 
share for transport equipment is particularly noteworthy when compared with the 
stagnant contribution of Japanese FDI to the employment share of electronic 
equipment during the same period. 
 
Overall, the employment distribution of Japanese MNCs in India is 
concentrated in medium-skill, labour-intensive industries in transport equipment while 
in China the employment distribution is broadly consistent with the overall transition 
of the Chinese economy from more labour-intensive to more skills-intensive 
industries. It has yet to be seen whether India will follow in the steps of East Asia 
where industrialization started from relatively labour-intensive export-oriented 














 Figure 24. Employment of Japanese MNC affiliates in India and China 
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Computers and electronics 
 
Source: RIETI FDI data, 2009, Available from www.rieti.go.jp/en/database/FDI2010/index.html. 
 
(b)  Employment of United States MNCs in India and China 
 
Table 8b shows the employment distribution of United States MNC affiliates 
in India and China from 1992 to 2008. In India, United States MNC employment  
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increased from 11,000 persons in 1992 to 313,000 persons in 2008. Employment 
distribution of United States MNCs in China appears similar to that of Japanese 
MNCs, with more weight given to computers and electronics. Employment in this 
area by United States MNCs increased from 70,000 persons in 2000 to 140,000 
persons in 2008, achieving an average annual growth rate of 9 per cent during that 
period. A notable difference from Japanese investment is seen in India. 
 
Relatively speaking, employment by United States MNCs in India is more 
concentrated in non-manufacturing sectors, such as information and professional, 
scientific and technical services, generating around 140,000 jobs, meaning that these 
sectors accounted for close to 50 per cent of total employment by United States 
MNCs in India in 2008 (figure 25). Between 2000 and 2008, the average annual 
employment growth of the information sector was 54 per cent, with a similar growth 
rate being recorded for the professional, scientific and technical service sectors. This 
is a stark difference compared with the more skewed employment distribution of 
Japanese MNCs in transport equipment. In 2008, employment in transport equipment 
only accounted for 5 per cent of total employment by United States MNCs in India 
(versus 60 per cent by Japanese MNCs); however, employment in transport 
equipment has been growing. 
 
Figure 25. Employment of United States MNC affiliates in India and China 
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A fuller analysis of the implications of the difference in employment emphasis 
by Japanese and United States MNCs for the future growth strategy of India is beyond 
the scope of this chapter. However, the employment pattern of United States MNCs in 
India appears to fit in well with the emerging view that the prospects for India’s future 
growth are largely driven by the expansion of high-skilled service sectors, led by 
innovative software and information- technology-related services (Eichengreen and 
Gupta, 2010). Some commentators have praised the emerging Indian growth model, 
driven by skills-based service sectors, for bypassing the phase of a typical labour-
intensive export industrialization as exemplified by East Asian countries (e.g., Rodrik 
and Subramanian, 2005).  However, many point out that India’s intrinsic comparative 
advantages rest on labour-intensive industries, given its abundance of relatively cheap 
labour. Therefore, the employment pattern of Japanese MNCs in India may be relatively 




Table 8. Employment of Japanese and United States MNC affiliates in India and China 
 
Table 8a. Employment of Japanese MNC affiliates in India and China, 1992-2005 
   Employment (’000)  Annual average growth (%) 
India  1992 1995 2000  2005  1992-2005  1992-2000  2000-2005 
Food and related products  0 X X X       
Chemicals and allied products  2.1 0.3 3.4 3.6  4.2  6.0  1.3 
Primary and fabricated metals  X X  0.8 X       
Industrial machinery and equipment  0.8 1.3 1.4 1.8  6.5  7.6  4.8 
Electronic equipment  2.2 3.7 4.2 3.7  3.8  8.3 -2.9 
Computers and electronics  X 1.2  1.6 1.0      -8.2 
Transportation equipment  8.6 13.7 35  23.9  8.1  19.1 -7.4 
Other manufacturing  0.7 1 0.9  0.4  -3.6  3.4  -13.7 
Non-manufacturing  X 1.6  3.4 5.5      10.1 
Total  14.5 22.8 50.8 39.9  8.1  17  -4.7 
            
China   1992 1995 2000 2005 1992-2005  1992-2000  2000-2005 
Food and related products  2.2 12.7  38.3 32.5  22.8  42.6 -3.2 
Chemicals and allied products  3.5 14.7  21.6 31.6  18.4  25.4  8 
Primary and fabricated metals  2.4 12.1  26.2 34.8  22.8  34.8  5.9 
Industrial machinery and equipment  5.7 18.6  49.4 98.6  24.5  31  14.8 
Electronic equipment  10.8 26.8 61.5 104.8  19.1  24.3  11.3 
Computers and electronics   18.4 74.8  156.2  289.0  23.6  30.6  13.1 
Transportation equipment  2.6 23.5  43.8  181.1  38.4  42  32.8 
Other manufacturing  30.8 86.1  115.4  120.4  11.1  18  0.9 
Non-manufacturing  13.7 22.7 31.4 74.3  13.9  10.9  18.8 
Total  90.2 292  543.6  967.1  20  25.2  12.2 
Source: RIETI FDI data, 2009, Available from http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/database/FDI2010/index.html  
Notes: X indicates suppression to avoid disclosure of data of individual companies.   
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Table 8b. Employment of US MNC affiliates in China and India, 1992-2008 
(Unit: ‘000) 
   1992 2000 2005 2008  Average 
growth, 
2000-2008 
1992 2000 2005 2008  Average 
growth, 
2000-2008 
  India   China  
Petroleum   0.2       0.2       
Mining    0.6 0.4 0.9  5.2    1 1.2  1.5 5.2 
Utilities    0.1 (*) (*)     0.4 G 0.2 -8.3 
Total  manufacturing  10.4 48 62.8  92.2  8.5  13.4  193.6  319.6  409.9 9.8 
   Food  0.4  2.4  2.8  5.4  10.7  0.5  7.6  17.1  22.8  14.7 
   Chemicals  2.9  8.8  11.2  18.7  9.9  2.7  24.1  39.3  56  11.1 
   Primary and fabricated metals  0  G  1.8  0.3    0.3 8  15.2  18.6  11.1 
   Machinery  I  15.5  14.6  16.9  1.1  0.5  17.7  33.6  38.9  10.3 
   Computer and electronic products   3.5  8.5  14.0  18.9    70.1 112.2  139.9  9.0 
   Electrical equipment, appliances, components  0  2.8  G  4.4  5.8  I  38.8  41.4  45.8  2.1 
   Transportation equipment  0  7.3  9.8  17.5  11.5  0  9.8  18.1  26.2  13.1 
   Other manufacturing  G       F       
Wholesale  trade  0.6  12.2 19.5 24.2  8.9  2  9  25.5 40.9  20.8 
Information   1.1  14.4  34.9  54.1    2 8.8  9.8 22.0 
Finance and insurance  (*)  1.2  3.5  2.2  7.9  0  G  H  H   
Professional, scientific and technical services    5.7  66.1  109  44.6    4.4 7.7  13.6 15.1 
Other industries  0  1.7  18.6  50.0  52.6  0  K  154.0  M   
All industries  11.4  70.8  185.2  313.4  20.4  15.8  252  521.8  774.2  15.1 
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis at  http://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm#omc.  
Notes: G indicates an employment range of 1,000-2,499; H indicates an employment range of 2,500-4,499; G indicates an employment range of 1,000-2,499; M indicates an 




(c)  Local sales and exports 
 
Table 9 reports local sales and export orientation of Japanese and United States MNC 
affiliates in India and other developing Asian countries in total manufacturing from 1989/90-
2004/05. MNC affiliates of both countries in India are predominantly local-market oriented. 
In 2004/05, the local sales rate of Japanese MNC affiliates in India was 78 per cent, whereas 
that of United States MNCs stood at 86 per cent. In 2000/01, 91 per cent of sales by United 
States MNC affiliates went to local Indian markets and the figure remained at 86 per cent in 
2004/05. Among the economies listed in table 9, the local sales rate is the highest for India for 
MNCs of both countries. This is consistent with the view that MNCs mainly came to India 
driven by the ‘tariff-jumping’ nature of investments (Athukorala, 2010).  
 
Exports to Japan accounted for only 0.6 per cent of sales by Japanese MNC 
affiliates in India in 2004/05, compared with 36 per cent in China, 32 per cent in 
Malaysia and 37 per cent in Thailand. As discussed in the previous section, the 
creation of production networks by Japanese MNCs usually revolves around 
developing close linkages with parent firms in Japan. This is especially the case when 
it comes to the initial stage of developing production networks and supply chains. 
Therefore, as discussed above, the weak linkage of MNC affiliates to parent firms in 
Japan shows the immature stage of Japanese production networks in India.  
 
 However, the rate of exports to other countries by Japanese MNCs in India actually 
increased from 6 per cent in 2000/01 to 22 per cent in 2004/05. It is also interesting to note 
that this rate is comparable to that of other MNC export-platform economies such as 
Singapore (28 per cent), Taiwan Province of China (16 per cent) and Thailand (27 per cent). 
 
As pointed out by Greaney and Li (2009), Japanese MNC affiliates in China are 
more export-oriented compared to United States MNC affiliates. Some 34 per cent of total 
sales of Japanese MNC affiliates went to local markets in China, and the remaining sales 
were exported either to Japan (36 per cent) or other countries (30 per cent) in 2004/05. In 
contrast, 64 per cent of total sales of United States MNC affiliates in China were directed 
towards the domestic market in 2004/05. Contrary to popular perception (Branstetter and 
Foley, 2010), there is no evidence to suggest that United States MNC affiliates in China are 
primarily export-oriented, and in 2004/05, 27 per cent of sales were exported to other 
countries, up from 14 per cent in 1989/90; 9 per cent of sales were exported back to the 
United States in 2004/05, up from less than 1 per cent in 1989/90. The relatively lower sales 
share that is exported back to the US reflects differences in distance-related trade costs. 
Compared to Japanese MNC affiliates, export orientation of United States MNC affiliates 
was generally lower with the exception of Malaysia, from where 42 per cent of sales by 
United States MNC affiliates in Malaysia were exported back to the United States and 29 
per cent of sales were exported to other countries in 2004/05. This unique position of 
Malaysia reflects the dominant presence of major United States electronics producers such 
as Intel Corporation, whose assembling operations are closely connected with headquarters.  
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Table 9.  Local sales and export orientation of U.S. and Japanese MNC affiliates in manufacturing, 1989-2005 
  (Unit: Per cent of sales) 
Japanese MNCs  1989/90     2000/01  2004/05  1989/90  2000/01  2004/05  1989/90  2000/01  2004/05 
  Local sales  Exports to home  Exports to other countries 
India  100  93.3  77.8  0.0 0.6 0.4 0.0 6.1 21.8 
China  59.6 40.4 33.8 20.6 38.0 36.0 19.8 21.5  30.2 
Hong  Kong,  China  77.1 44.3 56.5 14.0 21.9 21.3  8.8  33.8  22.2 
Indonesia  64.4 71.3 76.9 16.1 15.7 11.4 19.4  13  11.6 
Republic  of  Korea  27.1 26.5 48.6 18.4 29.4 20.5 54.5 44.1  30.9 
Malaysia  45.1 17.0 23.7 17.5 45.1 31.5 33.9 37.9  44.8 
Philippines  44.0 47.6 39.1 14.4 17.5 13.3 41.6 34.9  47.6 
Singapore  68.5 45.6 52.6 10.4 30.2 19.8 21.0 24.2  27.6 
Taiwan  Province  of  China 45.4 51.1 55.3 18.8 28.4 28.8 35.8 20.4  16.0 
Thailand  0.0 47.1 36.6  0.0  21.7 36.5  0.0  31.2  26.8 
Viet  Nam  57.5 66.1 69.5 17.7 19.3 14.2 24.8 14.6  16.3 
US  MNCs  1989/90 2000/01 2004/05 1989/90 2000/01 2004/05 1989/90 2000/01  2004/05 
 Local  sales  Exports to home  Exports to other countries 
India    90.6  86.0   4.1  5.4  5.3  8.6 
China  84.9  63.5  63.9 0.6 13.2 8.7 14.1  23.3 27.4 
Hong  Kong,  China  32.2 37.3 50.7 38.8 31.4 18.6 29.0 31.3  30.7 
Indonesia  46.2  83.9  84.2  0.0 1.3 1.5 0.0 5.8 14.2 
Republic  of  Korea  65.2 79.4 72.4 27.7  9.1  7.4  7.1  11.5  20.2 
Malaysia  23.9 19.7 29.2 47.9 32.8 42.1 28.3 47.5  28.7 
Philippines  66.4 35.1 30.3 16.1 16.1 25.7 17.6 14.7  44.0 
Singapore  14.5 30.8 39.0 54.7 34.5 15.1 30.9 34.6  45.9 
Taiwan  Province  of  China 56.2 54.8 60.7 27.2 23.2 17.8 16.6 22.0  21.5 
Thailand  13.4 40.1 55.0 17.1 10.9 11.9 37.9 48.9  33.1 
Viet  Nam  - - - - - - - -  - 




(d) Industry level  
 
Table 10 summarizes local sales, exports to home and exports to other 
countries as a percentage of sales at the industry level by Japanese and United States 
MNCs in China and India. Although the industries are not strictly comparable because 
of the different industry classifications across the two countries, the data do reveal 
some similarities and differences.  
 
Overall, Japanese MNC affiliates in India are predominantly local-market 
oriented, with little going to the export markets (especially to Japan). However, some 
variations occur across industries. Around 50 per cent of sales by Japanese MNC 
affiliates in the machinery industry were exported to other countries (other than 
Japan) in 2005. In the transport equipment industry, while the bulk of sales went to 
local markets, around 23 per cent of sales were still exported to third countries 
(Maruti-Suzuki is a primal example, as discussed above).  
 
In general, there are two possible explanations for the larger share of local 
sales in transportation equipment. First, most of emerging countries are continuing to 
use high import protection to nurture the domestic automobile industry, especially in 
China and India. Therefore, FDI in this sector is naturally local-market oriented. 
Second, compared with parts and components of electronics, automotive parts (body 
parts, vehicle bumpers and vehicle engines) are much heavier and bulkier, resulting in 
higher transportation costs relative to the export value of goods (i.e., a higher value-
to-weight). Consequently, there is a tendency for producers of automotive parts to 
locate their plants in the proximity of the assembly plants in a host country. 
 
Geographical distance is a crucial factor in transportation costs of automotive 
products. Therefore, it is still unclear whether Japanese automobile MNCs in India 
will become integrated more with parent firms in Japan, even though the Japan-India 
FTA should benefit such a process, particularly in the context of the growing presence 
of middle-incomes in local markers and intensified domestic competitions in India.  
 
  A similar pattern can also be observed for computers and electronics, with 23 
per cent exported to other countries and 76 per cent going to local markets. Hence, 
there is some indication that Japanese MNCs in India export to third countries, but are 
not integrated with the FDI home country.  
 
  The export proportion of sales by Japanese MNC affiliates in China is 
relatively higher than in India, especially in electronics-related industries. This is 
consistent with available evidence that Japanese MNCs use China as the assembly 
export point in their global operations in the world electronics markets (Athukorala 
and Yamashita, 2006). In 2005, 48 per cent of sales in the electronic equipment 
industry were directed towards local markets in China, whereas 36 per cent of sales  
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were exported to Japan and 16 per cent to other countries, with a similar pattern 
observed in computers and electronics. In comparison, Japanese MNC affiliates in 
transport equipment are more local-market oriented, with about 70 per cent of total 
sales going to local markets. In addition, some 26 per cent of transport equipment 
sales were exported to Japan in 2005 (compared with less than 1 per cent for India), 
again suggesting differences in production networks in the automobile sector.  
 
  United States MNC affiliates in the computers and electronics industry in India 
are relatively less export-oriented, compared to Japanese counterparts (table 10.b), with 
10 per cent of sales exported to other countries (versus 23 per cent for Japanese MNCs) 
in 2005. In the case of transport equipment, 8 per cent of sales were directed to other 
countries by United States MNCs (versus 23 per cent for Japanese MNCs) in 2005, 
while 86 per cent of sales went to local markets. In addition, exports to the home 
country have accounted for a relatively smaller share of exports, compared with their 
Japanese counterparts, especially in transport equipment, with United States MNC 
affiliates in India exporting only 4 per cent of sales to the United States; the figure for 
Japanese MNCs stood at 26 per cent in 2005. Perhaps, as discussed above, geographical 
distance, associated with transportation costs, is an impediment to exporting to the 
United States. In comparison, United States MNCs in professional, scientific and 
technical services, which enjoy free transport costs, exported a significant amount (48 
per cent) of sales to the United States in the same period.   
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Table 10 Sales and exports by Japanese and United States MNC affiliates, by 
industry in India and China, 2005    
 
Table 10a. Sales and exports by Japanese MNC affiliates  
(Unit: Per cent of sales)  













Food -  -  -  73.3  20.4  6.2 
Chemicals 98.0  0.0  2.0  78.6  14.8  6.6 
Primary and fabricated metals  -  -  -  72.3  11.8  15.8 
Machinery and equipment  49.2  2.3  48.5  47.0  32.2  20.7 
Electronic equipment  95.7  1.8  2.5  47.9  35.7  16.4 
Computers and electronics  75.4  1.6  23.0  33.0  33.2  33.8 
Transportation equipment  76.6  0.4  23.0  69.5  26.0  4.6 
Other manufacturing  94.7  3.9  1.4  52.1  38.1  9.7 
Source: RIETI at http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/database/d08.html  
 
 
Table 10b. Sales and exports by United States MNC affiliates  
(Unit: Per cent of sales) 













All industries  78.4  11.9  9.8  67.9  9.3  22.8 
Mining 98.8  0.8  0.4  (D)  (D)  1.3 
Utilities (D)  0.0  0.0  100.0     
Manufacturing  84.9  5.6     9.4  59.7  9.9  30.3 
 Food  97.9  0.3  1.8  91.1  0.7  8.1 
 Chemicals  94.4  0.2  5.4  86.7  3.5  9.8 
 Primary and fabricated 
metals 
(D) (D)  8.9  71.6  12.5  16.0 
 Machinery  58.9  19.7  21.5  64.8  9.8  25.4 
  Computers and electronic 
products 




(D) (D)  (D)  39.4  25.4  35.2 
Transportation equipment  85.5 6.6  7.8  84.4  3.9  11.7 
Wholesale trade  93.6  3.2  3.2  90.0  4.8  5.2 
Information (D)  19.2  (D)  (D)  (D)  2.3 
Finance and insurance  90.6  7.3  1.9  (D)  (D)  (D) 
Professional, scientific and 
technical services 
34.2 47.8  18.0  67.7  24.0  8.3 
Other industries  (D)  17.0  (D)  (D)  (D)  (D) 
Source: United States Bureau of Economic Analysis at http://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm#omc.    
Notes: (D) indicates suppression to avoid disclosure of data of individual companies.  
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(d)  Local purchases and imports 
 
  Figure 26 presents sourcing patterns of Japanese MNCs (as a percentage of 
total purchases) in India and China in 2005. (Similar data for United States MNCs are 
unfortunately unavailable). In his study of auto-component supply chains in India and 
China, Sutton (2004) found that as supply chains further developed, key components 
(cylinder heads and blocks) were manufactured either in-house or outsourced within a 
host country, gradually creating less dependency on imported components from the 
FDI home country.  
 
The local purchase ratio by Japanese MNCs in India is quite high in chemicals 
(87 per cent of total purchases), computers and electronic products (64 per cent) and 
transport equipment (60 per cent), even though they also depend on imports from 
Japan. In transport equipment, imports from Japan accounted for 38 per cent of total 
purchases. An interesting case is a sourcing pattern in computers and electronics, with 
64 per cent of purchases locally sourced and 33 per cent imported. It is also notable 
that Japanese MNC affiliates in other areas of manufacturing (mainly labour-intensive 
industries such as clothing and footwear) heavily depend on imports from Japan; 72 
per cent of total purchases came from Japan. Interestingly, Japanese MNC affiliates in 
transport equipment in China still depend extensively on imports (84 per cent) from 
Japan, while only 15 per cent was locally sourced.  
 
In sum, the high ratio of local purchases reflects the fact that Japanese MNCs 
in India appear to be developing supply chains in local markets in India, consistent 





















Figure 26. Local purchase and import of Japanese MNCs in India and China, 
2005 (as a percentage of purchase) 
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This chapter examines the economic operations of Japanese and United States 
affiliates in India and China, using previously little exploited MNC affiliate-level data. 
The main findings suggest that while Japanese and United States MNC affiliates in 
China are relatively more concentrated in computers and electronics, their investment 
focus is quite different in India. The United States MNCs are concentrated more in 
information technology-related service sectors, thus strengthening the service-led 
growth of the Indian economy. In contrast, Japanese MNCs hold the predominant 
position in the transport equipment industry (automotives), with the bulk of sales 
going to local markets as well as being exported to other countries. Given that the 
transport equipment sector is quite skills-intensive and focused on the domestic 
market more than on exports, it has yet to be seen whether India is following pattern 
of East Asia in integrating into the IPNs.  
 
In addition, it appears questionable whether Japanese MNCs in automobiles 
will further develop export orientation while incentives are becoming greater for 
focusing more on local markets due to India’s increasing number of middle-income 
households and current weak links with parent firms in Japan. In the author’s view, 
improvements in infrastructure and the investment climate will be necessary to 
connect India with global production networks. If the Japan-India FTA covers broad 
areas and can facilitate cross-border transactions between the two countries, it may 
have positive impacts on India’s participation in IPNs. This is particularly the case, 
given the fact that Japanese-style IPNs usually start by establishing strong supply-
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Integrating into Asia’s International Production Networks:  
Challenges and prospects for India
41 
 
Rahul Sen and Sadhana Srivastava 
 
 
During the past three decades, IPNs were created by multinationals in labour-
intensive manufacturing industries among East and South-East Asian countries. This 
phenomenon, in which FDI played a major role, was fuelled by the adoption of 
export-led outward-oriented growth strategy by Asian countries since the 1980s 
decade. In stark contrast, India, one of the world’s currently emerging and rapidly 
growing economies in terms of GDP growth adjusted for purchasing power parity 
(PPP), has been largely left out of such global division of labour.
42 A plausible reason 
is that India strictly followed a self-reliance and import-substitution growth until 
about 1991, when it adopted major policy reforms towards a more outward orientation.  
 
The “stop-go” economic reforms during the past two decades have reduced 
trade barriers and produced “relatively” open trade and investment environments in 
India. The economy grew very rapidly at an annual average of 7.2 per cent between 
2000 and 2009, with the merchandise trade-to-GDP ratio doubling from about 21 per 
cent in 2000 to 42 per cent in 2008, compared with just 13 per cent in the pre-reform 
period in 1990. However, the Indian manufacturing sector has so far not played an 
important role in the Indian growth process. When benchmarked with rapidly-growing 
countries in East and South-East Asia, Indian manufacturing industries have lagged in 
development and have not integrated into the growing IPNs in Asia. 
 
In this context, integrating into global manufacturing markets through 
participation in IPNs is viewed as a key driver in providing development opportunities 
for the Indian manufacturing sector through technology transfers and access to global 
markets. It is therefore important to analyse whether India is beginning to integrate into 
IPNs in Asia and globally, and whether that potential has been successfully utilized by 
the manufacturing sector. It is also important to identify the policy challenges that 
businesses are likely to face while aiming to connect India with the Asian IPNs. This 
chapter aims to shed light on these issues. 
 
Against the above backdrop, this chapter analyses the current state of 
participation of India in IPNs of manufacturing industries in Asia, and identifies the 
                                                            
 
41 This chapter draws on existing literature on this subject by Srivastava and Sen (2011). 




constraints and challenges for India’s deeper participation in the near future. The 
changing directions of India’s trade policy and that of FDI are critically analysed with 
regard to their role in fostering greater participation by India in Asian IPNs. This 
includes India’s recent initiatives towards Asian economic integration by entering into 
regional and bilateral PTAs, with ASEAN, the Republic of Korea and Japan. This 
chapter includes case studies of two industries (auto-components and electronics) to 
illustrate potentially successful examples of India emerging as an important regional 
player in Asian IPNs.  The emerging policy challenges and key recommendations for 
India to integrate into Asian IPNs are analysed, thus highlighting the implications for 
other countries in South Asia. 
 
Section 1 of this chapter presents the ongoing economic reforms of India. 
Section 2 analyses the current status of India in the Asian IPN process. Section 3 
expands on Srivastava and Sen (2011) by analysing the trends, extent and patterns of 
production fragmentation in India’s merchandise trade in parts and components (P&C) 
for manufacturing products during two distinct sub-periods. The first sub-period was 
1994-2004, which covered the first phase of calibrated globalization of the Indian 
economy. The second sub-period, 2005-2008, covered the effect of the ongoing 
integration of India into the global economy, and the events running up to the global 
economic crisis of 2008-2009. This period was chosen in order to capture the effect of 
economic reforms in India during the previous decadal period and more recent years. 
The Athukorala (2005) and Athukorala and Yamashita (2005) framework is applied in 
analysing the extent and trends in trade in P&C in India’s manufacturing sector trade, 
separately from that of total trade flows, for which disaggregated product level data is 
used from the United Nations COMTRADE database at the 5-digit level based on the 
Standard Industrial Trade Classification (SITC) Revision 3. 
 
Section 3 estimates the extent of intra-industry trade in these P&C trade 
sectors in the Indian economy. Intra-industry trade estimates provide indirect evidence 
of the role of FDI in the process of production fragmentation, especially when the 
sector concerned is more producer-driven.
43 It also uses estimates of marginal intra-
industry trade in India’s manufacturing trade in P&C, which provide useful insights to 
the nature and magnitude of product fragmentation. 
 
Section 4 provides a case study of the industry experience of India’s integration 
into Asian IPNs. Following Srivastava and Sen (2011) and Nag (2009), the auto-
components and electronics components industries emerge as the two potentially most 
important sectors wherein there is evidence of international product fragmentation and, 
hence, scope for participating in global and Asian IPNs. 
 
Section 5 analyses the policy challenges that are impeding India’s strong 
participation in Asian IPNs, and focuses on the unilateral measures that have been 
                                                            
 
43  Producer-driven commodity chains are mainly led by multinationals that play a central role in 




undertaken as a part of economic reforms as well as those within a select group of 
countries/regions through regional and bilateral PTAs. The unilateral measures 
analysed relate to India’s overall direction of trade policy, involving (a) the reduction 
of tariffs and non-tariff barriers as well as steps to improve trade facilitation, and (b) 
the state of infrastructure that has been identified as one of the biggest structural 
bottlenecks towards integrating India into IPNs. 
 
In conclusion, section 6 provides policy recommendations derived from the 
analysis, highlighting implications for India and South Asia in general.  
 
1. Ongoing economic reforms of India 
 
In July 1991, India adopted wide-ranging economic policy reforms in areas 
such as trade, investment, financial sector, industrial deregulation and reformation of 
the public sector. These reforms were aimed at achieving macro-economic 
stabilization through improved fiscal management, reduced distortions in the 
production structure, and increased competitiveness of India’s external sector through 
the reduction of trade barriers and encouragement of private capital flows (of which 
FDI was a major constituent). 
 
Rajan and Gopalan (2011) observed that after a decade of the ongoing 
reforms, India had experienced an international trade renaissance with its merchandise 
exports (including re-exports) with revenue than doubling from about US$ 95 billion 
in fiscal year April 2005-March 2006 to nearly US$ 220 billion in 2011. India’s 
exports grew at an average of almost 20 per cent between 2000 and 2009, averaging 
US$100 billion annually. Its merchandise imports more than doubled from about US$ 
138 billion to US$ 327 billion in the same period.   
 
From being among the relatively insignificant players in global trade in 1990 
(ranked below fortieth position globally, and constituting a share of 0.5 per cent of 
global merchandise exports and a share of 0.7 per cent in global merchandise imports), 
India moved rapidly up the global trade rankings. It was ranked twentieth in world 
exports in 2010, with its share of global merchandise exports increasing to 1.4 per 
cent, and thirteenth in world imports, with merchandise import shares increasing to 
2.1 per cent. In the area of trade in commercial services, India’s performance was 
highly impressive in 2010, when the country gained seventh position among world 
exporters and importers of commercial services – constituting a share of 3.3 per cent 
for that year, compared with thirty-fourth and twenty-eighth, respectively, in 1995 
(WTO, 2011a). Among developing countries globally, India was ranked as the second 
largest exporter and importer of commercial services in 2010, next to China (WTO, 
2011a). 
 
India’s “Look East policy” and its integration with South-East and East Asia is 
a significant policy development. China has emerged as the most important Asian 
trade partner of India during the past decade (figure 27). India’s trade with Singapore 
have also expanded considerably after the signing of the India-Singapore 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement. During the fiscal year from April 
2009 to September 2010, Asia was India’s largest export destination, accounting for  
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55 per cent of total exports, compared with just 40 per cent in 2001-2002;
44 during 
that period China accounted for 10 per cent of India’s total exports.  
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Source: Reserve Bank of India, 2011.  
 
  The FDI regime in India has also been significantly liberalized, with the 
opening up of its economy to foreign investors in industries such as power and fuels, 
electrical equipment, transport, chemicals, food processing, metallurgical, drugs and 
pharmaceuticals, textiles, and industrial machinery as well as in a range of 
commercial service activities. Besides liberalizing inward FDI inflows, procedures for 
outward FDI were also liberalized in the 1990s. This has resulted in a number of 
Asian countries investing in India as well as Indian companies investing in Asia. India 
attracted a cumulative total of FDI inflow worth US$ 150 billion during April 2000-
September 2011, with Singapore (10.1 per cent), Japan (4.8 per cent) and the Republic 
of  Korea (0.6 per cent) being ranked as second, fifth and fourteenth foreign investors 
in India during the same period (Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, 2011).  
 
Figure 28 presents the share of cumulative inward FDI inflows in the top 10 
industrial sectors of India from April 2000 to September 2011. The figure suggests that 
                                                            
 
44 See Rajan and Gopalan, 2011.  
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foreign investors have focused on the services sector of India; thus, the role of FDI in 
stimulating the IPN development process in India is still insignificant. The services 
sector (including financial and non-financial services) was the largest FDI-recipient 
sector, attracting nearly 20 per cent of India’s inward FDI inflow. In contrast, industries 
such as automobiles and electronics, which are an important part of Asian IPNs 
accounted for a small share in FDI inflows to India. The automobile industry (including 
automobile parts and components manufactures) was the seventh largest sector in terms 
of attracting inward FDI in India (constituting just 4 per cent of the share of FDI equity 
inflows over this period). The electronics industry was not even among the top 10 
industry sectors attracting FDI inflows during this period.  
 
Figure 28. India’s share of inward FDI inflows in the top 10 sectors, 
 April 2000-September 2011 
 












Source: Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (2011); FDI sectoral data revalidated in 
line with Reserve Bank of India data that reflect minor changes in the FDI figures compared 
with sectoral data published earlier. 
 
Recognizing that the manufacturing sector has to play a key role in sustaining 
India’s rapid growth, the Government has approved the draft national manufacturing 
policy for increasing the share of manufacturing in the gross domestic product (GDP) 
from the current share of 16 per cent to 25 per cent by 2025. In order to provide the 
necessary environment for India to emerge as a global manufacturing hub, the 
Government plans to build mega-industrial zones that contain world-class infrastructure  
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facilities. The project is expected to improve connectivity within the country and create 
100 million new jobs for the Indian workforce.  
2.  Current state of India in IPN process 
 
 In the global context, the value chains are controlled by MNCs that play the 
central roles in coordinating production networks, which includes backward- and 
forward-linkages. Industries that are subject to design, research and development, and 
significant economies-of-scale such as semiconductors, automobiles and heavy 
machinery, are likely candidates for the creation of IPNs controlled by MNCs. In Asia, 
IPNs of these industries have enabled different countries to participate along the 
global value-added chain of a good. As a result, expansion of intra-firm and intra-
industry (IIT) trade transactions between countries participating in the production 
networks has been rapid. 
 
  Kimura (2007 and 2009) developed an analytical framework based on the 
spatial nature of production networks and applied it to the Asian context, particularly 
ASEAN. He identified four phases of industrialization based on current participation 
in production/distribution networks (figure 29). The first phase essentially consists of 
countries that need to get into the production networks, and which are building a 
business-friendly investment climate in order to attract new production blocks. 
Typically, these are low-income developing economies, which face significant policy 
challenges in attracting efficiency-seeking or export-platform FDI.
45 The  second 
phase requires development of industrial agglomeration to support the existing 
production blocks. For countries in the second phase,
46  it is important to attract 
foreign small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that form into industrial clusters 
of vertical production network by removing investment bottlenecks and improving 
service link arrangements. The third and forth phases comprise countries that are 
industrialized and whose firms are already internationally competitive and have 
become multinationals developing their own production and distribution networks. 
Thus, developing international competitiveness of indigenous firms is crucial to 













45  The lesser developed ASEAN economies (Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic and 
Myanmar) are placed currently in this category (Kimura, 2009). 
46 According to Kimura (2009), Viet Nam has already moved into this phase, with most of the other 






Figure 29. The four phases of industrial development through utilizing IPNs 
 
 
Source: Based on Kimura, 2009. 
 
 
In the Indian context, it seems that FDI inflows have apparently not made a 
significant contribution to the development of IPNs, as the FDI inflows have been 
more market-seeking in nature. Veeramani (2009) analysed IIT of 75 Indian industries 
and found that India’s IIT was negatively influenced by the market-seeking nature of 
its inward FDI in the domestic industries.
47  This view of market-seeking motives 
driving Indian FDI in manufacturing has been empirically established by studies such 
as Aggarwal (2001), Kumar (1990), Kumar and Siddharthan (1994), Pailwar (2001) 
and Pant (1993 and 1995), among others.  
 
Based on the framework proposed by Kimura (2007) illustrated above, India 
would probably be characterized as having entered the first phase of integrating into 
IPNs. There are some modest signs that show India might gradually get involved in 
the IPN process after ongoing economic reforms have been pursued for more than a 
decade. Veeramani (2002) found that India’s IIT grew significantly and responded 
positively to economic reforms that have unleashed a series of trade and investment 
                                                            
 
47  Veeramani (2009) analysed the effect of trade barriers and multinationals on India’s IIT in 75 
industries through panel regressions. The study estimated IIT using 4-digit data based on the 
International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC). The Grubel-Lloyd (G-L)  index as well as an 
additional measure of marginal IIT, as suggested by Brülhart (1994), was used to understand changes 





















liberalization measures since the 1990s.
48 Kumar (2003) noted that reforms prompted 
foreign multinationals to begin exploring the potential of India as an export-
production platform in a modest manner. Srivastava (2007) observed that India was 
indeed becoming attractive to export-oriented FDI, with a greater potential in services 
than in the manufacturing sector. According to Banik and Gilbert (2010), one of the 
major reasons that IPNs had yet not flourished in South Asia was that manufacturing 
activities of countries in that subregion placed emphasis on low-level technology, 
labour-intensive exports such as textiles, leather products, in which there was little 
scope for production fragmentation. If India is to participate in global and Asian IPNs, 
diversification towards exporting parts and components of vertically-fragmented final 
products is essential. 
 
3.  Production fragmentation in India’s manufacturing trade:                 
Trends and patterns 
 
This analysis compares patterns of trade in P&C by India for 1994, 1999, 2004 
and 2005-2008.
49 Following the definition and methodology of Athukorala (2005), 
parts and components are defined at the 5-digit SITC Revision. 3. Data were 
downloaded from the United Nations COMTRADE database. The dataset for this 
study contains 231 products from SITC 7 and 8, i.e., 172 products belonging to SITC 




In 2008, global P&C exports were worth US$ 1,118 billion. India’s 
contribution to global exports was only about 0.8 per cent, which is quite insignificant 
when compared with other developing economies in East and South-East Asia.
51 
However, the growth of India’s P&C exports has been significantly higher than the 
growth of merchandise exports in general as well as manufacturing exports (figure 30).  
 
The structure of India’s exports has been highly concentrated. The top  10 
export items constituted more than 60 per cent of total exports in the P&C categories. 
Parts and accessories of automobiles and other vehicles (categories 784 and 785 in 
SITC Rev. 3) constituted the bulk of India’s P&C exports, followed by  parts and 
components for electrical, electronic and telecommunications equipment (categories 
SITC 75 to 77).





48 Veeramani (2002) analysed trends in India’s overall intra-industry trade (IIT) and with its 51 trading 
partners in three years: 1988, 1995 and 2000. 
49 The merit of using trade in parts and components as evidence of the intensity of IPN activities is 
discussed in chapter 3 of this book. 
50  The merit of using SITC Revision 3 classification is noted comprehensively in Athukorala and 
Yamashita, 2005. 
51 See Athukorala, 2010. 
52 For details see Appendix II to this book, tables 1a and 1b.  
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Source: Computed by authors from United Nations COMTRADE data. 
  
India contributed about 1.5 per cent to world imports of parts and components. 
Unlike the export side, India’s growth of P&C imports was less than that of total 
merchandise imports and manufacturing imports; the difference was particularly large 
during recent years (figure 31).  
 



























The import composition was slightly less concentrated than that of exports. 
The top 10 items constituted no more than 50 per cent of total P&C imports by India. 
Parts and accessories for data processing machines (SITC 75997) have been among 
the most important items in P&C imports by India.
53 
 
India’s intra-industry trade in parts and components 
 
Parts and components trade in IPNs usually involves a higher degree of IIT.
54 
This study followed the methodology used by Rajan (1996) and Srivastava and Sen 
(2011). Estimating IIT of P&C trade involves three steps.
55 The first step separates 
India’s total P&C trade into one-way trade (inter-industry trade explained by the 
traditional comparative advantage theory) and two-way trade (IIT), which implies that 
trade might involve fragmented production chains. The second step is an estimate 
both of the value of IIT as well as the G-L index, which measure degree of IIT of 
those products. The third step is an analysis of the estimates of marginal IIT (MIIT), 
as suggested by Brülhart (1994), to ascertain whether the change in trade volumes in 
these parts and components during the periods analysed are due more either to intra-
industry or to inter-industry trade.
56 
 
In the first step, the methodology applied is that of Abd-el Rahman (1991) and 
Ando (2006), which breaks down India’s total P&C trade into one-way trade and two-
way trade. Figure 32 provides the results of this break-down for 1994-2004. The share 
of two-way trade, which represents IIT, increased from 53.7 per cent to 79.4 per cent 
during 1994-2008. This provides evidence that evolving international production 










53  For details see Appendix II of this book, tables 2a and 2b. 
54 IIT has generally been estimated in the empirical literature by the Grubel-Lloyd (G-L) index (Grubel 
and Lloyd, 1975). The later versions of the index havebeen modified to improve upon the downward 
bias (Rajan, 1996). 
55   Although several empirical studies on IIT among East Asian economies have attempted to 
distinguish between horizontally and vertically differentiated products, this paper does not make such a 
distinction with volume of India’s P&C trade in total trade being significantly lesser in magnitude. 
56 MIIT is a transposition of the G-L index using first differences of trade flows (Brülhart, 1994). 
Similar to the Grubel-Lloyd (G-L) index, the MIIT index takes value from 0 to 1. The value close to 1 
indicates the almost 100 per cent of the changes in  trade over the time period is due to changes of 
intra-industry trade, while the index is close to zero indicates that inter-industry trade explained most of 
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Source: Author’s calculations, based on  United Nations COMTRADE data. 
 
 
There has been an increasing degree of IIT in parts and components for 
machinery and electronic products as well as for automobile and other vehicles. 
Specifically, auto-parts (SITC 78439) were always among the top three products that 
involved a high amount of IIT throughout the period of the study.
57 The results of 
MIIT estimates for the top 10 P&C products involving the highest levels of IIT in 
2008 are presented in table 11. It can be seen that from 1994 to 2008 intra-industry 
trade accounted for more than 50 per cent of the changes in trading of eight products 
in the top 10 P&C products. Automotive parts and accessories (SITC 78434 and 
78439), parts for spark-ignition combustion piston engines (SITC 71391) and 
photosensitive semiconductor devices (SITC 77637) showed relatively high levels of 









57 The estimates for the top 10 P&C products involving product fragmentation due to IIT over the 




Table 11. Marginal intra-industry trade in top 10 products involving P&C trade 
in 2008 
Commodity Code  2008 (over 1994)  2008 (over 1999) 
78439 74.0  75.3 
79295 48.4  70.4 
77637 87.3  88.9 
71392 78.4  88.6 
77282 64.9  66.2 
78434 95.5  94.6 
76493 34.4  36.3 
78537 71.2  40.4 
72855 67.7  63.6 
71391 82.6  99.5 
Source: Calculated from United Nations COMTRADE data. 
Note: See Appendix I of this book for commodity description. 
 
4.  Indian industries in IPNs: A case study 
 
The previous section suggests that product fragmentation appears to emerge in 
some Indian automotive components and electronics sectors. Anecdotal evidence 
shows that automobile MNCs from Japan, the Republic of Korea, Europe and United 
States (such as General Motors, Suzuki, Ford, Toyota, Hyundai, Daimler Chrysler 
Fiat, Skoda, Mitsubishi, Honda, Volvo and Yamaha) have increasingly exported auto-
components from India to global markets. In the area of consumer electronics, MNCs 
such as Samsung, LG, Nokia and Philips are strengthening their presence in India, and 
increasingly outsourcing parts and components from their Indian suppliers (India 
Brand Equity Foundation, 2011). India’s participation in Asian IPNs in each of these 
industries is analysed below. 
 
(a) Auto-components  industry 
 
The Indian auto-component industry has been growing at 20 per cent annually 
since 2000. The value of the auto-components industry has been estimated at US$ 22 
billion in 2009-2010, growing at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 20.4 per 
cent since 2004-2005. Technological shifts in the Indian automobile industry have been 
the key drivers of growth and innovation. India is currently emerging as a hub for engine 
components. Global original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) have been setting up 
engine manufacturing units in the country. By 2012, India was expected to foresee the 
increased deployment of IT-enabled automobile support systems that would promote  
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innovation in this industry, such as global positioning systems, anti-braking systems, and 
automatic speech recognition and safety systems.
58 
 
The auto-component industry recorded a total investment of US$ 9 billion in 
2009-2010, compared with US$3.8 billion in 2004-2005. During 2000-2011, the 
automobile industry (including auto-components) has been the sixth-largest 
recipient of FDI equity inflows into India, receiving a cumulative FDI inflow worth 
US$ 6.4 billion from April 2000 to September 2011, constituting a 4 per cent share 
of total FDI (Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, 2011). According to 
the Automotive Component Manufacturers Association (ACMA) (2011), 
investment in the industry (both domestic and foreign) is expected to reach US$ 35 
billion by 2020. 
 
Rising domestic demand has been a major factor driving the strong growth. 
In addition, the availability of low-cost skilled manpower is attracting foreign 
OEMs to invest in India. According to the India Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF) 
(2011), there are approximately 400,000 engineering graduates each year in India, 
and the cost of entry-level engineers is as low as US$ 8,000 per year. Recently, the 
Government provided investment incentives, such as lower excise duties, realization 
of value-added tax (VAT), allowing FDI up to 100 per cent, which have strongly 
contributed to the growth of this industry (ACMA, 2011).   
 
Currently, MNCs play a minor role in India’s auto-component production. In 
2010, MNCs such as Magna, Visteon, Federal-Mogul Corporation (North American-
based), Valeo, Bosch (European-based) and Denso (Japan-based) contributed only 15 per 
cent of the production in the Indian auto-components market.
59 This  suggests  that 
compared to South-East and East Asia, the role of Asian MNCs in India’s auto-
components industry has been minimal (IBEF, 2011). Data are unavailable for the 
contribution of MNCs in this industry by country of origin, which makes it impossible to 
ascertain whether Asian or non-Asian MNCs have been playing the dominant role in FDI 
in this industry, and more particularly in the subsector of auto-components.
60 
 
India exported about 13 per cent of its auto-components in 2010-2011, at a 
value of US$ 5.2 billion. This industry witnessed a CAGR of 21 per cent in its 
exports from US$ 1.3 billion in 2003-2004. Principal export items included 
replacement parts, tractor parts, motorcycle parts, piston rings, gaskets, engine 
valves, fuel pump nozzles, fuel injection parts, filter and filter elements, radiators, 
                                                            
 
58 India’s process-engineering expertise, applied to re-designing of production processes, has resulted 
in the reduction in manufacturing costs of components. As a result, India, today, has become the 
outsourcing hub for several global automobile manufacturers.  
59 The organized sector of this industry contributed 58 per cent of total production, with Indian firms 
contributing 43 per cent of total production while MNCs accounted for 15 per cent. The unorganized 
sector contributed 27 per cent of production (IBEF, 2011). 
60 Monthly FDI statistics published by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion of India 
provide detailed data on either aggregate country-wise FDI equity inflows or by industrial sectors, but 
not both.  
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gears, leaf springs, brake assemblies and bearings, clutch facings, head lamps, auto 
bulbs and halogen bulbs, spark plugs and body parts (ACMA, 2011). Nag (2009) 
observed that India’s auto-components exports were growing notably but that the 
growth rate was much smaller than that of China. He estimated that during 1995-
2006, India’s exports of auto-components increased from US$ 0.28 billion to US$ 
1.38 billion, while China’s auto-components exports increased from US$ 0.38 
billion to US$ 8.93 billion during the same period. 
 
Currently, India’s trade in auto-components is running at a deficit with Asia, 
while it is in surplus with Europe and North America. Europe was the main 
destination for Indian auto-component exports in 2010-2011 with a share of 36 per 
cent. North America accounted for nearly 24 per cent of these exports, while the 
share of Asia was 28 per cent. The majority of exports to Europe have comprised 
sourcing of auto-parts by European-based automobile OEMs such as BMW, 
Volkswagen, Fiat Renault and Mercedes Benz. During the same period, 54 per cent 
of India’s auto-component imports were from Asia, followed by Europe (36 per 
cent) and North America (8 per cent). 
 
Table 12 presents the top 10 export destinations for Indian auto-components 
in 2008, identified at the SITC 5-digit product level. With the exception of the 
Republic of Korea and Thailand, no other East or South-East Asian country ranked 
among the top three destinations for all auto-component exports during that year. 
The majority of India’s auto-component exports were destined for the United 
Kingdom, the United States, Italy, Germany, Mexico, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and 
Middle Eastern countries.  Nag (2011) also found that in 2007-2008, IIT in auto-
components of India was higher for trade with the United States and Germany than 
with any Asian country.
61 He noted that while the majority of India’s auto-exports 
were not destined for Asia, India was increasingly sourcing a significant amount of 
auto-components from Asia. This suggests that India’s level of participation in 
Asian IPNs involves more one-way than two-way trade in auto-components.  
 
Although the current participation of India in Asian IPNs is relatively low, it 
has been gradually increasing. Table 13 presents the trends in India’s automobile 
P&C exports to major Asian countries involved in automotive IPNs during 1994-
2008. The share of India’s automobile P&C exports to eight major auto-component 
producers in Asia increased from 6.3 per cent in 1994 to 10.8 per cent in 2008. The 
table shows rapid expansion rates in exports to the Republic of Korea, Thailand, 
China and Japan.   
                                                            
 
61 Nag (2011) defined auto-components as within the 8-digit harmonized commodity description and 
coding system classification.  
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Table 12. Export shares and major destinations for India’s auto-parts, 2008 
 


























































































































































































































































































Source: Calculated from United Nations COMTRADE data. 








Table 13. India’s exports of auto-parts to major countries involved in Asian IPNs, 1994-2008 
 
















Share in total 
(%) 
China  0.1  0.0 0.5  0.2  12.4  1.7 22.9 1.3 
Thailand  0.8  0.3 0.4  0.2  10.8  1.5 50.1 2.8 
Malaysia    2.9  1.1 2.8  1.1  11.5  1.6 11.7 0.7 
Indonesia  3.9  1.6 2.7  1.1  5.7  0.8 12.3 0.7 
Singapore 7.1 2.8 2.0 0.8  2.8  0.4 4.4 0.3 
Viet  Nam  0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0  0.7  0.1 0.6 0.0 





































World 251.4  6.5  253.0  8.1  709.9  8.4  1  765.5  10.8 
Source: Calculated from United Nations COMTRADE data. 
Note: See Appendix I of this book for commodity description.   
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The economic reforms since the 1990s have significantly liberalized India’s 
trade in auto-components. India’s tariffs on imported auto-components decreased 
from 35 per cent to 10 per cent during 2001-2008. Manufacturing and imports in this 
sector are now free from licensing and approval requirements. Tariffs on raw material 
have been reduced from 10 per cent to between 5 per cent and 7.5 per cent.  A 
restriction on foreign equity has been lifted for investment in auto-component sector, 
and foreign equity input is allowed up to 100 per cent.  In addition, the Government 
has initiated a number of investment incentives to encourage R&D, technology 
upgrading and use of fuel-efficient technologies.
62  
 
Those measures are expected to allow Indian and India-based global auto-
manufacturers to source auto-components more efficiently, and to increase integration 
of the Indian automobile sector into IPNs of MNCs. A case study by Nag (2011) 
points to the evidence that India is beginning to be chosen as an export platform for 
some auto-parts. Toyota Kirloskar Auto Parts (TKAP), a joint-venture between 
Toyota and a local manufacturer, has been exporting gearboxes from India to its 
assembly plants in different parts of the world, including Thailand, since 2004. In 
addition, Toyota has included India as a part of the firm’s international multipurpose 
vehicle (IMV) project, by designating India as its production base for gearboxes and 
other auto-parts supplied to Indonesia and other countries in Toyota’s network. The 




Apart from Toyota, automotive manufacturers such as Hyundai, Renault-
Nissan, Ford, Chevrolet, Honda, Toyota and VW are investing in new capacity for 
supplying local and overseas markets. Suzuki India has developed a global sourcing 
policy and is trying to procure components from its suppliers throughout the world by 
integrating them into its Asian IPNs (Nag, 2011). This is expected to increase two-
way trade of auto-components among China, India and Indonesia, where Suzuki’s 
                                                            
 
62 The aim of the Automotive Mission Plan 2006-2016 by the Ministry of Heavy Industries as well 
as public enterprises is aimed at increasing the auto-industry output from US$ 34 billion in 2006 to 
US$ 160 billion by 2016, and export revenues to US$ 35 billion during the same period ( export 
revenue was  US$ 5 billion in 2010-2011). The Automotive Mission Plan recommended setting up a 
technology modernization fund, with special emphasis on SMEs, and encouraging the establishment of 
development centres as well as streamlining training research institutions around auto hubs. As part of 
the national automotive testing and R&D infrastructure project, the Government planned to set up an 
R&D fund of US$ 388.5 million to enable the industry to adopt and implement global standards of 
vehicular safety, emission and performance standards. The recent Union Budget of 2010–2011 has also 
given further impetus to the automotive industry by increasing weighted income tax deduction for in-
house R&D from 150 per cent to 200 per cent, and for outsourced R&D from 125 per cent to 175 per 
cent; this is expected to reduce the upgrading costs of companies.  
63 According to Nag (2011), exporting gearboxes is just the beginning of Toyota’s strategy to integrate 
India into its Asian IPNs, and there may be possibilities for Toyota and other global automobile 
manufacturers to source automotive hardware such as cast parts, metal components and sub-assemblies 
as well as software from their Indian operations.  
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plants are located. In the case of two-wheelers, Indian companies such as TVS and 
Bajaj Auto are beginning to show a strong presence in Asian markets, particularly in 
Indonesia. These two companies recorded export growth of more than 50 per cent in 
2006 and have recently expanded manufacturing capacity in Asia, with TVS investing 
US$ 55 million in establishing an assembly plant in Indonesia.  
 













































China India Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand  
Source: Calculated from United Nations COMTRADE data. 
 
 
At the national level, it is still challenging for India to develop production and 
trade linkages with Asian IPNs to a scale that is comparable with China and ASEAN 
countries. The current trade and investment structures of the Indian auto-components 
industry are linked more with European and North American MNCs than with Asian 
MNCs. Europe and North America together account for more than 60 per cent of 
auto-component exports by India. Nag (2011) found that Indian auto-component 
producers preferred to tie up with European or American MNCs more than with Asian 
MNCs. A major reason is the higher flexibility in doing business, because Asian 
MNCs usually do not allow their local partners to supply the same products to firms 
outside their production networks  
 




The electronic components industry is a subsector of the electronics industry 
that caters to the requirements of consumer electronics, telecom, defence and 
information technology sectors. Some examples of electronic parts and components 
exported from India are television picture tubes (black and white, and colour), 
monitor tubes, diodes and transistors, power devices, integrated circuits, hybrid 
microcircuits, resistors, capacitors (plastic film, electrolytic, tantalum and ceramic), 
connectors, switches, relays, magnetic heads, printed circuit boards, crystals, 
loudspeakers, and hard and soft ferrites. Most of the top global semiconductor 
companies have set up chip design centres in India. With the introduction of the 
Special Incentive Package Scheme announced by the Government, it is expected that 
chip manufacturing will start in the near future. 
 
Production of electronic components during 2009-2010 registered a growth of 
17.7 per cent from 2008-2009. The rapid growth of India’s electronic components 
industry has mainly been driven by growth in the consumer electronics industry. The 
demand for electronic components such as printed circuit boards, semiconductor devices, 
connectors, wound components and antennas increased due to demand from indigenous 
manufacturing of mobile phones, set top boxes, DVD players etc. Shares of electronic 
components in total production increased from an average of 43 per cent in 2004-2005 to 
72 per cent in 2009-2010 (figure 34). 
 
 
Figure 34. Trends in India's electronics components production and 
exports, 2004-2010 
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Table 14 presents the export values and shares of major export destinations of 
the top 10 items of India’s electronics component exports in 2010, which also 
corresponds to the SITC 77 broad product category in the trade data. The bulk of these 
electronics component exports were destined for OECD countries, particularly the 
United States and Germany. This suggests that India’s links with Asian IPNs on the 
export side in this industry are also not so strong.  
 
However, according to the Electronics and Software Exports Promotion 
Council (2011), following the onset of the global economic crisis in 2008-2009, the 
share of India’s electronics components exports to the European Union declined from 
46 per cent in 2008-2009 to 37 per cent in 2009-2010, while exports to Japan, the 
Republic of Korea and East Asia as well as Singapore, Hong Kong, China and South 
Asian countries increased from 5 per cent to 11 per cent during the same period.   
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Export value in 
2009-2010 
(US$ million) 
Major destinations during 2009-2010, with approximate percentage share of  items in total export 
value 
 




United States  (11 per cent), Germany (10 per cent), United Arab Emirates (9 per cent), United Kingdom (6 





Germany (55 per cent), Netherlands (12 per cent), Italy (7 per cent), Spain (4 per cent), Australia (4 per cent), 
others (18 per cent) 




China (23 per cent), United Arab Emirates (19 per cent), United States (17 per cent), the Netherlands (10 per 





Ethiopia (12 per cent), Nigeria (9 per cent), Kenya (8 per cent),Djibouti (7 per cent), United Kingdom (6 per 
cent), others (58 per cent) 




United States (26 per cent), Austria (21 per cent), China (10 per cent),Germany (7 per cent), Spain (6 per 





Germany (24 per cent), Netherlands (15 per cent), Russia Federation (10 per cent), China (9 per cent), Hong 
Kong, China (6 per cent), others (36 per cent) 






United States (10 per cent), Islamic Republic of Iran (8 per cent), United Arab Emirates (8 per cent), 
Germany  





Germany (26 per cent), HK (10 per cent), Nigeria (9 per cent), United States (9 per cent), Czech Republic (7 





Germany (38 per cent), Spain (10 per cent), Italy (7 per cent), Singapore (6 per cent), United States (6 per 
cent), others (33 per cent). 




Bahrain (72 per cent), United States (20 per cent), Singapore (1 per cent), Mauritius (1 per cent), Nigeria (1 
per cent), others (5 per cent). 




Foreign investment in the electronic component industry has been facilitated 
by the export promotion scheme that allows foreign investment of up to 100 per cent 
in production exclusively for exports. The units set up under these programmes are 
bonded factories that are eligible to import their entire requirements of capital goods, 
raw materials and components, spares and consumables, office equipment etc. free of 
import tariffs.  As in case of auto-parts industry, this industry has also benefited from 
economic reforms, reductions and elimination of tariff barriers, and the creation of 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) for electronics firms to manufacture for export 
purposes as well as for the domestic market. In addition, tax incentives in SEZs, such 
as (a) total income tax exemption on export profits for five years, (b) 50 per cent  tax 
exemption for the subsequent five years and (c) 50 per cent tax exemption on 
ploughed-back profits for five years thereafter, has encouraged the growth and exports 
of this industry.  
 
However, the small amount of cumulative FDI inflows over the past decade 
suggests that MNCs have not played a significant role yet in development of this 
sector (IBEF, 2011).  From 2000 to 2011, the electronics industry has been the 
twenty-fifth largest recipient of FDI equity inflows in India, receiving a cumulative 
FDI inflow worth US$ 1.1 billion from April 2000 to September 2011, constituting a 




It is evident that current trade and investment patterns of the Indian electronic 
components industries are linked more with European and North American MNCs 
more than with Asian MNCs. Contract manufacturing and sourcing of electronic 
components is where India is currently playing a role in global IPNs, but the industry 
needs to move up the value chain and acquire capabilities as a manufacturing base to 
further strengthen its role in IPNs involving Asian countries in the near future. 
 
5. Improving India’s participation in Asian IPNs: Policy challenges 
 
The question is how can India strengthen its participation in Asian IPNs? As 
argued by Kimura (2009) and Hew, Das and Sen (2009), creating a competitive and 
business-friendly investment climate is the first step, with improvements in physical 
infrastructure to reduce trade costs as the next step that will allow industrial 
agglomeration and link it to the production blocks. The role of bilateral and regional 
PTAs involving tariff and non-tariff barrier reduction, regulatory reform, and reducing 
transaction and trade costs in an IPN are also of significance. In the Indian context 




64 Again, data are unavailable on the contribution of MNCs, by country of origin, in this industry. This 
makes it impossible to ascertain whether Asian or non-Asian MNCs have been playing the dominant 
role in FDI in this industry, and more particularly in the subsector of electronic components.  
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(a) The need for continued unilateral trade and investment liberalization with 
emphasis on regulatory reforms; 
(b)  The reduction of transactions costs of trade and improvement of the 
physical and institutional infrastructure; 
(c) Addressing factor market rigidities and making labour laws flexible; 
(d) Utilizing PTAs effectively with countries that are already part of Asian 
IPNs and supporting the PTAs with unilateral “second-generation” reforms. 
 
The significance of each of these policy challenges and India’s position vis-à-
vis South-East and East Asian developing countries needs to be analysed in detail. 
 
(a)  Unilateral trade and investment liberalization with emphasis on regulatory 
reforms 
 
India’s development strategy has moved away from an inward-looking stance 
towards a global and outward-oriented strategy during the past two decades. As a part 
of its unilateral trade liberalization since the first generation of economic reforms of 
1991, Indian policymakers have highlighted the need to expand the volume of trade 
and use trade expansion as a policy tool to promote economic growth and 
employment.
65  One of the major objectives of the new foreign trade policy is to 
enhance the process of diversification of India's export products and markets. 
 
The shift to non-traditional markets has been actively aided by offering a 
range of incentives to exporters to explore 39 new markets – 26 under the focus 
market scheme and 13 under market-linked focus product schemes.
66 The  focus 
market scheme primarily aims to offset high freight costs involved in trade with 
selected international markets in order to enhance India’s export competitiveness in 
those countries. Measures include providing credit for payment of import duties and 
other forms of export financial assistance for exporters – ranging from 2.5 per cent to 
3 per cent of the value of exports. Under the focus product scheme, a number of 
products (including automobiles and other engineering products) have been given 
incentives. The objective is to encourage production and exports of those products 
that possess high employment elasticity.
67 
 
As a result of policy shifts towards outward orientation, India’s simple average 
applied MFN tariff rate declined from 15.1 per cent in 2006/07 to 12 per cent in 
2010/11. The largest proportion of lines (8,042, i.e., 71 per cent) was subject to a tariff 
rate of between 5 per cent and 10 per cent, while 12.8 per cent of total lines were 
subject to a tariff rate greater than zero but lower than 5 per cent. This is a major shift 
from 2006/07, when 65 per cent of all tariff lines were within the 10-15 per cent range, 
                                                            
 
65 With the latest foreign trade policy of 2009-2014, Indian policymakers are hoping to achieve an 
annual export growth of 15 per cent; with the long-term objective being to accelerate export growth to 
25 per cent per annum and to double India's share in global trade by 2020 (WTO, 2011c). 
66 See Rajan and Gopalan, 2011,,and WTO, 2011c.. 
67 See Rajan and Gopalan, 2011..  
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followed by 10.4 per cent of lines at 25-30 per cent. Overall, India is estimated to 
have reduced its applied tariffs by an average 19.5 per cent during 2001-2009 (IDE-
JETRO and WTO, 2011b).  
 
The above tariff reductions have narrowed the gap between the levels of 
India’s trade protection and those of ASEAN and China. India’s trade-weighted MFN 
tariffs are now at 6 per cent, which is lower than those of Brazil and the Russian 
Federation, and not far from the Chinese and ASEAN levels (Sally, 2011). However, 
table 15 shows that when compared to other developing countries in East and South-
East Asia, India’s tariff structure still has room for further liberalization.  
 
Table 15. Tariff structure of non-agricultural goods in India and selected 
developing Asian economies 
Per cent of tariff lines 2009
Duty-free 0 <= 5 5 <= 10 10 <= 15 15 <= 25 25 <= 50 50 <= 100 > 100
India 2.4 12.7 76.3 1.1 2.2 4.4 0.6 0
China 7.8 19.9 46.5 14.3 10.5 1 0 0
Indonesia 23.7 41.6 17 15.7 1.4 0.5 0 0
Malaysia 56.9 7.7 8.5 3.6 16.3 6.9 0 0
Singapore 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thailand 24.2 43 15.2 0.2 6.2 10.8 0.4 0
Philippines 2.6 59.9 22.7 13.2 1 0.6 0 0
VietNam 37.8 19.6 7.3 9.3 11.5 13.6 0.3 0
Per cent of import values 2008
Duty-free 0 <= 5 5 <= 10 10 <= 15 15 <= 25 25 <= 50 50 <= 100 > 100
India 14.3 48.6 36.7 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0
China 48.4 18.2 27.8 2.9 2.5 0.2 0 0
Indonesia 61.2 20 8.7 8.3 0.6 0.7 0.5 0
Malaysia 64.6 14.6 2.1 5 6.7 7 0 0
Singapore 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Thailand 50.8 29.6 14.7 0 1.3 3.3 0.3 0
Philippines 22.2 60.8 9.1 4.5 0.7 2.6 0 0
VietNam 44.6 23.5 10.8 10.2 3.9 6.3 0.7 0  
Source: WTO, 2011b. 
 
Table 16 presents the average MFN applied tariffs, in 2009, of India and other 
developing Asian economies in selected manufacturing sectors that constitute the bulk 
of traded parts and components. This suggests that scope exists for India to reduce 
tariffs further, especially in the transport equipment sectors, to match the Chinese 
level.
68  A recent study by IDE-JETRO and WTO (2011) found that India’s tariff 
                                                            
 
68 These are sectoral averages.  
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levels for raw materials and semi-processed goods are higher than those of the 
ASEAN and East Asian economies.
69 
 
Table 16. Average MFN applied tariffs by selected product groups of India and 










India   7.3  7.2  20.7  8.9 
China   7.8  8.0  11.5  11.9 
Indonesia   2.3  5.8  10.6  6.9 
Malaysia   3.6  4.3  11.6  4.8 
Singapore   0  0  0  0 
Thailand   4.1  7.5  20.3  10.2 
Philippines  2.3  4.0    9.1  4.9 
Viet Nam   4.0  10.9  18.9  12.1 
Source: WTO, 2011b. 
 
However, there is concern that while tariff barriers may have declined 
drastically in India over the past decade, significant non-tariff barriers exist that 
include licensing requirements, provisional anti-dumping and safeguard duties, and 
tighter standards restrictions. These non-tariff measures continue to affect trade and 
investment relations of India with its major trading partners, including those in Asia. 
Elements of such non-tariff barriers include: (a) complex and often non-transparent 
administrative requirements as well as para-tariff measures involving customs 
surcharges; (b) additional charges; (c) internal taxes and charges levied on imports; 
and (d) decreed customs valuation.
70  
 
  In the area of industrial and FDI policy, India has pursued unilateral 
liberalization measures towards outward-orientation by abolishing industrial licensing 
in most industries.  This has encouraged private sector participation and opened up 
most industries to inward FDI, while encouraging Indian companies to invest abroad 
(Srivastava, 2007). After liberalization, the FDI attractiveness of India tended to 
increase. From being ranked sixth in A.T. Kearney’s 2003 FDI confidence, India was 
ranked third after China and the United States in 2010.
71 Ahluwalia (2002) noted that 
India’s economic reforms created a more competitive environment. He found that 
                                                            
 
69 IDE-JETRO and WTO, 2011 (figure 8). 
70 The Research and Information Systems for Developing Countries institution (RIS) (2004) estimated 
that for India-Bangladesh border trade, a consignment needs at least 22 documents, involving 55 
signatures and 116 copies for final approval.  
71 This index ranks 64 countries on the basis of their FDI attractiveness, computed from a survey that 




States which create an investor-friendly business environment attract the majority of 
inward FDI. 
 
However, the need for further unilateral liberalization in trade and FDI, 
focusing on domestic regulatory reforms, remains a major challenge for India. Studies 
indicate much of inward FDI in India’s manufacturing sectors has been largely 
undertaken as “market-seeking” to serve the large and growing domestic market in 
India rather than the “efficiency-seeking” FDI that will link India with Asian IPNs in 
China, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and other Asian countries.
72 Sally  (2011) 
estimated that although in terms of overall FDI regulatory restrictiveness India is on a 
par with China, Indian services sectors such as insurance, aviation, construction, retail 
and distribution are facing higher levels of protection. Based on the 2010 overall 
enabling trade index, which measures factors, policies and services that facilitate the 
trade in goods across borders, India lagged behind China in market access, border 
administration, transport and communications infrastructure, and the business 
environment (table 17).
 73  
 
 
Table 17. Enabling trade index comparisons of India and selected 
Asian developing economies 
 Country  Overall    Market    Border   Transport and     Business 
 market    access  administration  communications
 environment 
     Infrastructure 
    Rank   Score  Rank  Score  Rank Score  Rank  Score  Rank
 Score 
Singapore        1  6.1    1  6.0  1  6.6  7  5.7  2
 6.0 
China                48  4.3    79  3.9  48  4.5  43  4.1  41
 4.7 
India                 84  3.8  115  3.4  68  4.0  81  3.3  58
 4.5 
Indonesia          68  4.0    60  4.2  67  4.0  85  3.3  60
 4.4 
Malaysia      30  4.7  31  4.7  44  4.6  24  5.0  51
 4.6 
Philippines      92  3.7  64  4.1  74  3.8  83  3.3  103
 3.6 
Viet Nam      71  4.0  50  4.4  88  3.5  68  3.6  64
 4.3 
Thailand      60  4.1  113  3.5  41  4.6  40  4.2  71
 4.2 
Source: World Economic Forum, 2010. 
                                                            
 
72 See Aggarwal (2001), Kumar and Siddharthan (1994), Kumar (1990), Pant (1993 and 1995), and 
Pailwar (2001). 
73  This index is made up of four sub-indexes that measure the degree of market access, border 
administration, transport and communications infrastructure, and business environment that assesses 
the overall environment created by a country to enable its trading partners to trade and invest more 




Another important issue is the pace of India’s liberalization, which has not kept 
up its momentum. Sally (2011) observed that the process of India’s unilateral trade 
liberalization had largely been witnessed in two reform bursts of 1991-1993 and 1998-
2004, after which it had slowed. The slowdown and stalling of multilateral liberalization 
through WTO and rapid proliferation of “new regionalism” in Asia has further diverted 
the energies of Indian trade policymakers away from unilateral liberalization and 
domestic reforms.
74 This indicates that while the Indian economy may have become 
outward-oriented, the perception among trading partners of India as a preferred trade 
and investment partner needs to improve further. An important challenge will be the 
reduction of behind-the border restrictions on international trade and investment. Thus, 
the proper institution and regulatory reforms and infrastructure improvement are crucial 
to improving the business environment and reducing trade costs.   
 
(b)  Reducing transaction costs, and improving physical and institutional 
infrastructure for cross-border trade and investment 
 
India has high international trade costs. According to the World Bank (2010), 
the average cost of export in India was US$ 945 per container, driven mainly by export 
related documentation. The report estimated that in 2010, trade-related transaction costs 
in India amounted to approximately US$ 17 billion, or 10 per cent of the nation's export 
value. Banik and Gilbert (2010) noted that India has one of the highest logistics cost, at 
13 per cent of GDP, arising from low quality infrastructure involving inefficient ports, 
airports, very complicated bureaucratic procedures, frequent electricity outage and high 
transportation costs. This complex business environment not only hampers the trade but 
also creates a fertile environment for corruption. 
 
Table 18 compares India with respect to other developing Asian countries 
involved in IPNs, based on the World Bank (2011) “Ease of Doing Business Index 
indicators for 2012”, where a smaller number indicates a better performance on each 
sub-indicator and a higher ranking related to the creation of a business-friendly 
environment. India is ranked lower than China for all measures of ease of doing 
business except for electricity supply and protection of investors. India’s scores were 
particularly low in starting and closing a business, dealing with construction permits, 
paying taxes, trading across borders and enforcing contracts, all of which are critical 
to reducing transaction costs of trade.
75 Since these are important elements of the soft 
“institutional” infrastructure that supports the development of IPNs, it is evident that 
Indian policymakers will need to focus attention on reducing transaction costs of 
doing business and to address regional disparities if India is to emerge as the next 
assembly centre, when compared to China, in the near future. 
                                                            
 
74 See Rajan, Sen,  Siregar, 2001; and Rajan and Sen, 2004. 
75 Sally (2011) noted, however, that given the size of the Indian economy, there was a need to further 
observe the considerable variation among the performance of Indian States, and that if only the top 10 
performing States were counted, India would potentially jump 55 places in the ease-of-doing-business 






























Singapore 1 4 3 5 14 8 2 4 1 12 2
Thailand 17 78 14 9 28 67 13 100 17 24 51
Malaysia 18 50 113 59 59 1 4 41 29 31 47
China 91 151 179 115 40 67 97 122 60 16 75
VietNam 98 103 67 135 47 24 166 151 68 30 142
Indonesia 129 155 71 161 99 126 46 131 39 156 146
India 132 166 181 98 97 40 46 147 109 182 128
Philippines 136 158 102 54 117 126 133 136 51 112 163  
Source: World Bank, 2011. 
 
 
Indeed, some effort has been made to introduce reforms in recent years in order 
to improve India’s business environment. Compared to the 2011 rankings, when India 
was ranked 139 overall in terms of doing business, it jumped seven places to 132 in the 
2012 rankings.
76 This was mainly due to some second-generation reforms introduced 
during 2009-2011 in opening and closing a business, paying taxes and trading across 
borders (table 19). The Government acknowledged the importance of minimizing high 
transaction costs by creating a task force in October 2009 to identify ways of improving 
“the functioning of export processes, and reducing time and money spent in export 
transactions, with a view to enhancing the competitiveness of Indian exports”.
77 This 
task force has proposed measures such as round-the-clock customs clearance at selected 
ports, reductions in levies, and electronic message exchange between the customs 
authority and the director-general for foreign trade to facilitate faster clearances. Other 
key proposals in line for implementation include the integration of all trade-related 
agencies through a “single window e-Trade initiative” and the development of port-
related infrastructure. This demonstrates the commitment to further reforms aimed at 
reducing transaction costs, but such reforms need to be speeded up and pursued with 




76 During this period, China slipped four places from 87 in 2010 to  91 
in 2011. 
77 See Rajan and Gopalan, 2011.  
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Table 19. Recent regulatory reforms undertaken by India to improve its business 
environment rankings 
 
Year Reform  Area 
2011/2012  Reduced the administrative burden of paying taxes by 
abolishing fringe benefit tax and improving electronic 
payment, and later by making electronic filing and 
payment of VAT mandatory.  
Paying taxes 
2011  Eased business start-up by establishing an online 
value-added tax (VAT) registration system and 
replacing the previously required physical stamp with 
an online version. 
Starting a business 
2010  Procedures under the 2002 Securitization Act have 
become more effective, easing the processes and time 
required to close a business. 
Resolving insolvency 
2009  Electronic data interchange implemented, allowing 
exporters to submit documents to customs online. 
This system also enables customs to automatically 
assess export documents, making customs clearance 
more efficient and reducing time needed to export. 
Trading across borders 
Source: Compiled by the author from World Bank, 2011. 
 
The hard “physical” infrastructure is also absolutely crucial for MNCs when 
considering efficiency-seeking FDI in manufacturing. Table 17 shows that India ranks 
behind most developing Asian economies in terms of transportation and communications 
infrastructure. However, India’s infrastructure development is at comparable levels with 
Indonesia and Philippines, and far behind China.  
 
Thus, to plug into IPNs, there is not only a need to reduce transport costs at the 
border but also for information and communication technology (ICT) services, which 
provide complementary support to growth of physical infrastructure such as roads, 
railways and ports. Sally (2011) noted that India’s “hard” infrastructure as well as its 
“soft” regulatory infrastructure needed improvement. In fact, this appears applicable to 
most South Asian countries. Banik and Gilbert (2010) estimated that if the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation  (SAARC) countries were to improve trade 
facilitations to half of the East Asian levels, intraregional trade in South Asia could be 
increased by as much as 60 per cent of current intra-regional trade. In the South Asian 
subregion, port efficiency, customs environment, regulatory environment and service 
sector infrastructure need urgent attention if intra-regional trade is to be increased.  
 
(c)  Address labour market rigidities 
 
Most of the countries involved in Asian IPNs have witnessed a massive structural 
change, with significant shifts in employment from agricultural sector to the 
manufacturing sectors. Manufacturing development will be of particular importance for 
India in increasing its potential to integrate into Asian IPNs. As suggested by Virmani 
and Hashim (2009),   India’s manufacturing sector holds a unique importance mainly for 
two reasons. First, the ability of this sector to provide large-scale employment, and to be 
a driver of structural change as a developing economy such as India grows, is increasing  
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because the contribution of the agricultural sector to GDP is shrinking. Second, it can 
facilitate growth through forward and backward linkages with other sectors of the 
economy, particularly the services sector that is currently the driver of economic growth 
in the case of India. 
 
India’s employment structure has not significantly shifted towards the 
manufacturing sectors despite the fact that India possesses the advantages of low-cost 
labour and availability of skilled and scientific manpower. According to Basu (2005), the 
reason behind this is the fact that labour market rigidities
78 through existing legislation 
have resulted in India’s failure to deploy her large labour resources to compete more 
strongly in the domestic and international markets. Relative to India, the East Asian and 
South-East Asian countries appear to have fewer protective laws. 
 
Existing rigidities constrain the effective redeployment of labour in response to 
changes in demand and technology are acting as a disincentive towards employing workers, 
thereby resulting in jobless growth in organized manufacturing as well as increasing use of 
contract and temporary workers.
79  This also leads to capital-intensive methods in the 
organized sector and adversely affects the manufacturing sector’s long-term demand for 
labour. In the Indian context, state-level labour regulations are also an important 
determinant of industrial performance. Therefore, labour market reforms both at national 
and state levels are essential if India is to witness growth in productivity by labour-
intensive manufacturing and move away from the less productive agriculture sector.  
 
Jha and Golder (2008) analysed the links between labour market reforms and 
economic performance, and argued that policymakers needed to devote attention to 
several aspects of labour market reformation. First, they need to simplify and streamline 
existing laws.
80 Second, there is a need to design these laws to encourage investment in 
human capital as well as training and skills development of workers. Third, there is a 
need to improve the social safety net, especially for unorganized workers. Fourth, the 
implementation mechanism has to be strong, and dispute resolution should be quick and 
transparent; this will also facilitate improvement of enforcement of contracts, which is 
currently weak. All these reforms should perform in parallel with a long-term strategy to 
create a more competitive skilled-labour market in India, in order to bring about strong 
integration of India with existing IPNs in Asia. 
 
The recently approved draft national manufacturing policy includes labour market 
reforms and an exit policy as part of its objectives.
81 It seeks to introduce policy measures 
                                                            
 
78 These pertain to setting minimum wages above market clearing levels – especially in the organized sector  
79  See Ahsan and Pagés, 2008, Dutta, 2003, Gupta Hasan and Kumar, 2008, Ramaswamy, 2003, and 
Sharma, 2006. 
80 Chandra (2006) stated that close to 50 central laws and about 175 state laws existed that were related 
directly to labour, most of which were poorly designed and implemented. 
81 See www.indianexpress.com/news/govt-oks-national-manufacturing-policy/865186/.  
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to facilitate the expeditious redeployment of assets belonging to “sick” or non-performing 
units, while giving full protection to the interests of the employees, with a focus on 
making it easy to close a business and provide appropriate insurance for job losses. 
82 
 
(d)  Effectively utilize PTAs as a tool to plug into global and Asian IPNs 
 
The deadlock in multilateral trade negotiations and rise of new regionalism in 
Asia has prompted Asian and Pacific countries, including India, to become very active in 
negotiating and entering into bilateral and regional PTAs. India’s PTA activity is 
comparable to that of the other major Asian countries that are strongholds of IPNs, viz. 
China and Japan. India has already implemented regional PTAs involving ASEAN, 
MERCOSUR and SAARC and bilateral PTAs with Afghanistan, Bhutan, Chile, the 
Republic of Korea, Japan, Nepal, Singapore and Sri Lanka. India is a member of the 
Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) and is currently negotiating a PTA with the 
European Union while the PTAs with China and the United States are proposed for the 
not-too-distant future (ESCAP, 2011a and 2011b).
83 
 
Can India’s PTAs influence policies for supporting the formation of production 
networks that provide links to other existing Asian IPNs? It can be argued that the impact 
of PTAs on policies affecting the participation of countries in production networks is very 
much dependant on the extent of comprehensive coverage of a PTA and its focus on areas 
that would deepen regional integration through production networks (Hew, Das and Sen, 
2009, and Orefice and Rocha, 2011). 
 
PTA policies will have effective impacts on building IPNs if they remove cross-
border barriers as well as reduce behind-the-border impediments to trade and investment. 
Based on the framework of Hew, Das and Sen (2009), which identifies three types of 
costs related to IPNs (i.e., service link costs, network set-up costs and production costs), 
PTAs that only emphasize the liberalization of trade in goods and tariff reductions will 
reduce service-link costs, but will not be able to reduce network-set up and production 
costs. Thus, they are not sufficient to induce the participation of India in IPNs.   
 
Trade and investment facilitations, liberalization of trade in services and 
investment, and strengthening competition policy and intellectual property protection are 
                                                            
 
82The national manufacturing policy aims to increase manufacturing sector growth to 12-14 per cent in the 
medium term in order to (a) make it the growth engine of the economy; (b) create 100 million additional 
jobs by 2022; (c) create appropriate skill sets among the rural migrant and urban poor to make growth 
inclusive; (d) increase domestic value addition and technological depth in manufacturing; (e) enhancing 
global competitiveness of Indian manufacturing, particularly in the case of SMEs, through appropriate 
policy support; and (f) ensure sustainability of growth, particularly with regard to the environment 
(including energy efficiency, optimal utilization of natural resources and restoration of damaged/degraded 
eco-systems). The policymakers also plan to reduce the compliance burden on industry, and to improve and 
simplify procedural and regulatory formalities in order to make it easier for manufacturing industries to be 
technologically competitive and globally innovative (Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, 2011) 
83 See www.unescap.org/tid/aptiad/agg_db.aspx  
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desired characteristics for enabling PTAs to be an effective tool for IPN encouragement. 
Trade facilitation initiatives, such as improving customs clearance and procedures, will 
help to reduce all three types of costs involved in setting up a production network.   
Liberalization of trade in services and investment, particularly the inclusion of MFN and 
national treatment obligations in a PTA, are also likely to have a favourable impact on 
policy in terms of reduction of investment costs, strengthening the competitiveness of 
potential business partners as well as on overcoming geographical distance and border 
effects. It is likely to significantly reduce network-set up costs and service link costs 
within a production network. 
 
The analysis by Orefice and Rocha (2011) of 200 countries during 1987-2007 
confirmed that trade through IPNs was fostered by those agreements that aimed for 
deeper integration. Their study captured such deeper integration through five measures. 
Two of the measures are WTO+ in nature and therefore aim for strengthening discipline 
on rules related to state trading enterprises and Trade Related Intellectual Property 
(TRIPS), while the other three (competition policy, intellectual property protection and 
movement of capital) are WTO-X in nature and therefore currently not under negotiation 
in WTO. Orefice and Rocha argued that inclusion of such deep integration measures was 
more likely among PTA partnerships involving developed and developing countries 
rather than among just developing countries. 
 
In the context of Indian PTAs, potential benefits from encouraging India’s 
participation in IPNs might be limited. India’s PTAs with most Asian IPN members have 
mainly served as a tool for foreign policy rather than trade policy, and have been on a 
“trade-light approach to liberalization”. India’s PTAs with South Asian countries 
currently focus only on tariff reduction of goods, and do not cover comprehensive 
liberalization in services, investment and other non-border market-access issues. More 
than half of intra-regional trade is excluded through “sensitive lists”, restrictive rules of 
origin (RoO), and assorted NTBs. This indicates that India has been following a “trade-
light” approach to PTAs and that those PTAs are therefore unlikely to spur any IPN 
activity, since they do not include the deepening of regulatory measures related to the five 
measures identified above.    
 
India’s recent bilateral PTAs with Japan and the Republic of Korea, Malaysia and 
Singapore as well as its regional PTA with ASEAN are aimed at greater 
comprehensiveness, including services and investments, but most of these PTAs have not 
reached the stage of full implementation and are not supported by strong regulatory 
measures for strengthening intra-regional trade through IPNs. While tariffs are being 
eliminated in some cases for close to 90 per cent of products, there are long transition 
periods and restrictive RoO. As an example, India’s recently concluded PTA with the 
Republic of Korea covers only 66 per cent of Indian tariff lines that are subject to duty 
elimination during an eight-year transition period, with agreements on services and 
investment being weaker when compared to what has been agreed upon by these 
countries in WTO. Sally (2011) noted that fear of Chinese competition was one of the 
main factors driving product exemptions and restrictive RoO in India’s PTAs, resulting in  
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Overlapping of PTAs and restrictiveness of RoO create concerns on actual 
utilization of PTAs between India and Asian trading partners. Varieties of RoO in 
overlapping PTAs makes it costly for businesses to comply with them, resulting in low 
actual utilization.
85 Nag and De (2011) analysed the impact of RoO on the development 
of IPNs. They concluded that simpler RoO work better for parts and components and 
intra-industry trade in an IPN.
86 In addition, complex RoO provide increasing avenues for 
corruption, since customs officials can exercise significant discretion in deciding on 
which tariff or rules to apply to a certain product (Newfarmer, 2005). An overarching 
East Asia-wide comprehensive regional PTA would have greater potential to improve the 
coordination and linkages than individual bilateral PTAs, and perhaps reduce the costs of 
compliance for the user if simpler region-based RoO are designed (ESCAP, 2011c). 
 
Thus, PTA initiatives in India, as in rest of Asia, will need to be supported by 
unilateral liberalization and important domestic economic reforms as argued by Sally and 
Sen (2011). The engine of liberalization and regulatory reform by India and the rest of 
South Asia have to be home-driven, with PTAs  playing, at best, a supportive role. 
Support will also be needed by institutional and infrastructural development that would 
be critical for the development of regional production networks involving India, and East 
and South-East Asia. 
 
Some of these policy constraints are probably better addressed unilaterally 
through domestic reforms rather than bilaterally through PTAs. These include policies 
aimed towards institutional development in order to improve the business environment as 
well as developing infrastructure to support the same. The establishment of 
educational/occupational institutions for personnel training with the objective of securing 
various types of human resources, together with (a) the establishment of stable and elastic 
labour-related laws and institutions, (b) removing bottlenecks in infrastructure services 
such as the supply shortages of electricity and other types of energy, (d) improving 
industrial estate services (e) the establishment of institutional infrastructure such as 
transparent investment rules and laws on intellectual property-rights, are examples of 
                                                            
 
84 Studies in auto-component sector by Nag (2011) and Ghosh, Ray and Makkar (2010) found that PTAs 
between India and Asian countries seem not enhancing greater participation of India in Asian auto-parts 
IPNs. Ghosh, Ray and Makkar (2010) studied free trade agreements between India and ASEAN, Republic 
of Korea, European Union, and Japan. They indicate that FTAs could harm Indian auto-part industries. 
They point that the proposed PTA between Korea and the European Union has prompted Hyundai Motor 
India Limited to suggest that the company may look to shift part of its production meant for export to the 
European Union from India to the Republic of Korea and this could imply significant decline in exports for 
suppliers based in India.   
85 Businesses have to consider using these PTAs and therefore adjust their strategies for compliance, or else 
continue to pay MFN tariffs for their goods, ignoring PTA preferences. 
86 This study analyses sectoral impact of RoOs on integrated circuits, auto-components and textiles and 
observes that ASEAN PTAs having simple RoOs have benefitted intra-industry trade in these products.  
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areas wherein domestic reforms would be crucial to supporting the introduction of a 
business-friendly environment that could potentially be created by India’s PTAs.  
 
6. Conclusion and policy recommendations  
 
The analysis in this study has demonstrated that India has reoriented its growth 
strategy towards outward orientation during the past two decades; however, the pace of 
its reform has not caught up with this paradigm shift. As a result, the current levels of 
participation of India, both in global and in Asian IPNs, are low. Most of the exports 
comprise low-technology, labour-intensive goods that do not involve much fragmentation, 
such as textiles, gems and jewellery, animal and leather products.  
 
The case studies of auto-parts and electronics component sectors reveal that 
integrating with global IPNs has begun emerging for some products, but the linkages of 
production and trade with global MNCs are still minimal. Therefore, the business 
environment needs improvement in several areas in order to encourage MNCs and SMEs 
to integrate India further into global and Asian IPNs.  
 
Thus, six key policy recommendations are proposed, based on the current state of 
India’s participation in IPNs and the associated policy challenges. These are: 
1.  Step up the pace of unilateral trade and investment liberalization, and strive 
towards further reducing trade and investment barriers, particularly in the area 
of reducing behind-the border restrictions on international trade and 
investment, with a focus on improving domestic regulation. This should 
facilitate reduction of service link costs, network set-up costs and production 
costs involved in setting up an IPN in India; 
2.  Reduce transaction costs of cross-border trade as soon as possible. This can be 
done by improving customs clearance, developing port-related infrastructure 
for faster customs clearance and creating a single window e-Trade initiative 
that integrates all agencies responsible for trade facilitation with total 
integrity; 
3.  Improve the current state of physical and institutional infrastructure for doing 
business in India; this would have a significant impact on the reduction of 
production and service-link costs involved in setting up an IPN. Private sector 
participation through domestic and foreign companies in improving physical 
infrastructure needs to be strongly encouraged. Elements of soft “institutional” 
infrastructure that supports development of IPNs, such as starting and closing 
a business, dealing with construction permits, paying taxes, trading across 
borders and enforcing contracts, needs to be made easier by policymakers. So 
far, reforms in this direction, although initiated recently, are still too few; 
4.  Develop an appropriate exit policy for labour in the manufacturing sector, and 
address current rigidities to make it more competitive vis-à-vis South-East and 
East Asian countries. Given the unionization of the organized workforce and 
associated political compulsions, implementing this effectively could be  
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challenging. However, a strong commitment to achieving this objective will 
have to be demonstrated if India is to be part of an IPN that selects it as the 
next global assembly centre; 
5.  Implement comprehensive-broad based PTAs covering services, investment, 
and the movement of labour, and allow them to play a supportive role with 
ongoing unilateral liberalization. There is also a need to design RoO that are 
simple and which do not increase the transaction costs of trade for PTA 
members. The current state of India’s PTAs does not appear to be designed 
with the objective of reducing all costs involved in setting up an IPN. 
Therefore, a critical review is required of India’s current PTAs, including 
more inputs from businesses to identify specific areas of gains from PTAs in 
order to create a business environment that makes India a potential assembly 
centre for global manufacturing activities in the near future.  
   
The above recommendations also hold important implications for South Asia in 
general as most of the region’s countries face policy challenges similar to those identified 
above and have yet to connect with global and Asian IPNs.   
 
Given the size of the Indian economy, efforts to address the existing policy 
challenges to plug India into global and Asian IPNs will have to be pursued and 
coordinated at the national and State levels. With implementation integrity of these 
policies being the key to economic success, it is important that Indian policymakers do 
away with obsolete systems of governance and the compartmentalization mindset.
87 This 
will go a long way towards boosting India’s position further in terms of its business 
environment, and to firmly establishing the country as one of the world’s fastest-growing 
economies, making it attractive for both large and small MNCs to create a global 









Abd-el-Rahman, K. (1991). “Firms’ competitive and national comparative advantages as 
joint determinants of trade composition”, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, vol. 127. No. 
1; pp.  83-97. 
ACMA (2011). “Auto-component industry profile”. Available from http://acmainfo.com/ 
pdf/Industry-Statistics_23092011.pdf (accessed 1 November 2011). 
Aggarwal, A. (2001). “Liberalization, multinational enterprises and export performance: 
evidence from Indian manufacturing”, ICRIER Working Paper,  No. 69 Indian 
Council for Research on International Economic Relations, New Delhi 
Ahsan, A., and C. Pagés (2008). “Are all labor regulations equal? Evidence from Indian 
manufacturing”, IZA Discussion Paper, No. 3394. Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn. 
Ahluwalia, M. S. (2002). “Economic reforms in India since 1991: Has gradualism 
worked?”  Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 16, No. 3; pp. 67-88.  
Ando, M. (2006). “Fragmentation and vertical intra-industry trade in East Asia”, North 
American Journal of Economics and Finance, vol. 17, No. 3; pp. 257-281.  
Asher, M. G. (2010). “A strategic approach to trade agreements: Getting the most out of 
PTAs and economic agreements”, Pragati-The National Interest Review, March; 
pp.13-24; Available from http://www.scribd.com/doc/27658205/Pragati-March-
2010 (accessed 5 November 2011) 
—— (2009). “Make FTP an integral part of economic management and diplomacy”, 
DNA Money. Mumbai.  
A.T. Kearney (2010). “Investing in a rebound – the 2010 A.T. Kearney FDI confidence 
index”. Available from  
http://www.atkearney.com/images/global/pdf/Investing_in_a_Rebound-FDICI_2010.pdf    
(accessed 1 November 2011). 
Athukorala, P. C. (2010). “Production networks and trade patterns in East Asia: 
Regionalization or globalization?” ADB  Working Paper Series on Regional 
Economic Integration, No. 56. Asian Development Bank, Manila.  
——— (2005). Product fragmentation and trade patterns in East Asia. Asian Economic 
Papers, vol.  4, No. 3; pp. 1-27. 
Athukorala, P. C. and N. Yamashita (2005). Production fragmentation and trade 
integration: East Asia in a global context. North American Journal of Economics and 
Finance, vol.17 No. 3; pp. 233-256. 
Banik, N. and J. Gilbert (2010). “Regional integration and trade costs in South Asia”, in 
D. H. Brooks and S. F Stone (eds.), Trade Facilitation and Regional Cooperation in 
Asia. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, United Kingdom. 
Basu, K. (2005).  “Labour laws and labour welfare in the context of the Indian 
experience”, CAE Working Paper, No. 05-17. Centre for Analytic Economics, 
Cornell University, New York.  
 
114
Brooks and S. F Stone (eds.), Trade Facilitation and Regional Cooperation in Asia, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, United Kingdom. 
Brülhart, M. (1994). “Marginal intra-industry trade: Measurement and the relevance for the 
pattern of industrial adjustment”, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, vol. 130; pp. 600-613. 
Chandra, N. (2006). “Labour laws and their impact on unorganised sector enterprises” 
(mimeograph), submitted to the National Commission for Enterprises in the 
Unorganised Sector. New Delhi. 
Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (2011). “Fact sheet on foreign direct 
investment from April 2000 to September 2011”. New Delhi. Available from 
http://dipp.nic.in/English/Publications/FDI_Statistics/2011/india_FDI_September2011.
pdf  (accessed 10 December 2011). 
Dutta, R. C. (2003), “ Labor Market -- Social Institutions, Economic Reforms and Social 
Cost,” in S. Uchikawa (ed.), Labour Market and Institution in India, 1990s and 
Beyond,  Manohar, New Delhi. 
 
Electronics and Software Exports Promotion Council (2011). ESC Statistical Yearbook 
2010, pp. 82-84. Available from  
www.escindia.in/uploads/Electronicspercent20Componentspercent20exportpercent20
2009-10.pdf (accessed 1 November 2011). 
 
ESCAP (2011a). Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Agreements Database. Economic 
and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok. Available from 
http://www.unescap.org/tid/aptiad/agg_db.aspx (accessed 30 November 2011). 
——— (2011b). Fighting Irrelevance: The Role of Regional Trade Agreements in 
International Production Networks in Asia – A Study of Asia-Pacific Research and 
Training Network on Trade, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific, Bangkok. 
——— (2011c). Asia-Pacific Trade and Investment Report (APTIR) 2011. Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok. 
Gereffi, G. (2001). “Shifting governance structures in global commodity chains, with 
special reference to the Internet”, American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 44, No. 10; pp. 
1616-1637. 
Ghosh, A., S. Ray and J. Makkar (2010). “Indian auto-components industry: Riding the 
tide”, ICRA Rating Feature, December 2010. International Credit Rating Agency Ltd., 
New Delhi. Available from http://www.icra.in/Files/ticker/Auto_Ancillary_Ind_Note-
Dec10.pdf (accessed 10 December 2011). 
Grubel, H. G. and P. J. Lloyd (1975).  Intra-industry trade, the Theory and Measurement 
of International trade in Differentiated Products. McMillan, London 
Gupta, Poonam, Rana Hasan and Utsav Kumar (2008), “What Constrains Indian 
Manufacturing?” ERD Working Paper no 119, Asian Development Bank, Manila. 
Helpman, E.  (1984). “A simple theory of international trade and multinational 
corporation”, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 92, No. 3; pp. 451-471.  
 
115
Hew, D, Das S.B and Sen, R. (2009). “ASEAN economic integration and implication for 
CLMV countries”, in I. Kuroiwa (ed.), Plugging into Production Networks 
— Industrialization Strategy in Less Developed Southeast Asian Countries. Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies and Japan, IDE-JETRO, Singapore. 
IBEF (2011). India Brand Equity Foundation website at www.ibef.org (accessed 1 
November 2011). 
IDE-JETRO and WTO (2011). Trade Patterns and Global Value Chains in East Asia: 
From Trade in Goods to Trade in Tasks. Available from 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/stat_tradepat_globvalchains_e.pdf (accessed 
6 December 2011). 
Jha P. and S. Golder (2008). “Labour market regulation and economic performance: A 
critical review of arguments and some plausible lessons for India”, Economic and 
Labour Market Paper, No. 2008/1. International Labour Organization, Geneva. 
Kimura, F. (2009). “Expansion of the production networks into the less developed 
ASEAN region: Implications for development strategy”, in I. Kuroiwa (eds.), 
Plugging into Production Networks: Industrialization Strategy in Less Developed 
Southeast Asian Countries. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Japan, IDE-
JETRO, Singapore. 
——— (2007). “The mechanics of production networks in South-East Asia: The 
fragmentation theory approach”, in I. Kuroiwa and M. H. Toh (eds.), Production 
Networks and Industrial Clusters: Integrating Economies in South-East Asia. Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. 
Kumar, N. (2003). “Liberalization, foreign direct investment flows and economic 
development: The Indian experience in the 1990s”, Research and Information System 
for Developing Countries Discussion Paper, No. 65. New Delhi. 
——— (1990),  Multinational Enterprises in India: Industrial Distribution, 
Characteristics and Performance. Routledge, London and New York. 
Krugman, P. (1995). “Growing World Trade: Causes and Consequences”,. Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activities, twenty-fifth anniversary issue; pp. 327-377. 
Brookings Institute, Washington, D.C. 
Kumar, N. and N. S. Siddharthan (1994). “Technology, firm size and export behaviour in 
developing countries: The case of Indian enterprises”, The Journal of Development 
Studies, vol. 31, No. 2; pp. 289-309. 
Nag, B. (2011). “Trade liberalization and international production networks: Experience 
of the Indian automotive sector”, in Fighting Irrelevance: The Role of Regional Trade 
Agreements in International Production Networks in Asia – A Study of Asia-Pacific 
Research and Training Network on Trade. ESCAP, Bangkok. 
——— (2009). “Auto-component industry in Asia: Structure, trade patterns and potential 
for further upgrading”, Int. J. Technological Learning, Innovation and Development, 
vol. 2, Nos. 1 and 2; pp. 119-137.  
 
116
Nag, B. and D. De (2011). “Rules of origin and development of regional production 
network in Asia: Case studies of selected industries”, Asia-Pacific Research and 
Training Network on Trade, Working Paper Series, No. 101. Available from 
http://www.unescap.org/tid/artnet/pub/wp10111.pdf  (accessed 1 November 2011). 
Newfarmer, R. S. (2005). “Regional trade agreements: Designs for development”, in R. 
S.    Newfarmer (ed.), Trade, Doha, and Development: A Window into the Issues. 
World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
Orefice, G. and N. Rocha (2011). “Deep integration and production networks: An 
empirical analysis”, WTO Staff Working Paper, No. ERSD 2011-11. WTO Economic 
Research and Statistics Division, Geneva. 
Pailwar, V. (2001). “Foreign direct investment flows to India and export 
competitiveness”, Productivity, vol. 42, No. 1; pp. 115-122.  
Pant, M. (1993). “Export performance, transnational corporations and the manufacturing 
sector: A case study of India”, Indian Economic Review, vol. 28, No. 1; pp. 41-54. 
Pant, M. (1995). Foreign Direct Investment in India: The Issues Involved. Lancer Books, 
New Delhi. 
Rajan, R. S.  (1996). “Measures of intra-industry trade reconsidered with reference to 
Singapore's bilateral trade with Japan and the United States”, Weltwirtschaftliches 
Archiv, vol. 132, No. 2; pp. 378-389. 
Rajan, R. and S. Gopalan (2011). “India’s trade recovery after the global financial crisis: 
Good luck or good policies?” Policy Brief Series, No. 1. Lee Kuan Yew School of 
Public Policy, Singapore. 
Rajan, R and R. Sen (2004). “Singapore’s Drive to Form Cross-regional Trade Pacts: 
Rationale and Implications”, Chapter 7 in R. Rajan (ed.), Economic Globalization 
and Asia: Essays on Finance, Trade and Taxation, Singapore: World Scientific 
Rajan, R.S., R. Sen, and R. Siregar (2001). Singapore and Free Trade Agreements: 
Economic Relations with Japan and the United States. Institute of South East Asian 
Studies (ISEAS), Singapore. 
Ramaswamy, K.V. 2003. “Liberalization, outsourcing and industrial labor markets in 
India: Some preliminary results”, in Uchikawa, S. (ed.), Labour Market and Institution in 
India: 1990s and Beyond . New Delhi: Manohar. 
Reserve Bank of India (2011). Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy 2010-11. 
Available from http://www.rbi.org.in/scripts/PublicationsView.aspx?id=13723 
(accessed 10 December 2011). 
RIS (2004).
  South Asia Development and Cooperation Report 2004. Research and 
Information Systems for Developing Countries, New Delhi. 
Sally, R. (2011). “Indian trade policy after the crisis”, ECIPE Occasional Paper, No. 
4/2011, European Centre for International Political Economy, Brussels. 
Sally, R. and R. Sen (2011). “Trade policies in Southeast Asia in Wider Asian 
Perspective”, The World Economy, vol. 34, No. 4; pp. 568-601.  
 
117
Sharma, A. N. (2006). “Flexibility, employment and labour market reforms in India”, 
Economic and Political Weekly, May 27; pp. 2078-2085. 
Srivastava, S. (2007). “The role of foreign direct investment in India's exports in the post-
liberalization period” (unpublished doctoral thesis), National University of Singapore. 
Srivastava, S. and R. Sen (2011). “Is production fragmentation emerging in India’s 
manufacturing trade?” ASCI Journal of Management, vol. 40, No. 2; pp. 73-100.  
United Nations (2010). United Nations COMTRADE Database, New York. Available 
from http://comtrade.un.org/db/ (accessed December 2010). 
Veeramani, C. (2009). “Trade barriers, multinational involvement and intra-industry 
trade: Panel data evidence from India”, Applied Economics, No. 41; pp. 2541-2553. 
——— (2002). “Intra-industry trade of India: Trends and country-specific factors”, 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, vol. 138, No. 3; pp. 509-533. 
Virmani A. and D. A. Hashim (2009). “Factor employment, sources and sustainability of 
output growth: Analysis of Indian manufacturing”, Working Paper, No.3/2009-DEA. 
Ministry of Finance, New Delhi. Available from 
 http://finmin.nic.in/WorkingPaper/FactorEmploymentSourcesSustainability.pdf  
(accessed 2 November 2011). 
World Bank, (2010). Doing Business, 2010: Reforming through difficult times. World 
Bank and International Financial Corporation, Washington, D.C. Available from 
http://doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2010  
——— (2011). Doing Business, 2012: Doing Business in a More Transparent World. 
World Bank and International Financial Corporation, Washington, D.C. Available 
fromhttp://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/fpdkm/doing%20business/documents/an
nual-reports/english/db12-fullreport.pdf  (accessed 25 October 2011). 
——— (2010) World Development Indicators, 2010. Washington D.C. 
World Economic Forum (2010). The Global Enabling Trade Report 2010. Geneva. 
Available from  
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalEnablingTrade_Report_2010.pdf 
(accessed 25 October 2011). 
WTO (2011a). International Trade Statistics 2011. Geneva. 
——— (2011b). Tariff Profiles Database,  2010. Geneva. Available from 
http://stat.wto.org/TariffProfile/WSDBTariffPFHome.aspx?Language=E (accessed 2 
November 2011). 
——— (2011c). Trade Policy Review: India. Geneva: Geneva. Available from 






Estimating indices of trade overlap and intra-industry trade  
 
1. Trade overlap 
 
Abd-el Rahman (1991) and Ando (2006) broke down the trading of commodity j 
in terms of one-way trade or intra-industry trade. Trading of commodity j is regarded as 
one-way trade when equation (1) holds, while it is regarded as intra-industry trade if 
otherwise and intra-industry trade otherwise: 
 
Min(Xkj,Mkj)/Max(Xkj,Mkj)  0.1         
(1) 
 
where  Xkj  represents  country k ’s exports of commodity j  to  the  world,  and  Mkj 
countryk ’s imports of commodity j from the world.   
 
2. Intra-industry trade 
 
The Grubel-Lloyd (G-L) index measures the ratio of net exports in a product 
category to its total trade in an index that takes values from 0 to 100. It also calculates the 
part of balanced trade (overlap between exports and imports) in all trade in a given 
industry i. The index is calculated by the following formula, with the G-L index for a 
given industry j denoted as  
 
GLjx= Xj+Mj- | Xj-Mj| = 1- |Xj – Mj 
 
(2) 
 Xj + Mj               Xj + Mj 
 
This index takes a value of zero if either Xi or Mi equals zero, implying no IIT, 
and if Xi=Mi, it implies a value of 100 and signifies complete IIT in that industry. 
However, this index is observed to measure an incorrect level of IIT, especially if trade 
imbalances are higher. Studies such as that by Rajan (1996) have argued that G-L is a 
degree of measure of IIT rather than the absolute amount. Distinction needs to be made 
between the level of IIT and the actual amount of IIT that takes place, and the degree or 
extent of IIT. Therefore the level of IIT is estimated separately for these two-way P&C 
manufacturing products as   
 
Li=2 * min (Xi, Mi, )            
(3) 
 
for the i’th industry where Xi is the amount of exports and Mi is the amount of imports in 




Brülhart (1994) ascertained whether the change in trade volumes in these P&C 
manufacturing products during the periods analysed were due more to intra-industry or 
inter-industry trade. This measure, known as Marginal IIT (MIIT), is a transposition of 











 1           
(4) 
 
where Δ stands for the difference between the values of exports and imports in the j’th 
product over a specific period t.  This index also takes values from 0 to 1, and in 
percentage terms goes from 0 to 100 as the G-L index. An MIIT value close to 100 
indicates marginal trade during the periods analysed to be of the intra-industry variety, 





























  The analysis so far recognizes the important role of regional integration and/or 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in influencing successful development of 
international production networks (IPNs). Intuitively, one would expect a positive impact 
of reciprocal trade liberalization as it should bring about a reduction of border barriers to 
trade, and make the flows of goods, services and resources easier and cheaper, thus 
allowing further fragmentation of production and efficient allocation of resources. 
However, it turns out that in reality PTAs are not necessarily producing these results due 
to at least two groups of (related) problems. One concerns a transformation of 
agreements’ schedules into actual free and unobstructed trade flows, as it appears that 
many PTAs are not satisfactorily utilized and that a significant portion of trade ends up 
being left out of the liberalization coverage. India only recently started to entertain the 
idea of “substantially all trade” when negotiating the coverage of tariff liberalization. Yet, 
even if all products were on the list for liberalization, there would be problems in 
accessing the market under these liberalized conditions. The most frequent culprit for this 
is found in rules of origin (RoO), so this chapter reviews the substantial empirical 
analyses done under ARTNeT to highlight implications in the case of India.  
  
  The other problematic area is that development of IPNs might not only need 
smooth and open trade channels for goods, but also harmonization of national policies in 
several key areas (for example, competition or investment). It is not clear that current 
PTAs signed by countries, including India, will lead to such integration. We can say 
“might” because the empirical evidence in this area is still inconclusive with regard to the 
causal linkages between regional integration efforts and IPNs. ARTNeT (2011), in 
focusing on a small number of countries and three sectors, summarized extensive 
theoretical literature that pointed to wards the positive linkages between establishment 
and the growth of IPNs and preferential trade agreements, including an increase in parts 
and components trade; however, it failed to find strong empirical evidence about the 
causal direction.
88 Furthermore, WTO (2011a) and literature cited therein found that it 
was deep integration, not just free trade that positively and strongly influenced production 
network trade. It stated that “…on average, signing deep agreements increases trade in 
production networks between member countries by almost 8 percentage points” (p. 146). 
However, the report also acknowledged that it was likely that countries already 
participating in IPNs might be willing, more than others, to sign deep(er) trade 
                                                            
 
88 Given that most of the PTAs examined in that study were implemented very recently, while the IPNs 
explored have been established for longer than a decade, it is not surprising that the study failed to confirm 
that the occurrence of the PTAs could be given credit for the expansion of given IPNs.   
 
121
agreements in order to secure stable environment for the growth of these IPNs. Thus, the 
direction of causality between signing deep agreements and the amount of production 
network trade (in essence, trade in parts and components or intermediate goods) needs 
further scrutiny. One of the difficulties is the definition and measurement of “deep” 
integration. Following Horn, Mavroidis and Sapir (2010), WTO (2011a) developed a 
methodology to measure the depth of the integration achieved through PTAs; later in this 
chapter the findings of the report are used to comment on the state of India’s efforts in 
forging preferential trade deals supportive of production network trade as well as the 
expansion of vertical specialization more generally.  
 
1. India’s campaign for preferential trading deals 
 
  In 1995, India had no bilateral reciprocal preferential trade agreement, but it was a 
member of the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA), (then known as the Bangkok 
Agreement), South Asia Preferential Trade Arrangement (SAPTA) and Global System of 
Trade Preferences (GSTP). The first bilateral free trade agreement was signed in 1998 
with Sri Lanka; from then until the end of 2011, India signed another nine bilateral and 
two plurilateral agreements.
89   Figure 35 reflects how this proliferation of trade 
agreements signed by India has resulted in a “noodle bowl” phenomenon – the tangle of 
relationships created by multiple overlapping trading arrangements. With 15 trade 
agreements already in implementation,
90 India is well ahead of the Asia-Pacific region’s 

















89 A full list of other agreements under negotiations are available from the Department of Commerce online 
information, “Trade: International Trade: Other Agreements/Negotiations” at http://commerce.nic.in/ 
trade/international_ta.asp or from www.uneascap.org/tid/aptiad.  
90 This number excludes SAPTA since it has been superseded by SAFTA, even though SAPTA provisions 
are still being implemented. 
91 The average for the region does not include those economies that do not have any PTAs, i.e., Mongolia, 
Palau, Northern Mariana Islands, New Caledonia, Guam, French Polynesia, American Samoa, Timor-Leste 
and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (APTIAD, 2011).   
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Source: Based on “APTIAD noodle bowl”, available online at www.unescap.org/tid/aptiad. 
  
 
As is evident from its negotiating history (see box 1), India initiated several PTAs 
post-2000, starting with signing the framework agreements in 2003 and followed by PTA 
negotiations. Most of these agreements were finally signed during 2009-2010. India has 
embraced regionalism as one of the pillars of its trade policy, which started in early 2000 
and is now materializing. Given the increasing opening of the Indian economy after 1995, 
reciprocal trade arrangements were seen as a tool of obtaining market access for Indian 
exports as a necessity for sustaining further import liberalization and other market-
oriented reforms. Putting more focus on “discriminatory and preferential” liberalization 
coincided with, on one hand, a international Indian presence of competitive business in 














Box 1. Evolution of India’s approach to preferential trade liberalization 
India has stated it is a believer of the rules-based multilateral trading system, and 
historically it has not used PTAs as a trade policy instrument for its economic 
engagements until the early 2000s. India’s regional engagements were mainly guided by 
the political affiliations and traditionally the country followed a cautious and guided 
approach towards PTAs. This can be observed from its engagements in some of the PTAs 
such as the Bangkok Agreement (1975), GSTP (1988) and SAPTA (1993) or the 
agreements with Bhutan and Nepal, which has the political objective of regional 
prosperity. These agreements focused on promoting South-South trade; however, 
intraregional trade remained insignificant.  
While its commitment for regional prosperity and development in South Asia 
started with SAARC, India started looking outside the South Asian region, especially to 
the East, with its “Look East Policy” in 1991. Since India’s major trade interest was to 
the West (the developed world), the “Look East Policy” provided it with an opportunity 
to become a major partner of ASEAN in the areas of trade and investment. Since its 
beginning, the partnership between India and ASEAN has been developing at quite a fast 
pace. India became a sectoral dialogue partner 1992, a full dialogue partner in 1995, a 
member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996 and, finally, a summit level 
partner in 2002. 
India’s initial attention to PTAs started in 2000 after the European Union initiated 
plans for its expansion and the United States supported the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA). India felt that if it did not become a party to a major bloc in all 
likelihood it would be “locked out” of the markets of its major trading partners. It then 
focused on the SAARC, MERCOSUR and ASEAN markets. India’s position in ASEAN 
was further strengthened after ASEAN signed the Framework Agreement with China, as 
most of ASEAN’s members were slightly apprehensive of the economic size of China 
and felt that their engagement with India would serve as a counterbalance.   
    
  In principle, preferential trade negotiations move faster and produce more tailored 
results, and thus are preferred by many stakeholders, than a protracted and, at times, 
frustrating multilateral process. However, the trade disciplines achieved are (not 
unexpectedly) different across agreements in terms of tariff schedules, sector and/or 
product coverage, implementation timelines, customs procedures or other conditions 
important for traders and, most importantly in terms of RoO, that underlie the utilization 
of negotiated concessions. Therefore, it is appropriate to question the existence and size  
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of the net benefits of each additional agreement that has been signed.
92 For the subject 
matter of this study, however, it is very important to understand how RoO, an 
unavoidable part of each PTA, may influence operations of IPNs and related trade and 
investment. 
 
2. Rules of origin 
 
  Rules of origin define the conditions that a product must meet to be deemed as 
originating from the country that has been given preferential access.
93 Historically, the 
raison d’être for RoO has been to prevent loss of tariff revenue by a country granting 
preferential access to its market. This phenomenon is known as trade deflection, whereby 
products from countries that do not have right to preferential access are redirected 
through countries with such access to the partner country, in order to avoid payment of 
the partner country’s customs duties. There are other important objectives that RoO could 
help achieve, including promoting sophistication of domestic production through value 
addition and the provision of incentives to increase trade and investment in a specific region 
(cf. Das and Ratna, 2010). However, in reality, loading RoO with multiple objectives appears 
to have resulted in (a) RoO becoming less transparent, (b) more costly to comply with, and 
(c) in the end, preventing the use of tariff preferences negotiated in the PTAs. It is not rare to 
find that the complexity of RoO is used to both accommodate and conceal protectionist 
intentions. “By attaching multiple criteria for the satisfaction of origin, RoO may be another 
avenue to effectively exclude product groups from a country’s liberalization commitments” 
(Nag and De, 2011).  
  
  Apart from these “policy-driven” reasons for complex setting of the RoO, there is 
another reason. In the world of fragmented production, with multi-stage processes located in 
different countries becoming the normal way of production, it is increasingly difficult to 
ascertain origin to meet the RoO (which originated when the world had different production 
processes). Thus for a country like India which has aspirations and potential to become better 
integrated in vertical and horizontal chains in Asia and globally, the RoO as a policy tool 
becomes very important.  
 
  India applies different preferential RoO that are negotiated with each PTA.
94 A 
brief comparison of RoO characteristics for the agreements that are currently being 
implemented is provided in table 20. As reported in WTO (2011b), so far the most 
important rule used for determining origin is the limit on the foreign content. As table 20 
shows, the range of these maxima is wide, from 30 per cent to 70 Per cent. India also uses 
the rules of sufficient transformation and change in tariff classification to determine 
                                                            
 
92 The “Trade Policy Review on India” (WTO, 2011b) noted that “despite this generally positive view of 
regional agreements, India has some reservations regarding regionalism because of its complexity and 
possible trade diversion”, referring to India’s Ministry of Finance  text of 2011.  
93 This could be through PTAs or other preferential schemes (such as GSP) but the focus here is only on 
PTAs.  
94 WTO document G/RO/N/1, 9 May 1995.  
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origin. There are product-specific RoO for several agreements, with the number of 
products subject to such rules varying greatly among agreements (for example, 180 
products under the SAFTA, 1,780 products under the BTA with the Republic of Korea 
and 380 products under the BTA with Singapore.
95  
 
  The preferential RoO provide incentives for producers to change their forward 
and backward linkages. There are financial incentives (lower or zero tariffs) that 
sometimes may lead to the replacement of cheaper or better-quality inputs from non-
participating members in the PTA by higher-cost inputs from member economies in order 
to qualify for concessional entry. RoO can also adversely influence investment decisions 






























95 Department of Commerce online information, “International Trade: Trade Agreements”, available at: 
http://commerce.nic.in/trade/international_ta.asp?id=2&trade=i. 
96 Another issue related to different RoO criteria for the same country but under different PTAs also is a 
cause of concern as exporters get confused over which one to use and because it gives the customs 




Table 20. Rules of origin under preferential trade agreements 
 
Agreements  Maximum foreign-content requirements  Minimum cumulative local-content requirements 
Regional    
Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement 
(APTA) 
55% of the f.o.b. value (LDCs: 65%)  60% of the f.o.b. value (LDCs: 50%) 
Global System of Trade 
Preferences (GSTP) 
50% of the f.o.b. value (LDCs: 60%)  60% of the f.o.b. value (LDCs: 50%) 
South Asian Free-Trade Areas 
(SAFTA)
a 
60% of the f.o.b. value (LDCs: 70%; Sri Lanka: 65%) 
and change in tariff heading
97 
50% of the f.o.b. value, 
b and change in tariff heading with a 
minimum 20% being achieved in the exporting member where 
last stage of manufacturing done 
 
South Asia Preferential Trade 
Arrangement (SAPTA) 
60% of the f.o.b. value (LDCs: 70%)  50% of the f.o.b. value (LDCs: 40%) with a minimum 20% 
being achieved in the exporting member where last stage of 
manufacturing done 
Bilateral    
Afghanistan  50% of the f.o.b. value and change in tariff heading  40% of the f.o.b. value and 30% of the f.o.b. value
b 
ASEAN
a  65%  of the f.o.b. value and change in tariff sub-
heading
98  
65% of the f.o.b. value and change in tariff sub-heading  
Bhutan  n.a.   n.a.  
Chile  60% of the f.o.b. value
c and change in tariff heading  60% of the f.o.b. value and change in tariff heading 
Korea, Rep. of
a  65% of the f.o.b. value and change in tariff sub-
heading 
65% of the f.o.b. value and change in tariff sub-heading  
MERCOSUR  40% of the f.o.b. value
c  40% of the f.o.b. value 
Nepal  70% of the f.o.b. value and change in tariff heading  n.a. 
Singapore
a  60% of the f.o.b. value and change in tariff heading  60% of the f.o.b. value and change in tariff heading  
Sri Lanka  65% of the f.o.b. value and change in tariff heading  35% of the f.o.b. value and 25% of the f.o.b. value
c with 
change in tariff heading 
Thailand
d  60% of the f.o.b. value and change in tariff heading  40% of the f.o.b. value and change in the tariff heading  
Other preferential areas    
Mauritius, Seychelles, and 
Tonga 
50% of ex-work price of five specific items
e and 75% 
ex-work prices for others 
50% of ex-work price of five specific items
e and 75% ex-work 
prices for others 
Least-developed countries  70% of the f.o.b. value and change in tariff 
classification for not wholly produced or obtained 
category  
70% of the f.o.b. value and change in tariff classification for 
not wholly produced or obtained category  
Source: WTO, 2011b.  
Note: Rules of origin are not covered under the India-Bhutan preferential trade agreement. 
n.a. =  Not applicable. 
a Product-specific  RoO  apply. 
b Domestic value content in the exporting country. 
c  Foreign contents should not exceed 15% of the f.o.b. value for sets, as defined in General Rule 3 of the HS. 
d Not notified to WTO. 
e Manual sewing and knitting machines (and parts thereof) or those which require less than one quarter of one 
brake-horsepower for their operation; cycles (other than motor cycles) and parts and accessories thereof, excluding rubber 
tyres and tubes; motor cars including taxi-cabs and articles (other than rubber tyres and tubes) to be used as parts and 
accessories thereof; motor omni-buses, chassis of motor omni-buses, motor vans and motor lorries, and parts of 
mechanically propelled vehicles and accessories excluding rubber tyres and tubes; and motor cycles and motor scooters 




97 Change at 4-digit HS/tariff classification between “non-originating inputs” and export product. 




Empirical estimates of the restrictiveness of RoO are still not readily available for 
all PTAs due to their relatively recent establishment as well as the evolving nature of 
some of them. Restrictive RoO inhibit the growth of intra-industry trade, which often is 
closely associated with trade in parts and components inherent to existence of IPNs. 
Complex RoO can harm the natural growth of trade in components, which occurs with 
the process of development in Asian developing countries. Several studies, including 
under ARTNeT, have suggested that Indian RoO are relatively restrictive, both bilateral 
and regional compared to some other agreements in or outside Asia (cf. Nag and De, 
2011, Das and Ratna, 2010). Yet there are signs that this restrictiveness is weakening 
over time.
99  However, as pointed out above, there is no firm empirical evidence to 
suggest if these steps have helped the rise in intraregional trade and investment flows. 
UNCTAD (2003) analysed the India-Sri Lanka FTA and found that, despite being 
restricted to liberalization of goods, it promoted intraregional investments. The report 
attributed this result to the design of RoO in that agreement (see box 2). Today, India is 
the second-largest foreign investor in Sri Lanka, despite not having an investment treaty.  
 
Box 2. India-Sri Lanka free trade agreement and foreign direct investment 
The free trade agreement gives duty-free market access to India and Sri Lanka 
on a preferential basis. Covering 4,000 products, it foresaw a gradual reduction of 
import tariffs during three years for India and eight years for Sri Lanka.  
To qualify for duty concessions in either country, the RoO criteria spelled out 
value-added at a minimum of 35 per cent for eligible imports. For raw materials sourced 
from either country, the value-added component would be 25 per cent.  
The effect? Sri Lankan exports to India increased from US$ 71 million in 2001 
to US$ 168 million in 2002 while India’s exports to Sri Lanka increased from US$ 604 
million to US$ 831 million during the same period. Although the agreement does not 
address investment, it has stimulated new FDI for rubber-based products, ceramics, 
electrical and electronic items, wood-based products, agricultural commodities and 
consumer durables. Because of the agreement, 37 projects are now in operation, with a 
total investment of US$ 145 million. 
_________________ 






99 The change in tariff heading at the 4-digit HS level has now become change in tariff subheading at the 6-
digit HS level, which is less onerous to comply. Similarly, the local/regional value added has been reduced 
from 50 per cent to 35 per cent (or the imported content increased from 50 per cent to 65 per cent).  
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3. Coverage of agreements 
 
  Two-thirds of all India’s agreements in force are with one partner only, just one of 
which is a developed economy (Japan, signed in 2011) and two are high-income 
developing countries (Republic of Korea and Singapore). The remainder form a 
combination of membership in plurilateral (regional) trade agreements (table 21).
100 As in 
the case of other countries in the region, India has also doubled or tripled some of its 
preferential deals by signing bilateral agreements with countries that are also members of 
the regional agreements to which India is a party (e.g., Sri Lanka is in APTA, GSTP, 
SAFTA and BIMSTEC, while Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore are in ASEAN). The 
Trade Policy Review of India (WTO, 2011b) states that “tariff concessions under bilateral 
agreements with countries that also belong to regional agreements to which India is a 
party, are generally wider and deeper than those under the regional agreements, and that 
the trader can choose which preference to use. With regard to rules of origin, the 
authorities mentioned that product specific rules of origin are not necessarily the same in 
the bilateral and regional agreements, but that the original criterion for products not 
covered by specific rules has, by and large, been harmonized.” In practice, it appears that 
some work remains to be done to improve the utilization rate of, and utility from the 
Indian PTAs (see, for example, Jha, 2011). 
 
 







Free trade and economic 
integration agreements 
Bilateral trade agreements  3  2  5 
Regional trade agreements  1  1 - 
Country-bloc agreements  1  1 - 
Global (GSTP)  1 -  - 
Total  6  4 5 
 
Source: Based on WTO TPR India 2011, and WTO RTA-IS, available online at www.wto.org.  
Note: Solid shaded cells represent notification through the Enabling Clause, while the striped cell refers to 
notification through GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V.  
 
  Nine out of India’s 15 PTAs are labelled as free trade agreements (or a 
combination of an FTA in goods and economic integration agreements [EIA] in services) 
thus signalling the intention to improve on the multilateral liberalization commitments. 
Appendix III of this book provides full details of the areas covered by PTAs, and a 
summary is presented in figure 2. None of the agreements contain clearly designated 
articles or sections/chapters on labour standards, and only three agreements have included 
                                                            
 
100  India is a member of the Bay of Bengal Initiative on Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic 
Cooperation (BIMSTEC), signed as a Framework Agreement to form a free trade area by 2012. However, 
negotiations are still underway.  
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some provisions related to the environment. The most frequently found provisions (in 12 
agreements) are those on dispute settlement, safeguards and anti-dumping (the latter 
mostly expressing retention of the freedom to use anti-dumping actions as per WTO 
disciplines). Thus, it is clear that most areas covered in the agreements are linked to 
disciplines in goods trade, which supports prevalent opinion that, until recently, India had 
been very much focusing on policy space-related border measures in its PTAs. 
Agreements with provisions in services, intellectual property protection, investment etc. 
are found in a few agreements, mostly with either developed (Japan) or higher-income 
developing partners (Singapore, Republic of Korea and Malaysia). 
 
 
Figure 36. Areas covered




Source: Based on data from WTO RTA-IS, WTO (2011b) and information from the Ministry of Commerce, 
India 
* Mention of the provisions in any of the areas is registered as coverage; obviously, there is a sizable 
variation between agreements in terms of depth of obligations.  
 
  The outline of PTA coverage by PTAs given in figure 36 (and Annex table), while 
illustrative, is not sufficient to assess how deep Indian regional integration efforts really are. 
As mentioned above, since deep integration is found to be increasing network trade and 
enhancing operations of networks, it is important to understand what the components of such 
deep integration are, so that countries can pursue policies in that direction, if so desired.  
 
  In principle, the concept of “deep integration” implies a higher degree of 
integration than achieved simply by a free trade agreement, which is limited to a removal 
of tariffs and non-tariff barriers on trade in goods. The traditional literature on economic 
integration, grades the levels of integration from most shallow (free trade area) to the 
deepest (fiscal and political union) as shown in table 22. Even the common external trade 
policy of the customs union will be deemed as just a step towards deep integration. Only  
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the processes that lead to liberalization in substantively all goods, services and resources, 
accompanied by the development of some institutions to secure harmonization of certain 
policies, will deliver deep integration. 
 
A common market concept could be taken as an example of a fairly deep 
integration. The integration “deepens” based on the expansion of coverage, both in terms 
of policies and institutions necessary for managing harmonized polices. Lawrence (1996) 
suggested that strengthening production networks would require harmonization of those 
national policies facilitating smoother business activities. As harmonized policies also 
lead to a demand for institutions with supranational power, he argued that countries 
would move towards deeper integration in time. More recent literature, summarized in 
WTO (2011a), found that an increase in trade in intermediate products also created 
demand for deeper agreements. 
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  WTO (2011a) expanded on the methodology developed by Horn, Mavroidis 
and Sapir (2010) in order to empirically measure the depth of integration obtainable 
through a country’s PTAs. Box 3 provides some details on the methodology used. A 
derived measure represents two dimensions of integration: (a) an improvement of the 
specific agreement in covering more than just removal/lowering of tariffs, this being 
identified as the lowest common denominator in integration; and (b) an advance in 












Box 3. Methodology for determining depth of integration 
 
The methodology consists of three steps: (a) identification of policy areas 
classified into two groups (WTO+ provisions that are in the current WTO mandate and 
commitments, and WTO-X provisions that are obligations outside the current WTO 
coverage; see the table below for the list of 52 of these policy areas); (b) determining the 
policy areas included in a PTA and legally enforceable (e.g., a policy area would not be 
deemed enforceable if the legal language is unclear or loose); and (c) exploration of how 
much the policy area and its enforceability matters in practice. For a more detailed 
description refer to WTO (2011a).   
 
      WTO+ and WTO-X policy areas in PTAs 
WTO+ areas   WTO-X areas  
PTA industrial goods   Anti-corruption   Health  
PTA agricultural goods   Competition policy   Human rights  
Customs administration   Environmental laws   Illegal immigration  
Export taxes   IPR   Illicit drugs  
SPS measures  Investment measures   Industrial cooperation  
State trading enterprises   Labour market regulation   Information society  
Technical barriers to 
trade   Movement of capital   Mining  
Countervailing 
measures  Consumer protection   Money laundering  
Anti-dumping   Data protection   Nuclear safety  
State aid   Agriculture   Political dialogue  
Public procurement  
Approximation of 
legislation   Public administration  
TRIMS measures  Audio-visual   Regional cooperation  
GATS   Civil protection  
Research and 
technology  
TRIPS   Innovation policies  SMEs 
   Cultural cooperation  Social matters  
   Economic policy dialogue  Statistics  
   Education and training  Taxation  
   Energy  Terrorism  
   Financial assistance  Visa and asylum  
 







The final results show that of all the policy areas tracked, five consistently matter 
to deep integation, and understood to be motivated to promote production networks. In 
other words, these five policies combined within an agreement would contribute most to 
the expansion of production network trade. The five policy areas include measures for 
state trading enterprises (STEs) and TRIPS from the current WTO mandate, and 
competition policy, intellectual property rights and investment from the areas not covered 
by current WTO agreements. The WTO exercise unfortunately contained only seven of 
the India’s 15 PTAs (bilaterals with Chile, the Republic of Korea and Singapore, and 
with ASEAN and MERCOSUR as well as the two plurilaterals of APTA and SAFTA). 
Only the agreements with the Republic of Korea and Singapore were assessed as meeting 
the condition for deep integration.
101 
 
  It is not very difficult to see why these policy areas have important implications 
for production networks. Competition policy provisions – which were proposed for 
inclusion under the WTO mandate as one of the so-called Singapore issues and later 
dropped except for trade facilitation – are there to ensure that abuse of market power does 
not minimize benefits from liberalization. In the economic literature, competition policy 
is often seen as an extension, and in special cases a substitute, for trade and investment 
liberalization policies in goods and services areas. 
 
While not many PTAs have separate competition policy chapters, there are 
numerous competition-related provisions embedded in chapters on other policy areas, 
such as services liberalization (especially financial and telecommunications services), 
investment, intellectual property protection and government procurement chapters. These 
policy areas are responsible for provisions identified in this book and elsewhere as key 
factors for the operation of IPNs (e.g., infrastructural services, protection of investment or 
intellectual property). Another benefit of adding competition policy provisions where 
possible under the PTAs is their non-discriminatory character. As in other policies that 
are part of regulation, it is more costly to design them to be discriminatory among firms 
belonging to different countries than to not do so; therefore, this produces an additional 
pro-competitive effect and improves transparency.  
  Similarly provisions on STEs are meant to remove the potential for trade 
distortion caused by government involvement in the decisions and activities of an 
enterprise. STEs are not a feature of only developing countries; in fact, many developed 
countries nurture STEs in their agriculture and other sensitive sectors, or the areas linked 
also to social and other special government strategies such as food security. For a 
                                                            
 
101  Because India had still not finalized its agreement with Japan at the time of the WTO study, that 
agreement was was not included in the original assessment. Given the features of the agreement, it is 




multiplicity of reasons, operations of STEs appear to suffer from low transparency. 
Opening this policy area through PTAs would at least help to improve transparency. 
  Many would argue that trade and investment decisions are increasingly being 
made by the same players in the market, and therefore liberalizing one policy area 
without the other is not optimal. Provisions for liberalization of flows of capital, 
including human capital, would allow MNCs to establish production based on relative 
costs and would encourage FDI flows into those locations that are recognized as having 
all necessary ingredients to be part of production sharing.  
 
  In summary, PTAs cannot be identified as delivering (deep) integration. In India 
that is definitely not the case; despite an avalanche of PTAs signed in the past five years, 
only three have potential for creating environments for IPNs. The positive news is that all 
three agreements belong to the most recent vintage of PTAs, which might signal a change 
in a general policy towards regional integration, from shallow and protectionist to deep 
and trade enhancing. In addition, all partners in these agreements (Japan, the Republic of 
Korea and Singapore) are important players in Asian production networks. However, the 
fact cannot be ignored that trade and investment areas are not the only source of obstacles 
for IPNs. It is also important to note that there are many more factors involved in 
establishing and the functioning of production networks and in integrating producers 
from different markets, including having good physical connectivity, efficient 
infrastructural services and institutions for the protection of intellectual property (cf. 
Bhattacharyay and De, 2009). 
 
  The empirical literature indicates that improving the depth of PTAs would 
increase the production network trade, especially so in the sectors that are regulation-
intensive. For example, a 1 per cent rise in the depth of integration increases trade in 
automotive parts and ITC products by 81 per cent and 56 per cent, respectively (Orifice 
and Rocha, 2011). For India, both these sectors are at the top of industrial development 
priorities. Thus, it would not make sense to exclude any of these products from the lists 
of covered goods for tariff cuts as appeared to be the case for car parts in the past.  
    
  Furthermore, countries already participating in IPNs are more likely to be signing 
deep PTAs subsequently, as IPNs create awareness and demand for them. This appears to 
be the case in East Asia, where IPNs were established as a consequence of the region 
undergoing de facto integration (that is, by market forces rather than contractual 
obligations). According to Orifice and Rocha (2011), the almost five times higher chance 
that a deep PTA would be signed between countries at different levels of development was 






While there is a clear need to expand trade and deepen economic and other 
relations among developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region, evidence from empirical 
research finds that the agreements between countries at a similar and relatively low level 
of development remain shallow and fail to provide support to operation of production 
networks. On the other hand, if shallow agreements are the only possibility, it is better to 
have them than nothing. Shallow trade agreements, while rarely having concrete trade 
enlargement effects, might work towards developing trust and thus could help to generate 
trade in the long term. It is also helpful to know that countries that increased trade with 
partners with whom they had no preferential trade agreements have not been exceptions 
in this region (see APTIAD, 2011).  
 
In addition to contributing relatively little towards the deeper integration of India, 
its current trade agreements are also disappointing in terms of utilization by traders 
(exporting and importing firms).
102 In principle, utilization of preferences is inversely 
proportionate to the complexity of the rules of origin, given the margin of preference – 
the more complex the rules of origin, the more expensive the compliance, resulting in low 
propensity to use the preferences. Frequently, traders just use so-called “most-favoured-
nation” rules of origin without using preferential market access. This practice may result 
in agreements that do not effectively increase trade. This is a serious problem, but it is 
difficult to provide much more than anecdotal evidence in this regard as data are not 
readily available.  
                                                            
 
102 Jha (2011) estimated the utility of India-Sri Lanka FTA, which represents one of the more effective of 
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Prospects for India and lessons for latecomers 
 
Witada Anukoonwattaka and Mia Mikic 
 
The rapidly expanding international production networks driven by multinational 
firms has stimulated economic and trade integration between Asian countries during 
recent decades. The major countries in East and South-East Asia have benefited from the 
expanding IPNs, especially in terms of export growth, employment creation and 
technology transfer. However, the remainder of the region, especially low-income 
countries, has found increasing their presence in existing IPNs to be a difficult challenge. 
 
Building on the examination of India’s performance in IPNs, this study also offers 
some policy recommendations to other low-income countries that have been missing out 
on the opportunities presented by the IPN phenomenon. This study examines the current 
performance of India, and evaluates its prospects and challenges for catching up in this 
process, while taking into account India’s ongoing economic reforms and efforts to utilize 
PTAs as a vehicle for integrating with the rest of the region. The lessons from India are 
used to formulate policy recommendations relevant to fostering IPN participation by 
countries that are trailing behind in this area. 
 
Examination of India’s economic performance shows that the country has 
followed a distinctive pattern of development, especially when compared to major 
participants in Asian IPNs, including China. Recent trends reflect the fact that in creating 
value-added India is continuing to focus on some services, which are relatively skill-
intensive with little prospects of generating demand for unskilled labour. The growth 
pattern of India does not appear to be in line with the country’s overall factor endowment, 
which reflects a relative abundance of unskilled labour; therefore, concerns have been 
raised about “job-less” growth of India during the past two decades.  
 
The trade performance of India reveals that, so far, there has not been any clear 
evidence of the country entering into Asian IPNs that have created extensive trade 
opportunities in the machinery and transport equipment sectors of East and South-East 
Asian countries. Overall, the share of manufacturing exports in total exports by India has 
been declining (from 56% in 2000 to 42% in 2010). Manufacturing exports by India are 
still concentrating on resource-based manufacturing products and materials such as 
leather products, gems and jewelry, and textiles and garments. However, there is 
evidence of integration by some parts of the automotive and electronic industries into  
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IPNs. Multinationals such as Toyota, Suzuki and other MNCs have been increasingly 
adding their operations in India to the evolution of their IPNs.  
 
The reasons behind this rather unimpressive performance by India’s 
manufacturing exports are pointed out in existing literature that is referred to in this study. 
Many of the reasons relate to distortions created by import substitution policies that India 
adopted prior to the economic reforms initiated in 1991.
103 Those policies were translated 
into tight controls of foreign and domestic investment, heavy public sector involvement 
in production, and policy biases in favour of capital- and skill-intensive industries. 
Consequently, production by the Indian manufacturing sector has been focused on 
capital-intensive, large-scale and heavy manufacturing industries, notwithstanding India’s 
comparative advantage in labour-intensive production. The distorted economic patterns 
remain despite the fact that the economic reforms have removed some policy 
impediments.  
 
At the same time, foreign investment in India was discouraged by highly 
restrictive investment regulations, industrial licensing, rigid constraints imposed to 
businesses on their entry to, and exit from the market as well as high protection for 
workers and small-scale firms. The lack of policy flexibility led to India being perceived 
as an unattractive place for FDI, particularly for those firms driven by efficiency-seeking 
motives.  
 
Those policies contributed to the underperformance of India’s manufacturing 
sector when compared to East and South-East Asian economies, whose economic policies 
were relatively more open. Although the economic reforms started in 1991 have 
increasingly opened the Indian economy, comparisons show that there is still a large gap 
between India and rapidly growing East and South-East Asian economies. India still 
needs to reduce tariffs further, especially on raw materials, parts and components, and 
semi-processed goods, if it wants to match the level of ASEAN and East Asian countries. 
Most importantly, steps are necessary to address significant concerns about non-tariff 
barriers and the “behind-the-border” issues. Private investors are still required to apply 
for permission from a large number of government offices to start a business.
104  Once 
permits and clearances are obtained, investors are still faced with a high level of 
                                                            
 
103 A comprehensive analysis is provided by, for example Athukorala, 2008; Grabowski, 2009; Kochhar, 
Kumar, Rajan, Subramanian and Tokatlisdis, 2006; and Srinivasan, 2003.  
104 According to Henry (2004), starting a new business in India required, on average, 10 permits, compared 
with the six permits required to legally establish the same business in China. In addition, the permit process 
took 90 days on average in India, three times longer than in China.   
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government oversight – the so-called “inspector Raj.” The management time required to 




Further reforms are needed in the labour market. While it is important to adhere to 
high workers’ protection in the organised labour market, for the purposes of efficiency 
reforms could be taken at the same time to improve market functioning. For example, 
labour laws designed to protect workers makes it difficult to dismiss employees or to 
employ temporary workers. As a result, factories are reluctant to take on new workers 
unless they are confident that demand for their output will be steady. Exiting a market by 
unviable and uncompetitive business units remains difficult in India, making it urgent to 
introduce competition mechanisms that will allow the more efficient firms to enter and 
the less efficient firms to exit more easily. For infrastructure services, significant reforms 
and upgrading have been made in telecommunications and road systems, but  other 
crucial infrastructural elements such as power, freight and cargo services have not 
undergone significant improvements (Kalish, 2006).
106   
 
Despite the reforms and recent rapid growth of FDI inflows, India is still having 
limited success in attracting FDI into manufacturing sector. This could be attributed to 
four factors. First, heavy regulations have not been completely removed. Second, 
reservation of products for production by small-scale firms prevents utilization of full 
market size to utilize benefits from scale economies. Third, inadequate soft and hard 
infrastructure limits India’s productive capacity and reduces its attractiveness to MNCs. 
Furthermore, India has been at a disadvantage with regard to first-comers in this 
international specialization, particularly by China and ASEAN countries, as there is 
considerable agglomeration of companies that have already fixed their location in those 
countries.  
 
However, prospects for India to emerge as a player to be counted on in the 
specialization process of IPNs do exist. Important advantages of India arise from the 
sheer size of the country’s economy and population, the large pool of engineers and 
                                                            
 
105 In India, 16 per cent of senior management’s time may be occupied by interactions with government 
officials, compared with 9.9 per cent of management time in China (Henry, 2004). 
106 For example, highways comprise a very small share of India’s roads. Of 3.3 million kilometres of Indian 
roadways, only 195,000 kilometres are highways. In contrast, China has approximately 1.4 million 
kilometres of highway
 . There is insufficient capacity to service today’s large cargo ships at Indian ports, 
and which have yet to prepare for the next generation of container ships that will be even larger and more 
sophisticated, requiring long docks, deep harbours and very tall cranes. Again, in contrast, China already 
handles one fifth of the world’s container shipments and is developing massive new ports in Shenzhen and 
Shanghai (Karlish, 2006)  
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relatively sound intellectual property protection. An initial requirement for a country to 
integrate into IPNs is to offer low trade costs. Clearly, India has to further liberalize its 
economy and rapidly upgrade crucial infrastructure in order to bring down trade costs to 
an adequate level. 
 
India is building upon some positive results from its autonomous reforms by 
scaling up its efforts in preferential liberalization. Since the early 2000s, India has 
embarked on bilateral trade arrangements with all those countries in Asia that have 
proved to be successful participants in the Asian and global IPNs, i.e., Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Singapore. Furthermore, it has signed a comprehensive 
trade agreement with ASEAN, thus securing links to potentially useful suppliers in 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. An inspection of these agreements from a 
perspective of fitting into the “deep integration” type of PTAs (WTO, 2011a) finds that 
indeed only these latest agreements feature disciplines in those policy areas that matter 
for the development of IPNs, including competition, investment and intellectual property 
protection. Other agreements, including those signed with neighbours in South Asia, are 
all shallow agreements. 
 
Anecdotal evidence supports the view that efforts in securing deeper PTAs were a 
reaction to a demand that had built up as a result of the increasing amount of production 
network trade (parts and components  amounted to 10% of India’s manufacturing exports 
and 23% of manufacturing imports, on average, during 2006-2007). However, the long 
implementation periods negotiated for agreements with these strategic partners (2021 
with Japan, 2019 with Malaysia and the Republic of Korea, and 2015 with Singapore) 
could prove to be a deterrent to some investors who are now having a second look at Asia 
and deciding on alternate locations, given the changes in China’s labour costs and issues 
with the exchange rates.  
 
India is not saved from the similar problems arising from exchange rate 
management. A managed float system was introduced in India in 1992-1993. There is 
considerable evidence that the Reserve Bank of India has intervened to keep the exchange 
rate from appreciating in order to preserve export competitiveness. However, there are 
limits to what the Reserve Bank of India can do to keep the Indian rupee from 
appreciating, given rising capital inflows and a high inflation rate. Although attempting to 
keep the exchange rate low may help the IT, textiles and tourism sectors, as their exports 
generally have low imported input content, it may increase the production costs of 
industries participating in IPNs because imported inputs, parts and components are a 




The ongoing weak prospects for the global economy will make competition for 
market share tougher and the achievement of inclusive growth more difficult. While the 
previous episode of global collapse in international trade enforced the adverse effects of 
strong interconnectivity among economies, the ability of Asian economies to recover 
their trade equally quickly also proved the value of being connected to the production 
networks. Asian economies have shown stronger resilience to external shocks. It is not 
possible for all countries to be part of IPNs. Some could prosper even without 
participating in these vertical specializations, based on their specific endowments and 
patterns of production and trade. However, those low-income countries that are only 
labour-abundant and are facing the challenges of unemployment would do well to 
consider introducing similar policies to those followed by other significant players, and 
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Lists of parts and components (based on the 5-digit SITC Revision 3) 
Commodity code  Description 
71191  Parts for boilers of subgroup 7111 
71192  Parts for apparatus and appliances of subgroup 7112 
7128  Parts for turbines of subgroup 7121 
71311  Spark-ignition reciprocating or rotary internal combustion piston engines for aircraft 
71319  Parts, n.e.s., of aircraft engines of heading 71311 
71321  Reciprocating piston engines of a cylinder capacity not exceeding 1,000 cc 
71322  Reciprocating piston engines of a cylinder capacity not exceeding 1,000 cc 
71323  Compression-ignition engines (diesel or semi-diesel engines) 
71332  Other spark-ignition reciprocating or rotary engines 
71333  Compression-ignition engines (diesel or semi-diesel engines) 
71391  Parts, n.e.s., suitable for use solely or principally with spark-ignition internal combustion piston engines 
71392  Parts, n.e.s., suitable for use solely or principally with compression-ignition internal combustion piston engines 
71441 Turbojets 
71449  Other than turbojets 
71481 Turbo  propellers 
71489 Other  gas  turbines 
71491  Parts for turbojets or turbo propellers 
71499  Parts for gas turbines, n.e.s. 
7169  Parts, n.e.s., suitable for use solely or principally with the machines falling within group 71893 
71819  Parts, including regulators, of hydraulic turbines and water/wheels 
71878  Parts of nuclear reactors  
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71899  Parts of engines and motors of headings 71449,718191,71892 and 71893 
71219  Parts of the machinery of subgroup 7221 
72129  Parts of the machinery of subgroup 7221 through 72126 
72139  Parts for milking machines and dairy machinery 
72198  Parts of machinery of heading 72191 
72199  Parts of machinery and appliances of heading 72195 and 72196 
72392  Bulldozer or angle dozer blades 
72393  Parts for boring or sinking machinery 
72399 
 
Parts n.e.s., of civil engineering etc. machinery, including mining and public works machinery Parts (heading 723) and cranes etc. 
(heading 744.3) 
72439  Parts of the machines and furniture subgroup 7243 
72449  Parts and accessories of textile machinery designed for use in the preparation and production of textile fibres and yarns 
72461  Auxiliary machinery for machines of headings 72441, 72442, 72243, 72451, 72452 and 72453 
72467  Parts and accessories of weaving machines (looms) of heading 72451 or of their auxiliary machinery  
72468  Parts and accessories of knitting and stitch-bonding machines, tulle, lace, embroidery, net etc. machines or their auxiliary machines 
72488  Parts for machinery of subgroup 7248 
72491  Parts for machinery of subgroups 7247 and 7751 
72492  Parts for machinery of subgroups 7247 and 7751 for the machines of headings 72472, 72473, 72474, 77512 
72591  Parts for machinery of subgroup 7251 
72599  Parts for machinery of subgroup 7252 
72635  Printing type, blocks, plates, cylinders and other printing components 
72689 Parts  for  bookbinding  machinery 
72691 
 
Parts for machines of heading 726.31 and subgroups 726.5 and 726.6 for the machines of  
heading 726.31 
72699  Parts for machines of heading 726.1 and subgroups 7265 and 7266  
72719  Parts for machines of headings 72127 and 72711 
72729  Parts for the machinery, n.e.s. for the industrial preparation or manufacture of food or drink  
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72819    Parts and accessories suitable for use solely or principally with machine tools of subgroup 7281 
72839 
 
Parts of machinery for sorting, washing, crushing or mixing earth, stone, ores etc., and for shaping solid mineral fuels, ceramic pastes 
etc. 
72851  Parts for machines of heading 72841 
72852  Parts of machinery for working rubber or plastics or manufacturing products made from rubber or plastics, n.e.s. 
72853  Parts for machines of heading 72843 
72855 
 
Parts, n.e.s., of machinery for public works etc., preparing animal or fixed vegetable fats and oils, and specialized for particular 
industries n.e.s. 
73511    Tool holders and self-opening die-heads 
73513 Work  holders 
73515  Dividing heads and other special attachments for machine tools 
73591 
 
Parts, n.e.s., and accessories suitable solely or principally for use with metalworking machine tools working by removing metal or other 
material 
73595  Parts and accessories suitable for use solely or principally in machines of group 731 for machines of group 733 
73719 Foundry  machine  parts 
73729  Rolls and other Parts for metal-rolling mills 
73739    Parts for machines and apparatus of subgroup 7373 
73749     Parts for machinery and apparatus of subgroup 7374 
74128     Parts for burners and other articles of subgroup 7412 
74135  Parts for the equipment of headings 74131 through 74134 
74139  Parts for furnaces and ovens of headings 74136 through 74138 
74149  Parts of refrigerators, freezers and other refrigerating or freezing equipment (electric or other) 
74159 
 
Parts for air-conditioning machines (having a motor-driven fan and elements for changing the temperature and humidity) of heading 
7415 
74172     Parts for generators of heading 74171 
7419    Parts, n.e.s., for machinery of headings 74173 through 74189 
74291  Parts of pumps for liquids 
74295  Parts of the pumps and liquid elevators of group 742, of liquid elevators  
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7438  Parts for pumps, compressors, fans and hoods of subgroups 7431 and 7434 
74391     Parts of machines and apparatus of subgroups 7435 and 7436 of centrifuges (including centrifugal driers) 
74395  Parts of filtering or purifying machinery and apparatus 
74419  Parts of trucks and tractors of headings 74414 and 74415 
74491  Parts suitable for use in machinery of subgroups 7442 and 7444 
74492  Parts suitable for use in machinery of headings 744.1, 74412 and 74413 
74493  Parts suitable for use in lifts, skip hoists or escalators 
74494  Parts for lifting, handling, loading or unloading machinery, n.e.s. 
74519  Parts of tools of subgroup 7451 
74529  Parts of machinery of subgroup 7452 and heading 7753 
74539  Weighing-machine weights of all kinds; Parts of the weighing machinery of subgroup 7453 
74568     Parts of appliances of subgroup 7456 
74593  cylinders and other Parts for machines of heading 74591 
74597  Parts for automatic goods-vending machines (postage stamps, cigarettes, food etc.) 
7461 Ball-bearings 
7462  Tapered roller bearings (including cone and tapered roller assemblies) 
7463  Spherical roller bearings 
7464  Needle roller bearings 
7465  Other cylindrical roller bearings 
7468  Other ball- or roller bearings (including combined ball-/roller bearings) 
74691  Balls, needles and rollers 
74699  Parts of ball and roller bearings, n.e.s. 
7471 Pressure-reducing  valves 
7472  Valves for oleo-hydraulic or pneumatic transmissions 
7473     Check-valves 
7474  Safety or relief valves 
7478    Taps, cocks, valves and similar appliances, n.e.s.  
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7479    Parts for the appliances of group 747 
7481       Transmission shafts (including camshafts and crankshafts) and cranks 
74821  Bearing housings, incorporating ball- or roller bearings 
74822  Bearing housings, not incorporating ball- or roller bearings; plain shaft bearings 
74839  Parts of articulated link chain 
7484    Gears and gearing and other transmission elements presented separately) 
7485  Flywheels and pulleys (including pulley blocks) 
7486   Clutches and shaft couplings (including universal joints) 
7489  Parts, n.e.s., for articles of group 748 
7492    Gaskets and similar joints of metal sheeting combined with other materials 
74991  Ships’ or boats’ propellers and blades  
74999  Machinery Parts, not containing electrical connectors, insulators, coils, contacts or other electrical features, n.e.s. 
7591  Parts and accessories of photocopying and thermo-copying apparatus of subgroup 7513 
75991    Parts and accessories for machines of subgroup 7511 
75993    Parts and accessories for machines of subgroup 7519 
75995 
 




Parts of automatic data processing machines and units thereof, magnetic or optical readers, and machines for transcribing and 
processing data, n.e.s. 
76211    Radio broadcast receivers, incorporating sound-recording or reproducing apparatus 
76212  Radio broadcast receivers, not incorporating sound-recording or reproducing apparatus 
76491  Parts of electrical apparatus for line telephony or line telegraphy (including apparatus for carrier-current line systems) 
76492 
 




Parts of television receivers, radio broadcast receivers, transmission apparatus for radio telephony, telegraphy, broadcasting or 
television etc. 
76499  Parts of apparatus for sound recorders or reproducers and parts of television image and sound recorders or reproducers  
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77129  Parts of electric power machinery (other than rotating electric power generating machinery and equipment), and parts thereof 
7722 Printed  circuits 
77231  Fixed carbon resistors, composition- or film-type 
77232 Other  fixed  resistors 
77233    Wire-wound variable resistors (including rheostats and potentiometers) 
77235  Other variable resistors (including rheostats and potentiometers) 
77238  Parts for electrical resistors of subgroup 7723 
77241     Fuses 
77242  Automatic circuit-breakers for voltages of less than 72.5 kv 
77243    Other automatic circuit-breakers 
77244  Isolating switches and make-and-break switches 
77245  Lightning arresters, voltage limiters and surge suppressors for voltages exceeding 1,000 volts 
77249 
 
Electrical apparatus for switching or protecting electrical circuits, or making connections to or in electrical circuits, n.e.s., exceeding 
1,000 volts 
77251    Fuses 
77252  Automatic circuit-breakers for a voltage not exceeding 1,000 volts 
77253  Apparatus for protecting electrical circuits, n.e.s., not exceeding 1,000 volts 
77254 Relays 
77255    Other switches 
77257 Lamp-holders 
77258  Plugs and sockets 
77259 
 
Electrical apparatus for switching or protecting electrical circuits or making connections to or in electrical circuits, n.e.s., not exceeding 
1,000 v 
77261 
  Switchboards etc <1000v 
77262  Switchboards etc >1000v 
77281  Switchboards etc unequip  
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77282 Switchgear  parts  nes 
77312    Co-axial cables and other co-axial conductors 
77313    Ignition wiring sets and other wiring sets of a type used in vehicles, aircraft or ships 
77322         Electrical insulators of glass 
77323  Electrical insulators of ceramics 
77324  Electrical insulators of materials other than glass or ceramics 
77423    X-ray tubes 
77429 
 
Electro-diagnostic apparatus for medical, surgical, dental or veterinary sciences and radiological apparatus, n.e.s., including parts and 
accessories 
77549    Parts of hair clippers  
77579  Parts of food grinders and mixers (fruit or vegetable juice extractors)   
77589  Parts of electro-thermic appliances of subgroup 7758 
77611  Television picture tubes, colour 
77612  Television picture tubes, black and white or other monochrome 
77621  Television camera tubes; image converters and intensifiers; other photocathode tubes 
77623  Other cathode-ray tubes 
77625      Microwave tubes (excluding grid-controlled tubes) 
77627    Other valves and tubes 
77629  Parts of the tubes and valves of subgroups 7761 and 7762 
77631    Diodes, other than photosensitive or light-emitting diodes 
77632  Transistors (excluding photosensitive transistors) with a dissipation rate of less than one watt 
77633  Transistors (excluding photosensitive transistors) with a dissipation rate of one watt or more 
77635  Thyristors, diacs and triacs (excluding photosensitive devices) 
77637  Photosensitive semiconductor devices; light emitting diodes 
77639  Other semiconductor devices 
77641 Digital  monolithic  integrated  units 
77643 Non-digital  monolithic  integrated  units  
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77645  Hybrid integrated circuits 
77649  Electronic integrated circuits and micro-assemblies, n.e.s. 
77681     Piezoelectric crystals, mounted 
77688 
    
Parts of the devices of subgroup 7763 and of the mounted piezoelectric crystals of item  
77681 
77689  Parts of electronic integrated circuits and micro-assemblies 
77811  Primary cells and primary batteries 
77812  Electric accumulators (storage batteries) 
77817  Parts of primary cells and primary batteries 
77819  Parts of electric accumulators 
77822  Discharge lamps (other than ultraviolet lamps) 
77823    Sealed-beam lamp units 
77824     Ultraviolet or infrared lamps; arc lamps 
77829  Parts of electric filaments or discharge lamps 
77831 
 
Electrical ignition or starting equipment used for spark-ignition or compression-ignition  
internal combustion engines 
77833 
 
Parts of electrical ignition or starting equipment for internal combustion engines; parts of generators and cut-outs used with such 
engines 
77834      Electrical lighting or signalling equipment, windscreen wipers etc., used for cycles or motor vehicles 
77835    Parts of equipment of heading 77834 
77848    Hand elec-mech tool part 
77869  Parts of electrical capacitors 
77879  Parts el equip of 7787 
77883    Parts of the equipment of heading 77882 
77885  Parts of electric sound or visual signaling apparatus, n.e.s. (including parts of indicator panels, burglar and fire alarms) 
77886     Carbon electrodes, carbon brushes, lamp carbons, battery carbons and other carbon articles 
77889  Electrical parts of machinery or apparatus, n.e.s.  
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78425  Bodies (including cabs) for tractors, trucks and special purpose motor vehicles and road motor vehicles n.e.s. 
78431  Bumpers and parts thereof, for tractors, motor cars and other motor vehicles etc. 
78432  Other parts and accessories of motor vehicle bodies of headings 8701 to 8705 (including cabs) 
78433  Brakes and servo-brakes, and parts thereof, for tractors, motor cars and other motor vehicles etc. 
78434 Gearboxes 
78435    Drive axles with differential, whether or not provided with other transmission components 
78436  Non-driving axles, and parts thereof, for tractors, motor cars and other motor vehicles etc. 
78439 
 
Parts and accessories n.e.s. for tractors, motor cars and other motor vehicles, trucks, public transport vehicles and road motor vehicles, 
n.e.s. 
78535  Parts and accessories for motorcycles (including mopeds) 
78536  Parts and accessories for invalid carriages 
78537  Parts and accessories for bicycles and other cycles (except motorcycles and mopeds), n.e.s. 
78689 
 




Parts of railway or tramway locomotives or rolling stock railway vehicles; parts of railway or tramway coaches, vans, trucks, service 
vehicles etc. 
79291    Propellers and rotors, and parts thereof 
79293  Undercarriages and parts thereof for aircraft 
79295  Parts of airplanes or helicopters, n.e.s. 
79297  Other parts of goods of group 792 
81219     Parts for boilers of heading 81217 
8138  Parts of portable electric lamps of heading 81312 (excluding storage batteries) 
81391  Parts, n.e.s., of lamps, light fittings etc. of glass 
81392  Parts, n.e.s., of lamps, light fittings etc. of plastics 
81399    Parts, n.e.s., of lamps, light fitting etc. other 
82111     Seats of a type used for aircraft 
82112    Seats of a type used for motor vehicles  
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82119     Parts of seats of subgroup 8211 
84848    Headbands, linings, covers, hat foundations, hat frames, peaks and chin-traps, for headgear 
87119 Binoc/telescope  part/acc 
87139  Electron/etc diffr parts 
87149     Microscopes parts/access 
87199  Parts and accessories of liquid crystal devices, n.e.s., lasers (other than laser diodes), and other optical appliances and instruments, n.e.s. 
87319    Parts and accessories of gas, liquid or electricity meters 
87329  Parts and accessories of revolution and production counters, odometers, pedometers, speedometers, tachometers, stroboscopes etc. 
87412      Parts and accessories of navigational instruments and appliances 
87414      Parts and accessories for articles of heading 87413 
87424  Parts and accessories for articles of headings 87422 and 87423 
87426     Parts and accessories for articles of heading 87425 
87439    Fluid instrum parts/acc 
87454      Parts and accessories for machines and appliances of heading 87453 
87456    Parts and accessories for instruments of heading 87455 
87469  Parts and accessories for automatic regulating or controlling instruments, and apparatus 
87479  Parts and accessories for instruments and apparatus of subgroup 8747 
8749  Parts and accessories for machines, appliances, instruments and apparatus, n.e.s. 
88112      Flash bulbs, flash-cubes and the like 
88113  Photographic flashlight apparatus (other than the discharge lamps of subgroup 7782) 
88114  Parts and accessories for the photographic cameras of heading 88111 
88115     Parts and accessories for photographic flashlight apparatus 
88123  Parts and accessories for the cinematographic cameras of heading 82121 
88124    Parts and accessories for cinematographic projectors 
88134  Parts and accessories for the equipment of headings 88131 through 88133 
88136     Parts and accessories for the apparatus and equipment of heading 88135  
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88422    Parts for frames and mountings of spectacles, goggles or the like 
88431     Objective lenses for cameras, projectors or photographic enlargers or reducers 
88432    Other objective lenses 
88433 Filters 
88439  Mounted optical elements, n.e.s. 
88571 
 
Instrument panel clocks and clocks of a similar type, for vehicles, aircraft, spacecraft or  
vessels 
88591  Watch-cases, and parts thereof 
88597  Clock cases and cases of a similar type for other goods of group 885, and parts thereof 
88598  Complete watch or clock movements, unassembled or partly assembled (movement sets) 
88599  Clock or watch parts, n.e.s. 
89121  Cartridges for riveting or similar tools or for captive-bolt humane killers, and parts thereof 
89195        Other parts of shotguns and rifles of heading 89131 
89410  Baby carriages, and parts thereof, n.e.s. 
89423  Parts and accessories of dolls representing only human beings 
8989  Parts and accessories of musical instruments   
89935     Parts of lighters, n.e.s., other than flints or wicks 
89949      Parts, trimmings and accessories of articles falling under heading 89941 or 89942 
89984    Button moulds and other parts of buttons; button blanks 
89986    Parts of slide fasteners 
89992 
  
Skins and other parts of birds with their feathers or down, feathers, parts of feathers, down  
and articles thereof   
89994      Human hair, animal hair, or other textile materials, prepared for use in making wigs or the like 
89997  Vacuum flasks and other vacuum vessels, complete with cases, and parts thereof (other than glass inners) 





India’s trade of top 10 items of manufacturing parts and components, 1994-2008 
 
Table 1a.  India’s exports of top 10 items of manufacturing parts and components, 1994-2004 
 










(US $ million) 






Share in total P&C 
exports (%) 
78537 101.2  15.9  78436 1  64.0  14.9  78439  529.7  17.5 
78439 100.4  15.8  78536 145.4  13.2  75997  221.1  7.3 
75997    66.2  10.4  75995  84.6  7.7  71392  162.5  5.4 
71392    33.6    5.3  77885  66.8  6.1  78537  139.1  4.6 
71391    28.0   4.4  71392  47.6  4.3  72855  133.1  4.4 
77249    13.5    2.1  71391  32.0  2.9  71391  111.3  3.7 
78431    13.2    2.1  79293  26.1  2.4  89410  87.1  2.9 
74291    12.9    2.0  76499  25.1  2.3  77637  85.0  2.8 
72855    12.2    1.9  72449  22.9  2.1  78431  82.7  2.7 
72449    12.1    1.9  72855  21.6  2.0  77611  80.3  2.7 
Top 10 P&C  393.2 61.8  Top 10 P&C  636.1 57.9  Top 10 P&C  1,631.9 53.9 
Total P&C  636.5     Total P&C  1,098.4     Total P&C  3,027.8    
Share of P&C 
exports in total 
mfg. exports (%) 3.2    
Share of P&C 
exports in total 
mfg. exports (%) 3.8    
Share of P&C 
exports in total 
mfg. exports (%)  5.2   
Source: Calculated from United Nations, 2010. Note: See Appendix I of this book for detailed commodity description.   
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Table 1b.  India’s exports of top 10 items of manufacturing parts and components, 2005-2008 
 



































78439 778.3  20.5  78439 880.0  18.8  78439  919.5 15.6  79295  1,119.4  13.1 
71392 229.3 6.0  71392 327.0 7.0  71392  423.5  7.2  78439  1,085.1  12.7 
75997 221.3 5.8  75997 200.6 4.3  79295  288.6  4.9  77637  528.8 6.2 
72855 155.5 4.1  72855 164.4 3.5  77637  212.8  3.6  71392  505.7 5.9 
78537 148.8 3.9  78537 160.7 3.4  76493  193.4  3.3  79297  242.8 2.9 
71391 138.3 3.6  78431 150.0 3.2  72855  167.0  2.8  77282  233.9 2.7 
78431  113.0 3.0  71391  143.5 3.1  77282  141.2 2.4  78434  206.9 2.4 
77637  93.7 2.5  77637  133.9 2.9  71391  137.5 2.3  78537  184.4 2.2 
73591  82.8 2.2  76493  122.0 2.6  78431  136.9 2.3  76493  175.4 2.1 
78434  78.9 2.1  78434  112.6 2.4  78434  124.6 2.1  72855  158.0 1.9 
Top 10 
P&C 2,039.6  53.8  Top 10 P&C  2,394.6 51.2 Top 10 P&C  2,745.1 46.5 Top 10 P&C  4,440.5 52.1 
Total  P&C  3,795.0   Total  P&C  4,673.8   Total P&C  5,905.0   Total P&C  8,526.6  





Share of P&C 




Share of P&C 




Share of P&C 
exports in total 
mfg. exports (%) 
7.3  
Source: Calculated from United Nations, 2010..  





Table 2a. India’s imports of top 10 items of manufacturing parts and components, 1994-2004 
 

















Share in total 
P&C imports (%) 
79295 292.1 12.4  75997  428.3 14.2  75997  1,064.5  15.2 
78439 156.9  6.7  78439  309.9 10.3  78439  546.6  7.8 
75997 129.2  5.5  77641  202.8  6.7  76493  445.2  6.3 
71499 123.1  5.2  76493  138.0  4.6  79295  396.3  5.6 
76493 75.5 3.2  71392 104.7 3.5  76491 292.8  4.2 
72449 73.2 3.1  76491  77.9 2.6  77643 226.1  3.2 
77643 67.3 2.9  71391  69.5 2.3  77282 172.6  2.5 
71392 66.2 2.8  74291  54.2 1.8  72399 139.5  2.0 
78431 64.5 2.8  71499  54.1 1.8  71392 133.1  1.9 
74494 60.5 2.6  79295  53.1 1.8  72393 133.0  1.9 
Top 10 P&C  1,108.5  47.2  Top 10 P&C  1,492.5  49.5  Top 10 P&C  3,549.6  50.5 
Total P&C  2,349.9     Total P&C  3,017.6     Total P&C  7,028.0    
Share of P&C 
imports in total 
mfg. imports (%) 
16.3    
Share of P&C 
imports in total 
mfg. imports (%) 
13.2    
Share of P&C 
imports in total 
mfg. imports (%) 
13.7    
Source: Calculated from United Nations, 2010. 




Table 2b. India’s imports of top 10 items of manufacturing parts and components, 2005-2008 
 





























































75997  1,287.6 14.7  75997  1,413.5 12.7  75997  1,231.5 8.8  78439  1,834.3 11.3 
79295 636.2  7.3 79295 800.9  7.2 78439 931.3  6.6 75997  1,242.8  7.7 
78439 624.5  7.1 76493 784.4  7.1 79295 859.3  6.1 76493  878.8  5.4 
76493 499.7  5.7 78439 760.3  6.8 76493 785.1  5.6 79295  647.5  4.0 
76491 323.8  3.7 76491 443.8  4.0 76491 649.8  4.6 77282  503.7  3.1 
77643 272.6  3.1 77643 361.4  3.3 77282 438.3  3.1 72399  446.6  2.8 
77282 253.5  2.9 77282 344.1  3.1 77643 414.6  3.0 77637  420.0  2.6 
72399 186.2  2.1 72399 284.3  2.6 72399 356.4  2.5 71392  370.5  2.3 
71392 174.5  2.0 72855 217.8  2.0 72393 277.6  2.0 77812  355.9  2.2 
72855 145.8  1.7 71392 170.0  1.5 72699 274.4  2.0 73729  350.6  2.2 
Top 10 P&C  4,404.3  50.2  Top 10 
P&C  5,580.5 50.2  Top  10  P&C  6,218.3 44.2  Top 10 
P&C  7,050.6 43.4 
Total P&C  8,767.7    Total P&C  11,113.8    Total P&C  14,076.8    Total P&C  16,233.5   
Share of P&C 






















Source: Calculated from United Nations, 2010.  
Note: See Appendix I of this book for detailed commodity description.  
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Table 3a. Estimates of intra-industry trade in india’s top 10 products involving P&C trade: 1994-2004 
 




















78439 200.8  78.1  71392  95.2  62.5  78439  1,059.4  98.4 
75997 132.4 67.8 71391 64.1  63.1 75997 442.1 34.4
71392 67.1  67.3  76499  50.2  87.1  71392  266.2  90.0 
71391 28.8  67.9  72449  45.9  90.5  72855  201.9  86.3 
78431 26.4  33.9  72855  43.2  74.9  77611  160.7  86.2 
74291 25.8  54.2  73591  39.7  98.4  71391  127.8  72.9 
72855 24.3  43.8  77811  22.1  97.4  77429  108.0  88.5 
72449 24.1  28.3  77252  21.3  93.0  73591  103.2  96.9 
73591 20.1  81.7  87469  21.2  56.4  77637  89.6  69.0 
78535 17.9  94.5  77833  20.5  80.8  74291  88.6  63.9 
Source: Calculated from United Nations, 2010.  
Note: See Appendix 1 for detailed commodity description. 
 
Table 3b. Estimates of intra-industry trade in India’s top 10 products involving P&C trade: 2005-08 
 

























78439 1,249.1  89.0 78439 1,520.6  92.7 78439 1,838.9  99.4  78439  2,170.2  74.3 
75997 442.5  29.3  75997 401.1  24.9  79295 577.1  50.3 79295  1,295.0  73.3 
71392 349.0  86.4  71392 340.0  68.4  71392 481.7  72.5 77637  840.1  88.5 
72855 291.6  96.8  72855 328.8  86.0  76493 386.9  39.5 71392  741.0  84.6 
73591 151.2 95.4 76493 244.0 26.9 77637  337.8 88.5 77282 467.9 63.4 
77259 134.1  75.9  78537 229.0  83.2  72855 334.0  76.8 78434  380.9  95.9 
71391 124.5  62.1  77637 209.6  87.8  77282 282.3  48.7 76493  350.8  33.3 
77429 117.2  93.5  71391 194.7  80.8  71391 275.0  94.2 78537  318.6  92.7 
74291 111.8  57.5  77129 157.5  95.8  75997 247.0  18.2 72855  316.0  65.0 
77129 109.6  83.1  77259 154.4  67.4  72839 220.0  86.9 71391  303.4  88.7 
Source: Calculated from United Nations, 2010.  




Overview of India's preferential trade agreements, 2011 
 
Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) 
Parties  Bangladesh, China, India, Korea (Rep. of), Lao People's Democratic Republic and Sri Lanka 
Date of signature/entry into force  31.07.1975/17.06.1976
a 
Transition for full implementation  Immediately on implementation 
India's duty-free tariff lines (2009/10)  3.36% of the total
b 
Provisions concerning goods  Rules of origin, safeguards, balance-of-payment measures, and dispute settlement 
Trade in goods  Tariff concessions apply to 570 HS 6-digit tariff lines (margin of preferences: 5%-100%) Special 
concessions apply to 48 HS 6-digit tariff lines (margin of preferences: 14%-100%) for LDC members. 
The fourth round of negotiations aimed at widening the coverage of preferences to at least 40% of the 
tariff lines of each member State at an average margin of preference of 40%, was scheduled to be 
completed in October 2009 but has not been concluded yet 
India's merchandise trade (2009/10)  Imports from APTA: 13.9% of total; exports to APTA: 11% of total 
   of which preferential  Imports: .. 
WTO document series  L/4418 (GATT), BISD 25S/L4635 (GATT), WT/COMTD/N/22, and WT/COMTD/62 
South Asian Free-Trade Agreement (SAFTA) 
Parties  Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka 
Date of signature/entry into force  06.01.2004/01.06.2006 
Transition for full implementation  2013 
India's duty-free tariff lines (2009/10)  0.028% of the total
b 
Provisions concerning goods  Rules of origin, safeguards, balance-of-payment measures, general exceptions, and dispute settlement 
Trade in goods  Tariff reduction to 20% for non-LDC members by 2008 (30% for LDC members), followed by a 
reduction to 0%-5% by 2013 (by 2014 for Sri Lanka and by 2018 for LDC members). Tariff reduction to 
0%-5% on imports from LDC members by 2009. However, India granted duty-free access on imports 
from LDC members on 1 January 2008 (i.e., one year ahead of the tariff liberalization schedule). The 
base rate is the MFN tariff in force on 1 January 2006. India's sensitive list includes 744 products from 
LDC members and 865 products from non-LDC members
c 
India's merchandise trade (2009/10)  Imports from SAFTA: 0.5% of total; exports to SAFTA: 4.4% of total 
of which preferential  Imports .. 
WTO document series  WT/COMTD/N/26 
South Asian Preferential Trade Arrangement (SAPTA)
d 
Parties  Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka 
Date of signature/entry into force  11.04.1993/07.12.1995 
Transition for full implementation  On implementation 
India's duty-free tariff lines (2009/10)  0.028% of the total
b 
Provisions concerning goods  Balance-of-payment measures, dispute settlement, rules of origin, and safeguards 
Trade in goods  Tariff concessions apply to 2,565 HS 6-digit tariff lines (margin of preferences: 10%-90% for non-LDC 
members and 10%-100% for LDC members) 
India's merchandise trade (2009/10)  Imports from SAPTA: 0.5% of total; exports to SAPTA: 4.4% of total 
of which preferential  Imports: .. 
WTO document series  WT/COMTD/10 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
Parties  India and Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, 
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam 
Date of signature/entry into force  13.08.2009/01.01.2010
e 
Transition for full implementation  31.12.2019  
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India's duty-free tariff lines (2009/10)  1.13% of the total
b 
Provisions concerning goods  Rules of origin, dispute settlement, safeguards, balance-of-payment measures, customs-related 
measures, exceptions (general and for security) and dispute settlement 
Trade in goods  Tariff concessions apply to 12,169 HS 8-digit tariff lines. For “normal track” products, applied MFN 
rates will be reduced and subsequently eliminated by end-December 2013 (7,775 HS 8-digit tariff lines) 
and by end-December 2016 (1,252 HS 8-digit tariff lines). For “sensitive track” products (1,805 HS 
8-digit tariff lines), applied MFN rates higher than 5% will be reduced to 5% by end-December 2016. 
For special products,
f applied MFN rates will be reduced from 70%-100% to 37.5%-50% by end-
December 2019. For “highly sensitive” products, MFN applied rates will be reduced to 50% for 
category I products (nine HS 8-digit tariff lines), 45% for category II products (30 HS 8-digit tariff 
lines), and 37.5% for category III products (one HS 8-digit tariff line) by end-December 2019. The 
exclusion list (1,297 HS 8-digit tariff lines) must be reviewed annually 
India's merchandise trade (2009/10)  Imports from ASEAN: 8.9% of total; exports to ASEAN: 10.1% of total 
of which preferential  Imports: .. 
WTO document series  WT/COMTD/N/35 
MERCOSUR 
Parties  India and Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay 
Date of signature/entry into force  25.01.2004/01.06.2009 
Transition for full implementation  Immediate on implementation 
India's duty-free tariff lines (2009/10)  0.25% of the total
b 
Provisions concerning goods  Rules of origin, safeguards, and dispute settlement 
Trade in goods  450 HS 8-digit tariff lines are granted tariff concessions (margin of preferences: 10%, 20% or 100%) 
India's merchandise trade (2009/10)  Imports from MERCOSUR: 1.4% of total; exports to MERCOSUR: 1.5% of total 
of which preferential  Imports: .. 
WTO document series  WT/COMTD/N/31 
India-Afghanistan 
Parties India  and  Afghanistan 
Date of signature/entry into force  06.03.2003/13.05.2003 
Transition for full implementation  Immediately on implementation 
India's duty-free tariff lines (2009/10)  Nil
b 
Provisions concerning goods  Rules of origin, safeguards, balance-of-payment measures, state trading, dispute settlement, general 
exceptions, safeguards, and national treatment 
Trade in goods  Tariff reductions apply to 38 HS 6-digit tariff lines. Margin of preferences is 50% or 100% of the MFN 
tariff in force as of 13 May 2003 
India's merchandise trade (2009/10)  Imports from Afghanistan: 0.04% of total; exports to Afghanistan: 0.3% of total 
of which preferential  Imports: .. 
WTO document series  WT/COMTD/N/32 
India-Bhutan 
Parties India  and  Bhutan 
Date of signature/entry into force  28.07.2006/29.07.2006 
Transition for full implementation  Immediate 
India's duty-free tariff lines (2009/10)  Negligible
b 
Provisions concerning goods  Safeguards and customs-related measures 
Trade in goods  Tariff exemptions on all goods imported from Bhutan. No restrictions on Bhutan's trade with third 
countries. Non-tariff restrictions may be imposed on imports of third countries from Bhutan. Annual 
refund of excise duties. Bhutan-flagged vessels operating to and from Indian ports are given equal 
treatment than granted to vessels from other foreign country 
India's merchandise trade (2009/10)  Imports from Bhutan: 0.1% of total; exports to Bhutan: 0.1% of total 
of which preferential  Imports: .. 




Parties India  and  Chile 
Date of signature/entry into force  08.03.2006/17.08.2007
g 
Transition for full implementation  Immediately on implementation 
India's duty-free tariff lines (2009/10)  0.004% of the total 
Provisions concerning goods  Anti-dumping and countervailing measures, customs-related measures, dispute settlement, general 
exceptions, import/export restrictions, rules of origin, safeguards, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, 
national treatment, state trading, agriculture export subsidies, and technical barriers to trade 
Trade in goods  Tariff preferences apply to 178 HS 8-digit tariff lines (margin of preferences: 10%-50%) 
India's merchandise trade (2009/10)  Imports from Chile: 0.4% of total; exports to Chile: 0.2% of total 
of which preferential  Imports: .. 
WTO document series  WT/COMTD/N/30, WT/COMTD/RTA/M/3, and WT/COMTD/RTA/4 
India-Korea (Rep. of) 
Parties  India and Republic of Korea 
Date of signature/entry into force  07.08.2009/01.01.2010 
Transition for full implementation  2019 
India's duty-free tariff lines (2009/10)  0.32% of the total
b 
Provisions concerning goods  Rules of origin, customs-related measures, anti-dumping and countervailing measures, safeguards, 
technical regulations, exceptions (general and for security), state trading, non-tariff measures, and 
sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
Trade in goods  E-0 group of products (460 HS 8-digit tariff lines) have been free of duty since 1 January 2010. Phased 
elimination of duty for E-5 group of products (448 HS 8-digit tariff lines) by 2014. Phased elimination of 
duty for E-8 group of products (7,248 HS 8-digit tariff lines) by 2017. Phased reduction of duty to 
0%-5% for RES products (941 HS 8-digit tariff lines) by 2017. Phased reduction of duty to 50% for SEN 
products (704 HS 8-digit tariff lines) by 2019. Exemption of tariff reduction or elimination applies to 
1,895 HS 8-digit tariff lines. The base rate is the MFN duty in force as of 1 April 2006 
Provision concerning services  Yes 
India's merchandise trade (2009/10)  Imports from the Republic of Korea: 3.0% of total; exports to Republic of Korea: 1.9% of total 
of which preferential  Imports: .. 
India's commercial services trade 
(2009/10) 
.. 
WTO document series  WT/REG286/N/1 and S/C/N/558, and WT/COMTD/N/36 and S/C/N/570 
India-Nepal 
Parties India  and  Nepal 
Date of signature/entry into force  27.10.2009/27.10.2009 
Transition for full implementation  Immediate on implementation 
India's duty-free tariff lines (2009/10)  0.002% of the total
b 
Provisions concerning goods  Rules of origin and safeguards 
Trade in goods  Tariff exemptions for all goods. Imports of vegetable fats, copper products, acrylic yarn, and zinc oxide 
are subject to annual quotas. Imports of alcoholic liquors/beverages (except industrial spirits),
h perfumes, 
and cosmetics with non-Nepalese/non-Indian brand names, and cigarettes and tobacco are not allowed 
preferential entry into India 
India's merchandise trade (2009/10)  Imports from Nepal: 0.2% of total; exports to Nepal: 0.9% of total 
of which preferential  Imports: .. 
WTO document series  WT/COMTD/N/34 
India-Singapore 
Parties India  and  Singapore 
Date of signature/entry into force  29.06.2005/01.08.2005 
Transition for full implementation  01.12.2015 
India's duty-free tariff lines (2009/10)  .. 
Provisions concerning goods  Rules of origin, customs-related measures, safeguards, standards and technical regulations, sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures, and dispute settlement  
 
196
Trade in goods  506 HS 8-digit tariff lines have been granted duty-free access since 1 August 2005. Phased elimination 
of duty for 2,202 HS 8-digit tariff lines by 1 April 2009. Phased reduction of duty for 2,407 HS 8-digit 
tariff lines by 1 April 2009. Some 6,550 HS 8-digit tariff lines are excluded from duty reductions 
Provision concerning services  Yes 
Other provisions  Investment and government procurement 
India's merchandise trade (2009/10)  Imports from Singapore: 2.2% of total; exports to Singapore: 4.2% of total 
of which preferential  Imports: 0.58% of total during 2009-10 
India's commercial services trade 
(2009/10) 
.. 
WTO document series  WT/REG228/N/1 and S/C/N/393, WT/REG228/2, WT/REG228/1/Rev.1, WT/REG228/3, and 
WT/REG228/M/1 
India-Sri Lanka 
Parties  India and Sri Lanka 
Date of signature/entry into force  28.12.1998/15.12.2001 
Transition for full implementation  18.03.2003 
India's duty-free tariff lines (2009/10)  0.001% of the total
b 
Provisions concerning goods  General exceptions, national treatment, state trading, rules of origin, safeguards, balance-of-payment 
measures, disputes settlement, and rules of origin 
Trade in goods  As of 18 March 2003, all tariff lines (except those in the negative list and those under tariff rate quotas) 
have been free of duty. India's negative list comprises 429 tariff lines. Tariff concessions on textiles are 
restricted to 25% below the MFN rate; although textiles under HS chapters 61-62 remain in India's 
negative list, an annual quota of 8 million pieces is offered a 75% tariff concession on a fixed basis.
i 
Tariff quota also applies to tea: a 50% tariff concession on a fixed basis is offered, subject to an annual 
quota of 15 million kg 
India's merchandise trade (2009/10)  Imports from Sri Lanka: 0.1% of total; exports to Sri Lanka: 1.2% of total 
of which preferential  Imports: .. 
WTO document series  WT/COMTD/N/16 
India-Japan   
Date of signature/entry into force  16.02.2011/.. 
Transition for full implementation  Within 10 years from the date of implementation 
India's duty-free tariff lines (2009/10)  0.25% of the total
b 
Provisions concerning goods  Customs-related measures, export subsidies, import/export restrictions, safeguards, anti-dumping 
measures, balance-of-payment measures, and rules of origin 
Trade in goods  For category A products (1,378 HS 8-digit tariff lines), customs duties are to be eliminated as from the 
date of entry into force of the agreement. For category B5 products (509 HS 8-digit tariff lines), customs 
duties are to be eliminated in six equal annual installments from the base rate to free. For category B7 
products (two HS 8-digit tariff lines), customs duties are to be eliminated in eight equal annual 
instalments from the base rate to free. For category B10 products (7,151 HS 8-digit tariff lines), customs 
duties are to be eliminated in 11 equal annual instalments from the base rate to free. For gearboxes and 
diesel engines of a capacity exceeding 250 cc (two HS 8-digit tariff lines), customs duties are to be 
reduced to 6.25% and 5%, respectively, by 1 January 2019. Category X products (1,535 HS 8-digit tariff 
lines) are to be excluded from any customs reduction or elimination 
Provision concerning services  Yes 
Other provisions  Investment, intellectual property, government procurement, and competition 
India's merchandise trade (2009/10)  Imports from Japan: 2.3% of total; exports to Japan: 2% of total 
of which preferential  Imports: .. 
India's commercial services trade 
(2009/10) 
.. 
WTO document series  Not notified to the WTO 
India-Malaysia  
Parties India  and  Malaysia 
Date of signature/entry into force  18.02.2011/01.07.2011 
Transition for full implementation  31.12.2019 




Provisions concerning goods  Rules of origin, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to trade, trade remedies, general 
exceptions, and customs-related measures 
Trade in goods  For “normal track” products: (a) applied MFN rate will be reduced and subsequently eliminated for 
7,747 HS 8-digit tariff lines by end-September 2013 and for 1,270 HS 8-digit tariff lines by end-
June 2016; and (b) tariff lines that bear a zero-rated duty cannot be changed (402 HS 8-digit tariff lines). 
For “sensitive track” products, applied MFN rates higher than 5% will be reduced to 5% by end-
June 2016. For special products,
j the applied MFN rates will be reduced from 80%-100% to 37.5%-50% 
by end-December 2019. For “highly sensitive” products, MFN applied rates will be reduced to 50% and 
45% for category I and II products, respectively, (42 HS 8-digit tariff lines) and to 37.5% for category III 
products (one HS 8-digit tariff line) by end-December 2019. For “special track” products,
k the applied 
MFN rate will be reduced from 30% to 5%-10% by end-December 2016. The exclusion list (1,224 HS 8-
digit tariff lines) must be reviewed annually 
Provision concerning services  Yes 
Other provisions  Dispute settlement and investment 
India's merchandise trade (2009/10)  Imports from Malaysia: 1.6% of total; exports to Malaysia: 1.8% of total 
of which preferential  Imports: .. 
India's commercial services trade 
(2009/10) 
.. 
WTO document series  Not notified to the WTO 
India-Thailand 
Parties India  and Thailand 
Date of signature/entry into force  09.10.2003/01.09.2004 
Transition for full implementation  17 rounds of negotiations have been held. The free-trade agreement is expected to be concluded during 
2011 
India's duty-free tariff lines (2009/10)  0.09% of the total
b 
Provisions concerning goods  Rules of origin, general exceptions, and dispute settlement 
Trade in goods  Duty-free access for 82 HS 6-digit tariff lines since March 2006 
Provision concerning services  Yes 
Other provisions  Investment, dispute settlement, and trade facilitation 
India's merchandise trade (2009/10)  Imports from Thailand: 1% of total; exports to Thailand: 1% of total 
of which preferential  Imports:  
India's commercial services trade 
(2009/10) 
.. 
WTO document series  Not notified to the WTO 
GSTP 
Parties (as notified)  Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, 
Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, 
India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Rep. of), Iraq, Korea (Rep. of), Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Macedonia 
(FYR), Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Pluri-national State of Bolivia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Tunisia, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe 
Date of signature/entry into force  13.04.1988/19.04.1989 
Transition for full implementation  On implementation 
India's duty-free tariff lines (2009/10)  .. 
Provisions concerning goods  Rules of origin, balance-of-payment measures, safeguards and dispute settlement 
Trade in goods  Tariff concessions on 53 HS 6-digit tariff lines (margin of preferences: 10%-30%). A 50% tariff 
concession applies to three tariff lines for imports from LDC members only (Bangladesh, Benin, Guinea, 
Haiti, Mozambique, Sudan, and Tanzania) 
India's merchandise trade (2009/10)  Imports from GSTP: 26.5% of total; exports to GSTP: 23.4% of total 
of which preferential  Imports: .. 
WTO document series  L/6564 (GATT) 
Source: WTO Trade Policy Review India, WT/TPR/S/249, September 2011. 
.. = Not available.  
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a  APTA was formerly known as the Bangkok Agreement. The amended agreement entered into force on 
1 September 2006. 
b Information provided by the Indian authorities. 
c India has offered Bangladesh market access for 8 million pieces of garments, which are on India's sensitive list, 
without any sourcing condition. 
d  SAPTA was superseded by SAFTA. However, concessions granted under SAPTA remain in force for the 
contracting parties until the SAFTA trade liberalization programme is completed by 2014 (SAFTA Agreement, 
Article 22). 
e  The agreement entered into force on 1  January  2010 for India, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, and on 
1 June 2010 for Myanmar and Viet Nam. For the remaining parties, entry into force is in accordance with Article 23 
of the Agreement (i.e., mutually agreed date). 
f  India's special products are crude and refined palm oil, coffee, black tea and pepper. 
g The Agreement effectively entered into force in India on 11 September 2007. 
h Nepalese beers can be imported on payment of the applicable liquor excise duty equal to the effective excise duty as 
levied on Indian beers. 
i Of which 6 million pieces will be extended the concession only if made of Indian fabric, provided that no category 
of garments exceeds 1.5 million pieces per year. 
j India's special products are crude palm oil, refined palm oil, palm kernel oil, palm kernel oil and its fractions, 
margarine of vegetable origin, coffee, black tea and pepper. 
k India’s “special track” products include pineapples and bird eggs (HS 0407.00.10, 0407.00.20 and 0407.00.90). 
 
 
 